Opinion
00 Civ. 9704
September 30, 2002
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff Mary Velez ("Mrs. Velez") sued defendant Goldco Industries, Inc. ("Goldco"), who in turn sued third-party defendant Ball Corporation ("Ball Corp."), for the wrongful death of Mrs. Velez's husband, Armando Velez ("Mr. Velez"). On April 9, 2002, all parties mediated the matter and plaintiff accepted in principal the amount of $2,000,000 to settle the case. Goldco and Ball Corp. proceeded to a jury trial on April 15, 2002, in order to apportion the relative percentages of responsibility between them. Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Goldco on April 17, 2002, and this Court entered judgment on April 24, 2002 finding Ball Corp. 100% responsible for Mr. Velez's death and Goldco 0% responsible. Ball Corp. now moves for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. ("FRCP") 59(a) on the ground that the verdict returned by means of special interrogatories under FRCP 49(a) was inconsistent and against the clear weight of the evidence. In addition, Goldco moves for sanctions against Ball Corp. under FRCP 11(c)(1)(b) on the ground that Ball Corp. has filed a frivolous motion. For the reasons set forth in detail below, Ball Corp.'s motion for a new trial is denied and Goldco's request for sanctions on the Court's own initiative under Rule 11(c)(1)(b) is also denied.
FRCP 49(a) provides, in pertiment part, that
[t]he court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence . . . .
FRCP 11(c)(1)(b) provides that
[o]n its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
BACKGROUND
Mrs. Velez, as administrator of the estate of Mr. Velez, brought this action against Goldco and Ball Corp. for the wrongful death of Mr. Velez. Specifically, Mr. Velez, an employee of Ball Corp., sustained fatal injuries as a result of an accident that occurred on December 17, 1999 while he was repairing a palletizer manufactured by Goldco. (Joint Pre-Trial Order Ex. A, at ¶¶ 6-7) ("JPTO"). After the parties settled Mrs. Velez's suit in the amount of $2,000,000 on April 9, 2002, Goldco and Ball Corp. proceeded to trial to apportion the relative percentages of liability between them. According to paragraph 4 of the April 9, 2002 stipulation of settlement,
On or about December 1982-January 1983, and prior to the accident on December 17, 1999, Goldco sold three of its palletizers to Reynolds Metal Company ("Reynolds"). Reynolds then sold the plant to Ball Corp. in or about August 1998. (JPTO at Ex. A, ¶¶ 9, 15).
[t]he percentage of responsibility determined by the jury in the trial shall be binding upon the Defendant Goldco Industries, Inc., and upon the Third-Party Defendant Ball Corporation; Goldco and Ball Corporation agree not to appeal the jury's apportionment to any other Court.
Following a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Goldco on April 17, 2002. The verdict sheet contained the following four special interrogatories: (1) was Ball Corp. negligent in failing to train and supervise its employees? (2) was Goldco's palletizer defective, and, if so, was it a substantial factor in causing the accident; (3) was Goldco negligent in its design of the palletizer, and, if so, was it a substantial factor in causing the accident; and (4) was Goldco negligent in failing to warn of the hazard, and, if so, was it a substantial factor in causing the accident. (Verdict Sheet). The jury responded "yes" with respect to the first question and "no" to the next three, thereby finding Ball 100% liable and Goldco 0% liable.
Notwithstanding the parties' April 9, 2002 stipulation to the contrary, Ball Corp. now moves for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) on the ground that the jury's verdict was inconsistent and against the clear weight of the evidence.
ANALYSIS
1. Standard for Motion for a New Trial
FRCP 59(a) states, in pertinent part' that
[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.
