Opinion
# 2019-038-102 Claim No. 123311
01-16-2019
JOHN VELEZ v. STATE OF NEW YORK
JOHN VELEZ, Pro se LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Stephen Barry, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim for wrongful confinement dismissed after trial. Despite administrative reversal of hearing officer's finding of guilt, claimant did not prove that his confinement was not privileged or that he was not timely released from confinement after the administrative reversal.
Case information
| UID: | 2019-038-102 |
| Claimant(s): | JOHN VELEZ |
| Claimant short name: | VELEZ |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 123311 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | W. BROOKS DeBOW |
| Claimant's attorney: | JOHN VELEZ, Pro se |
| Defendant's attorney: | LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State of New York By: Stephen Barry, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | January 16, 2019 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an individual incarcerated in a State correctional facility, filed this claim alleging that he was wrongfully confined at Green Haven Correctional Facility (CF) for 113 days, ending on August 27, 2013. The trial of this claim was conducted by videoconference on November 29, 2018, with the parties appearing at Green Haven CF in Stormville, New York and the Court sitting in Albany, New York. Claimant, whose native language is Spanish, presented his testimony through a duly sworn interpreter; defendant called no witnesses. Neither party offered any exhibits; the filed claim was received in evidence as Court Exhibit 1. After listening to claimant testify and observing his demeanor as he did so, and upon consideration of that evidence and the applicable law, the Court concludes that claimant has failed to prove defendant's liability.
FACTS
At trial, claimant gave brief, unfocused and somewhat confusing testimony about the particulars of the claim. Claimant testified that on or about December 27, 2013, he was called out by corrections personnel at Green Haven CF and was given a urine test. Claimant testified that approximately four days later he was given a disciplinary ticket and told by correction officers that he would be punished, to which he told them that it was "past the date" and that he was "clean." Claimant testified that another inmate named "Eddie" assisted him in reading the disciplinary ticket and he discovered that it was not he but another inmate who was named in the ticket. Claimant testified that he was given punishment for the ticket, including four months in his cell, as well as no packages, commissary or phone privileges for four months. Claimant testified that he appealed the punishment, that his punishment was overturned, and that the appeal was received one day before the four month expiration of his punishment, and he was released from confinement.
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are to the audio recording of the trial of this claim. --------
The claim alleges that on May 8, 2013 claimant was issued a "knowingly false and defective misbehavior report . . . at Greenhaven [sic] CF alleging that [he] used drugs in violation of defendant's rules" (Court Exhibit 1, Statement of Facts, ¶ 1). The claim alleges that the hearing officer found claimant guilty, "contrary to the Urinalysis Procedure Form containing an incomplete name; a prisoner identification number that was not [his]; and that the Request for Urine Test Form was doctored repeatedly" (id., ¶ 2). The claim alleges that the hearing officer knowingly, willfully and voluntarily failed to protect claimant's statutory, regulatory and due process rights, and sentenced claimant to 120 days of cell confinement, 120 days loss of phones, commissary and packages, and loss of good time, which extended his sentence (id., ¶¶ 3-4). The claim alleges that claimant appealed the hearing officer's decision, which was administratively reversed and expunged on August 21, 2013 and that claimant was not informed of the administrative reversal until August 27, 2013, and that claimant was wrongfully confined for an additional seven days (id., ¶ 5). The claim seeks compensation for 113 days of wrongful confinement (id., ¶ 6).
DISCUSSION
The elements of a cause of action for unlawful confinement are "that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975] cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). As an initial matter, it bears noting that while portions of claimant's testimony were consistent with the allegations in the claim, it differed in several respects. Specifically, claimant testified that he was given a disciplinary ticket in December 2013 while the claim alleged that he was issued a misbehavior report in May 2013. Further, absent from claimant's testimony was any mention of irregularities in the documents that were used by the hearing officer to find him guilty, or that he was kept confined after the hearing officer's determination was reversed and expunged. However, notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the first three elements of the unlawful confinement cause of action are clearly established by the uncontroverted evidence that claimant was confined in his cell and denied privileges until his release, and that he was aware of and did not consent to the confinement. Thus, defendant's liability for claimant's confinement turns upon whether the confinement was privileged.
The confinement of an inmate is privileged if it was accomplished in accordance with Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) regulations (see Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d 305, 307 [3d Dept 1986]; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]). Where defendant's "employees act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations (Correction Law §§ 112, 137; 7 NYCRR parts 250-254), their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]). Such immunity does not attach, however, where there has been a violation of an inmate's right to due process (see id., at 221).
At trial, claimant essentially argued that he was innocent of the disciplinary charges, and he did not specifically argue that defendant's agents violated DOCCS regulations or his due process rights. As decisional law makes abundantly clear, reversal of a finding of guilt of inmate misbehavior on the ground that the charges lacked evidentiary support is not sufficient to sustain a finding that the confinement was not privileged. Rather, claimant must prove that defendant's agents failed to comply with DOCCS regulations and violated claimant's due process rights. Although claimant testified that his disciplinary proceeding was administratively reversed, he failed to adduce proof as to the basis for the reversal, i.e. whether it was reversed due to a lack of proof or on due process grounds. While the claim and claimant's testimony present facts that may support due process violations - i.e. that claimant was not named in the misbehavior report and that the documentary evidence in support of charges did not properly name claimant - claimant failed to offer any documentary evidence at trial to support his claims, and thus the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that defendant's agents violated any DOCCS regulations or his due process rights.
Although the claim appears to allege that defendant is liable because defendant breached its ministerial duty to release claimant from disciplinary confinement after the administrative reversal of the hearing officer's determination (see Court Exhibit 1, at ¶ 5; see Sellers v State of New York, UID No. 2011-030-012 [Ct Cl, Scuccimarra, J., May 25, 2011]), claimant offered no testimonial or other evidence in support of such a claim, and has therefore failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a breach of any such duty.
CONCLUSION
Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his confinement was not privileged, or that defendant breached a ministerial duty to release him from confinement, thus precluding a finding of liability against defendant. Accordingly, claim number 123311 is DISMISSED. Any motions not previously ruled upon are hereby DENIED.
The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
January 16, 2019
Saratoga Springs, New York
W. BROOKS DeBOW
Judge of the Court of Claims