Id. at 573. We first engaged in a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance Co., 405 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1987). Id. at 814 (observing that "[t]he rule has been sparingly applied in other jurisdictions and only alluded to in our own"). There, we observed that judicial estoppel is a "commonsense doctrine" that "prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding."
The doctrine [of judicial estoppel] `prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding.'" Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Group, 666 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987)); see Duder v. Shanks, 689 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Iowa 2004) (same); State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Iowa 2000) (same). The doctrine is a rule based on a common sense rule "designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing deliberately inconsistent — and potentially misleading — assertions from being successfully urged in succeeding tribunals."
The doctrine aims "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing intentional inconsistency." Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. , 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987). Further, it "addresses the incongruity of allowing a party to assert a position in one tribunal and the opposite in another, thereby creating the perception that at least one court has been misled."
Elmer and SSFI cite two cases that they claim would have made Polking realize, had he read them, that he could not assert an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. Those cases are Graber v. Iowa Dist. Court, 410 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1987) and Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1987). We agree with the district court and Polking that these two cases do not support Elmer's and SSFI's contention that the fraud action was not warranted by existing law.
Judicial estoppel is a " ‘commonsense doctrine’ that ‘prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding.’ " Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund , 740 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co. , 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987) ). "The doctrine is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing intentional inconsistency. It addresses the incongruity of allowing a party to assert a position in one tribunal and the opposite in another, thereby creating the perception that at least one court has been misled." Vennerberg Farms , 405 N.W.2d at 814.
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (alteration omitted) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)). However, Iowa courts have recognized that: (1) the positions taken must be inconsistent to a degree that creates "the perception that at least one court has been misled," Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund, 740 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Insurance Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987)); (2) there must have been "judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position" in the prior proceeding, Id. (quoting Vennerberg Farms, 405 N.W.2d at 814); and (3) the party invoking the doctrine must be prejudiced by its opponent's assertion of the inconsistent positions, Winnebago Indus., 727 N.W.2d at 573 (quoting Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 666 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa 2003)). Accord New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51.
(quoting Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Iowa 2006)); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund, 740 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2007) ("[J]udicial estoppel is a 'commonsense doctrine' that 'prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding.'"(quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987))). Although
The Iowa Supreme Court has described it as a “commonsense doctrine” that “prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding.” Vennerberg Farms v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987). Success is generally a pre-requisite for applying the doctrine because “[a]bsent judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position, application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk of inconsistent, misleading results exists.”
The doctrine is "designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process." Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Hedlund , 740 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. , 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987) ). In Winnebago Industries, Inc. v. Haverly , we discussed judicial estoppel at length, finding that it barred an employer from taking inconsistent positions at different stages of the same proceeding.
The doctrine "prohibits a party who has successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987). It is a "common sense" rule, designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing deliberately inconsistent-and potentially misleading-assertions from being successfully urged in succeeding tribunals. Id. The doctrine is properly limited in its application to cases involving privity with, or prejudice to, the party invoking the doctrine.