]" ( Id., at p. 876.) In support of their assertion that a jury cannot disregard the valuation testimony presented at trial, Ransbottom and the Marshalls also cite County of Los Angeles v. Kling (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 916, 923 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 642]; Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653]; Redevelopment Agency v. Modell (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 321, 326-327 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 245]; and People ex rel. D. of P. Wks. v. McCullough (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 101, 105 [ 223 P.2d 37]. The language in the Aetna case stressed by Ransbottom and the Marshalls was stated in the context of the granting of a motion for a directed verdict.

The applicable law governing severance damages is not favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff relies on Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653], for the proposition that "[s]everance damages must be based upon real physical disturbance of a property right and a decrease in market value of the property rather than upon remote possibilities which are highly speculative and conjectural." Neither this case nor this proposition supports plaintiff's assertion in the instant situation.

This contention must likewise fail. While loss of profits from a business is not compensable as an element of damage in eminent domain ( Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653]), evidence of economic feasibility of a claimed highest and best use of the property bears upon market value and is, therefore, admissible (see San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Sweet, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d 889, 899). "[T]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not as the measure of value, but to the extent that the prospect of such use affects the market value of the land; . . ." ( People v. Ocean Shore Railroad, 32 Cal.2d 406, 425-426 [ 196 P.2d 570, 6 A.L.R.2d 1179]; accord People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Flintkote Co., 264 Cal.App.2d 97, 102 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 27].)

Defendant's search for "exceptions" to the general rule denying compensation for loss of business goodwill next leads him to make reference to various instances in which evidence of lost business profits is taken into account in making an award for government taking or damage. He points out that such evidence may be considered in certain cases of inverse condemnation in arriving at the difference between the value of the real property before and after the injury (see Natural Soda Prod. Co. v. City of L.A. (1943) 23 Cal.2d 193, 199-201 [ 143 P.2d 12]; Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 5 Cal.2d 525, 542-543 [ 55 P.2d 850]; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 367 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 357]); that it may likewise be regarded in cases of severance damage in order to determine whether and how the value of the remainder for its immediate highest and best use has been affected (see Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002-1003 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653], and cases there cited; People ex rel. Dept. Public Works v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp. (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 309, 319-320 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 902]); that it may also be considered in cases involving a temporary taking (see KimballLaundry Co. v. U.S. (1949) 338 U.S. 1, 8-21 [93 L.Ed. 1765, 1773-1780, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 7 A.L.R.2d 1280]); and, finally, that it is taken into account in determining the capitalized value of a leasehold interest in condemned realty (see Evid. Code, §§ 817, 819). We are again at a loss, however, to understand how these rules may be considered "exceptions" to the rule here challenged.

For example, under appropriate circumstances severance damages may be recovered for loss of access, ingress or egress (see People ex rel. Dept.Pub. Wks. v. Ramos, 1 Cal.3d 261 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 792, 460 P.2d 992]; Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713 [ 123 P.2d 505]), impaired visibility to and from the highway ( People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 399, 404 [ 144 P.2d 799]), loss of view ( Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State of California, 70 Cal.2d 282, 294-295 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 521, 449 P.2d 737]), limited use to which remaining property could be put (see Pacific Gas Elec.Co. v. Hufford, 49 Cal.2d 545 [ 319 P.2d 1033]; San BernardinoCounty Flood Control Dist. v. Sweet, 255 Cal.App.2d 889, 902 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 640]), loss of a citrus grove windbreak ( Ventura CountyFlood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1000-1001 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653]), increased flood hazard ( Colusa Hamilton R.R. Co. v. Leonard, 176 Cal. 109 [ 167 P. 878]), and even increased aircraft noise resulting from the acquisition of private airspace (see City of Oakland v. Nutter, 13 Cal.App.3d 752 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 347]). (1) In the instant case, the imposition of an assessment lien upon defendant's property was not the direct result of the taking of an easement or construction of an improvement upon that property.

"Where it appears that the opinion of a valuation witness is based upon considerations which are proper as well as those which are not, the testimony may be admitted and the trier of fact shall determine its weight and credibility." ( Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653].) In eminent domain actions, "`all issues except the sole issue relating to compensation . . . are to be tried by the court.'"

Judge Wade simply found that the damages must be measured by the diminution in value caused by the cutting of the trees, rather than the cost of replacement. (See Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1001 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653].) Although Judge Wade later found that the loss of trees had no effect on the value of the remainder, the court did not contradict Judge Ludvigsen's decision by excluding evidence of the cost of replacement.

(Cf. Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004 ["Where it appears that the opinion of a valuation witness is based upon considerations which are proper as well as those which are not, the testimony may be admitted and the trier of fact shall determine its weight"]; County Sanitation Dist. v. Watson Land Co., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282; Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1522-1523; South Bay Irr. Dist. v. California-American Water Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 984; San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Sweet (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 889, 902.)

[Citations.] It has frequently been held that loss of business, profits, goodwill or future income is not compensable. [Citations.] Nonetheless, the reduction in probable income from the operation of the lemon grove as a result of the taking would be considered by a prospective purchaser in determining the fair market value and the price he would be willing to pay, and it therefore constitutes an acceptable reason for the opinion of severance damage asserted by defendant's appraiser." ( Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653] .)(1c) Notwithstanding the long-standing antipathy for speculative damages as an improper element of severance damages (see historical review in City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 747-749), courts have acknowledged the present value of property may reflect its development potential. (See People v. Ocean Shore Railroad (1948) 32 Cal.2d 406, 425-426 [ 196 P.2d 570, 6 A.L.R.2d 1179]; City of San Diego v. Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 756.)

(9) Severance damages must be based upon real physical disturbance of a property right and a decrease in market value of the property rather than upon remote possibilities which are highly speculative and conjectural. ( Ventura County Flood Control Dist. v. Security First Nat. Bank (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 996, 1002 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 653].) Genewick's opinion as to severance damages suffers from the same flaws as described previously in this opinion.