Opinion
2d Juv. No. B304494
08-18-2020
In re G.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. VENTURA COUNTY PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.H., Defendant and Appellant.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. J072072)
(Ventura County)
S.H. appeals the judgment entered after the juvenile court denied appellant's petition for services (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388) and terminated parental rights with respect to her 10-month-old son, G.H. (§ 366.26.) We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. --------
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant, a chronic heroin and methamphetamine user, lost custody of two older children before G.H was born in 2019. Two days after G.H.'s birth, Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) detained the infant and filed an amended petition for failure to protect and sibling abuse. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (j).) Appellant had a long history of substance abuse and mental health issues (depression and anxiety), and could not care for or protect the infant. The petition alleged that appellant and the biological father lost custody of two older children based on substance abuse, unsafe home conditions, domestic violence, and criminal conduct. When the siblings were detained, appellant had syringes filled with heroin, drug paraphernalia, and firearms laying about the house.
Little changed after G.H. was born and placed in protective custody. The trial court sustained the petition, by-passed reunification services (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(13), and set the matter for a permanent planning hearing (§ 366.26). Before the section 366.26 hearing, appellant filed a petition for services (§ 388), alleging that she enrolled in a drug rehabilitation program while pregnant with G.H, completed three levels of parenting classes, was in therapy, and was taking medication to treat her depression and anxiety. Denying the petition, the trial court found that appellant had "done a lot of good work to address her substance abuse problems" but was still on the road to recovery and had not shown it would be in G.H.'s best interest to delay the permanency planning hearing. At the section 366.26 hearing, the trial court found that G.H. was adoptable and terminated parental rights.
388 Petition for Services
Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying her section 388 petition. We review for abuse of discretion. (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) To prevail on the petition, the parent must show a change of circumstances and that modification of the existing order would be in the best interest of the child. (Ibid.) It is a daunting task because denial of a section 388 petition rarely merits reversal as an abuse of discretion. (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685-686.) "After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' . . . . [Citation.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
The trial court reasonably concluded that ordering services was not in G.H.'s best interest because there was no change of circumstances. Appellant was still trying to address her 20+ year substance abuse problem and on-going mental health issues. Appellant took drugs during her pregnancy with G.H. and continued taking drugs after he was removed. When appellant filed the section 388 petition for services, county mental health reported that appellant suffered from severe opioid use disorder, and a moderate amphetamine-type substance use disorder, and that both were in early remission. Appellant's goal was "[t]o get completely off" Suboxone, a medication for heroin addiction, but was still taking the medication. Appellant suffered drug relapses in the past and tried to downplay the same substance abuse problems that resulted in the removal of the two older siblings. Appellant, however, continued to abuse drugs, even after G.H. was removed. Before the 366.26 hearing, appellant tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2019, missed a drug test in July 2019, stopped testing in August and September 2019, tested once in October 2019, and tested positive for methamphetamine when HSA conducted an on-demand test.
The evidence clearly shows that appellant is still addressing a long term substance abuse problem and cannot provide a stable home for the infant. (See, e.g., In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 200; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 48-49 [nine months of sobriety insufficient to warrant section 388 modification]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [seven months of sobriety since relapse, "while commendable, was nothing new"]; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463 [parent's sobriety very brief compared to many years of addiction].) Renewed attempts to facilitate reunification are not in the child's best interests where, as here, the parent is a chronic drug user and has relapsed after prior treatment. (In re Levi U., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 200.)
The trial court was concerned about appellant's relationship with the biological father, a substance abuse user and enabler. Appellant remained in contact with father, allowed him to stay at her apartment and use her cell phone, and asked if he go with her to supervised visits. Before the section 366.26 hearing, appellant told family members she would not sever her relationship with father because "'he's part of the family. . . . [H]e just needs to get right and be with the lord and stay clean . . . I'm proud of him.'"
Appellant's reliance on In re J.C. (20104) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 is misplaced. There, mother was drug free and sober for 18 months, completed parenting classes, was mentally healthy and employed, had a savings accounts, and enjoyed unmonitored visits that grew into overnight visits. (Id. at p. 519.) Mother was closely bonded to the child, had assumed a parental role with the child, and made a prima facie showing that modification of the dependency order was in the child's best interest. (Id. at p. 526.)
That type of best interest determination can not be made here. The only stable and permanent home G.H. has known has been with the paternal aunt and her partner. G.H. is bonded to the paternal aunt who is eager to adopt so that G.H. can live in the same household with his two older siblings.
The trial court reasonably concluded that ordering services in the hope that appellant could stay clean and sober would be detrimental to G.H. and undermine the permanency and stability of an adoptive home that the infant so badly needs. Childhood is fleeting and does not "wait until the[] parents grow up." (In re Rikki D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1632, disapproved on other grounds in In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624.)
Disposition
The judgment (order denying section 388 petition and section 366.26 order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J. We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
TANGEMAN, J.
Tari L. Cody, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leroy Smith, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.