The decision whether to grant a new trial following a jury trial under FRCP 59 is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 263 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993). However, the trial judge should exercise such discretion only in "the most extraordinary circumstances." United States v. Locasido, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d Cir. 1993). Further, the power of a district court to grant a new trial based on the weight of the evidence is limited to instances in which the court is "`convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" Ishay v. City of New York, 158 F. Supp.2d 261, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 608, 623 (2d Cir. 2001)). In considering whether a verdict is so "seriously erroneous" as to justify a new trial, the district court "is free to weigh the evidence and "need not view [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.'" Farrior v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting DCL Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)). In addition, "`[b]efore a [district] court may set aside a special verdict as inconsistent and remand the case for a new trial, it must make every attempt "to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary.'" The Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp.2d 266, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Turley v. Police Dep't of N.Y., 167 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (other citation omitted)). In assessing whether a given verdict is inconsistent, the Second Circuit has held that'" [w]here the district court properly instructed the jury . . ., [t]here is a strong presumption that the jury in reaching its verdict complied with those instructions, "'and that'" [a] jury's verdict reached after proper instructions must be upheld where there is a reasonable explanation for the jury's seemingly inconsistent answers. Id. at 282-82 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Ball Corp. contends that a new trial is warranted under Rule 59(a) on the ground that the jury, in finding Ball Corp. 100% liable and Goldco 0% liable, returned a verdict that was both inconsistent and against the clear weight of the evidence. Specifically, Ball Corp. maintains that the evidence was "overwhelming" that Goldco's palletizer was defective, as "[i]t lacked a fail-safe anti-drop device, despite the fact that such devices have been commonly installed by manufacturers for decades." (Ball Corp. memorandum at 1). Furthermore, Ball Corp. argues that the evidence at trial revealed that while "Goldco created the danger," it failed to "tell Ball about it"; consequently, "Ball had no knowledge of any need for training to avoid the hazard which was unknown to it." (Id). Because the clear weight of the evidence indicates that Goldco created and hid the hazard, the argument goes, the jury's verdict was inconsistent insofar as it found Ball Corp. 100% liable and Goldco 0% liable.
Goldco counters by adverting to the fact that the April 9, 2002 stipulation expressly provides that "[t]he percentage of responsibility determined by the jury in the trial shall be binding upon the Defendant GOLDCO iNDUSTRIES, INC., and upon the Third-Party Defendant BALL CORPORATION; GOLDCO and BALL CORPORATION agree not to appeal the jury's apportionment to any other Court." (Goldco affirmation Ex. A, ¶ 4). However, Goldco maintains that, regardless of Ball Corp.'s agreement not to upset the jury's finding, a new trial is not warranted in this case because the jury did not reach a "seriously erroneous" result and the verdict was not inconsistent. More precisely, Goldco points to the fact that Ball Corp. never in fact called a warnings expert at trial; that one of Ball Corp.'s own mechanics took the drive chain off the sprocket that served to keep the lift elevated; that the OSHA report concluded that Ball Corp. had provided an inadequate training program for the palletizer and had failed to provide its employees with sufficient lockout devices for the palletizer; and that Ball Corp.'s own expert, Henry Krebs ("Krebs"), testified that Ball Corp. continues to use palletizers to this day without an anti-drop device — the "cause" of the accident in Ball Corp.'s estimation. (11. at ¶¶ 15-17, 19). Goldco asserts that in light of this evidence, the jury's finding was neither inconsistent nor constituted a seriously erroneous result.
I fully agree. To be sure, as Goldco correctly notes and as the jury evidently observed, the overwhelming weight of the evidence militated in favor of Goldco. Not only did the OSHA report conclude that Ball Corp. was negligent in failing properly to train its employees, such as Mr. Velez, with respect to using the palletizer, but Krebs even testified that Ball Corp. still uses palletizers without the anti-drop device — the alleged cause of Mr. Velez' s accident. Furthermore, it is difficult to apprehend exactly how the jury's answers to the four special interrogatories are inconsistent, insofar as it found Ball 100% negligent for failing to train its employees with respect to using the palletizer and Goldco 0% negligent with respect to designing the palletizer or including a failure to warn on the palletizer. Put simply, the jury did not find that Goldco's palletizer was defective. In my view, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict in this case. Indeed, the jury was presented with evidence from both sides, and I have no reason to second guess its verdict. Members of the jury were instructed to weigh the evidence as the sole fact finders, to assess credibility, and to deliberate rationally. In my opinion, they satisfactorily performed all three of these duties. Consequently, I find that Ball Corp. has failed to meet the exacting test for a new trial under FRCP 59(a) by demonstrating either that the jury's verdict was seriously erroneous or that a miscarriage of justice occurred. However, because I do not find that Ball Corp.'s motion for a new trial is frivolous, I decline to enter an order under FRCP 11(c)(1)(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ball Corp.'s motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) is denied and Goldco's request for sanctions under Rule 11(c)(1)(b) is also denied.