Summary
reversing grant of summary judgment where staffing agreement expressly stated temporary employees "shall not be considered as" employees of the claimed employer and temporary employee submitted affidavit that he "never had a deliberate and informed consent to be an employee" of that company
Summary of this case from Saul v. Seaboard Triumph Foods, LLCOpinion
No. 5-895 / 05-0603
Filed March 1, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Dan F. Morrison, Judge.
Jesus Velazquez appeals from the trial court's ruling granting Hydro Conduit Corporation d/b/a Rinker Materials Hydro Conduit Division's motion for summary judgment. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Daniel D. Bernstein and William J. Bribriesco of William J. Bribriesco and Associates, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Brenda Wallrichs, J. Michael Weston, and Sasha L. Monthei of Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On March 1, 2002, Adecco North American, L.L.C. and Hydro Conduit Corporation entered into a "Temporary Services Agreement." Under the terms of that agreement Adecco agreed to provide Hydro temporary service workers referred to in the agreement as "assigned employees."
On September 20, 2002, Adecco hired Jesus Velazquez as a temporary service worker and assigned him to Hydro for temporary employment at Hydro. On October 7, 2002, Velazquez was injured while working at Hydro. Velazquez subsequently sued Hydro for personal injury damages, claiming his injuries were caused by the negligent acts of a Hydro employee. Hydro moved for summary judgment, claiming its special employment relationship with Velazquez and resulting immunity from tort liability for employee injuries arising in the course of employment required dismissal of Velazquez's civil action for damages.
The trial court's ruling on Hydro's motion states:
The facts demonstrate Hydro and Jesus fall within the special employment doctrine for these purposes. . . . There is no genuine issue of material fact. The relationship between Hydro and Jesus was such that Hydro was considered the plaintiff's "special employer" under Iowa law. Accordingly, the plaintiff's tort suit against Hydro is barred by Iowa Code section 85.20.
The court granted Hydro's motion and dismissed Velazquez's civil action against Hydro. On appeal, Velazquez raises the following issue:
"THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT JESUS VELAZQUEZ, AN EMPLOYEE OF A TEMPORARY STAFFING SERVICES AGENCY AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY, WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF A CLIENT EMPLOYER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFFING SERVICES"II. Standard of Review.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Financial Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank Trust, 588 N.W.2d 450, 455 (Iowa 1999). Summary judgment will be upheld when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000). The court must consider every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record in favor of the resisting party. Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Iowa 2001). An inference is legitimate if it is "rational, reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law." Id. (citing Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994)). On the other hand, an inference is not legitimate if it is based upon speculation or conjecture. Id. If reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of an issue, a genuine issue of material fact exists. Phillips, 625 N.W.2d at 718. A factual issue is "material" only if "the dispute is over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit." Id. at 717 (citing Fouts ex rel. Jensen v. Mason, 592 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted)).
III. Merits.
Iowa Code section 85.20 provides that the rights and remedies of employees injured in the course of their employment are limited to workers' compensation benefits. Section 85.20 effectively precludes injured employees from suing employers for damages in a civil action. Parson v. Procter Gamble, 514 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Iowa 1994). "The threshold determination in deciding whether a worker falls into the workers' compensation scheme is whether the worker entered into a contract of hire, express or implied." Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized the special employment relationship whereby a worker may be considered to have two employers at the same time: a general employer and a special employer. Id. at 893. When an express contract is absent, courts must look for evidence of the employee's consent to enter into an employment relationship with a special employer. Id. at 894. The court is guided in this determination by the following five factors:
(1) the right to selection, or to employ at will; (2) responsibility for the payment of wages by the employer; (3) the right to discharge or terminate the relationship; (4) the right to control the work; and (5) is the party sought to be held as the employer the responsible authority in charge of the work or for whose benefit the work is performed.
Id. at 896. These factors give the court guidance, but they are secondary to the requirement that a contract of hire be shown as a matter of law. Id. at 895. The court must consider the "overriding element of the intention of the parties as to the relationship they are creating." Henderson v. Jennie Edmundson Hosp., 178 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Iowa 1970). If there is a dispute concerning an employee's status as a special or general employee, the presumption is that the general employer continues to be the sole employer. Parson, 514 N.W.2d at 894.
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the summary judgment record fails to establish an implied contract of employment between Velazquez and Hydro as a matter of law. Most notably, Hydro's affidavits asserting its intent to form a special employment relationship with Velazquez are contradicted by the express provisions of the March 1, 2002 "Temporary Services Agreement" stating assigned employees shall not be considered as Hydro employees. Additionally, Velazquez states in his affidavit: "I never had a deliberate and informed consent to be an employee of Hydro."
The parties' conflicting versions of the nature of their employment relationship present material questions of fact for the jury's resolution. Like the court in Parson, we find the summary judgment record in this case falls short of establishing an implied contract of employment or special employment relationship as a matter of law. We need not resort to the five factors test to resolve the issue. Because the trial court's contrary conclusions were in error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformity with our opinion.