Opinion
CV 24-4336-CBM-ASx
07-25-2024
GUSTAVO VERGARA, Plaintiff, v. C.R. LAURENCE, CO., et al., Defendants.
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [19] [JS-6]
CONSUELO B. MARSHALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The matter before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (Dkt. No. 19 (the “Motion”).) After the matter was fully briefed, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition to remand. (Dkt. No. 29.)
I. BACKGROUND
On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff Gustavo Vergara filed a complaint against Defendants in state court (Vergara v. C.R. Laurence Co. et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 24STCV05056), asserting the following seven causes of action: (1) discrimination, including discriminatory discharge, based on ancestry, national origin and/or immigration status under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) discrimination, including discriminatory discharge, based on age under FEHA; (3) harassment and/or hostile work environment based on ancestry, national origin and/or immigration status under FEHA; (4) retaliation, including retaliatory discharge based on actual or perceived participation in protected activities under FEHA; (5) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation under FEHA and 2 C.C.R. § 11023; (6) aiding, abetting, and/or inciting violations of FEHA; and (7) retaliatory unfair immigration-related practices under Cal. Lab. Code § 1019(d)(1). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On May 24, 2024, Defendants timely removed the action based on federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.) On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed the instant Motion to Remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (Dkt. No. 19.)
II. STATEMENT OF THE LAW
“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The general rule, referred to as the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' is that a civil action arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the complaint.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). However, complete preemption is “an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 686 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 905). Moreover, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists for a small category of state law claims which “necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities” (hereinafter, the “Grable doctrine”). Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); see also City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904. There is a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction,” and “the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants removed this action based on references in the Complaint to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) with respect to Plaintiff's seventh cause of action for retaliatory unfair immigration-related practices under Cal. Lab. Code § 1019(d)(1). (See Compl. ¶¶ 88-90.)
The Court finds Plaintiff's claim under Cal. Lab. Code § 1019(d)(1) does not necessarily raise a substantial federal issue demonstrating Plaintiff's state claim arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Hernandez v. C.R. Laurence Co. et al. (24-cv-3904-CBM-MAR) (Dkt. No. 22); Grable, 545 U.S. at 314; City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904; Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042. The Court further finds 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is not a complete preemption statute because the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is not so broad as to entirely preempt any state law claim. Nor does 8 U.S.C. § 1324a preempted Plaintiff's Cal. Lab. Code § 1019(d)(1) claim because it does not provide a substitute cause of action for Plaintiff's state claim. Therefore, complete preemption under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a cannot be a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See Saldana, 27 F.4th at 686; Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co., 59 Cal.4th 407, 421, 416-17 (2014). Accordingly, Defendants' removal of this action based on 8 U.S.C. § 1324a was improper. See Easton v. Crossland Mortg. Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he mere reference of a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists.”).
A. Fees and Costs
Plaintiff requests an award for fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). However, Cal. Lab. Code § 1019 makes specific reference to a federal statute (8 U.S.C. § 1324a), and the parties do not cite any decisions regarding remand of a case asserting a claim under Cal. Lab. Code § 1019 based on lack of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues although there is no prior case law cited by the parties regarding improper removal and remand of a case involving Cal. Lab. Code § 1019, Defendants had the benefit of the Court's order remanding the action in Hernandez v. C.R. Laurence Co. et al. (24-cv-3904-CBM-MAR) (Dkt. No. 22). However, the Court's remand order in Hernandez v. C.R. Laurence Co. et al. was entered on July 5, 2024, whereas Defendants removed the instant action on May 9, 2024. Therefore, Defendants did not have the benefit of the Court's remand order remanding in Hernandez v. C.R. Laurence Co. et al. at the time Defendants removed this action. The Court thus finds an award of fees and costs is not warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); see also Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and remands this action to state court. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's request for fees and costs incurred as result of the removal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.