Opinion
December 5, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Cusick, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
The plaintiff Robert Vencius was assigned by his employer to perform work on a barge owned by the defendant. Vencius was allegedly injured while disembarking from the vessel via a ladder. After a trial on the issue of liability only, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict, contending that they had been precluded by the trial court from proving that the shipyard employment regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (hereinafter OSHA) (see, 29 C.F.R. § 1915 et seq.) applied to the defendant's conduct.
By their terms, however, the responsibility for compliance with the OSHA regulations lies with the employer, and not with the owner of the vessel (see, 29 C.F.R. § 1915.3). It is undisputed that the defendant was neither Vencius's employer nor acting as Vencius's employer (see, 29 C.F.R. § 1915.4). The Supreme Court therefore properly concluded that the OSHA regulations in question did not apply to the defendant (see, Stockstill v Gypsum Transp., 607 F.2d 1112, cert denied 451 U.S. 969; Brown v Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331; Gallardo v Westfal-Larsen Co., 435 F. Supp. 484).
In light of our determination, we need not address the plaintiffs' remaining contentions. Copertino, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.