He cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that the term "riding" does not require that the automobile must be in motion. Typical of the cases cited by the appellant are: Miller v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 110 W. Va. 494, 158 S.E. 706 (1931) (insured found dead in automobile which had been stuck in the mud, died of carbon monoxide poisoning); Brown v. Hearthstone Insurance Company of Massachusetts, 19 A.D.2d 578, 240 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1963) (insured died of carbon monoxide asphyxiation while sitting with her boy friend in an automobile parked on a private road); Veillon v. Combined Insurance Company of America, 166 So.2d 307 (La.App. 1964) (milk delivery truck driver injured while stepping toward cooling compartment and opening door within truck while truck was idling at customer's home); Fowler v. First National Life Insurance Company of America, 71 N.M. 364, 378 P.2d 605 (1963) (insured injured when, as he entered the vehicle and his body was partially inside, a gust of wind blew the door shut causing injury to his legs); Standard Life Accident Insurance Company v. Hardee, 330 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Civ.App. 1959) (insured, while standing in the bed of a truck, was killed when struck by a pole, which was being used in an effort to get the truck out of a hole in which it was stuck) and, Wright v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 10 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir. 1926) (passenger in car killed when he struck the pavement after leaping from car which was out of control on a mountain road). We agree that motion of the automobile is not required, but none of the cases cited by appellant involved factual situations, or policy provisions substan

Defendant suggests that it can be reasonably concluded that, by using this language, and the policy's above quoted definition of it as excluding coverage of a "Member while on the * * * platform * * * of any conveyance or vehicle," the parties to the insurance contract intended such an insured to be covered only while in the truck's seat, since that is the place its driver or passenger usually occupies and is a position "of little or no danger," where the risk is slight, while "the operation of the crane from the crane's seat is a position of exceeding danger, * * *". On the other hand. apparently to support the hypothesis that a motor vehicle does not have to be moving, nor its driver have to be in its seat, for his injury to be covered by such a policy, plaintiff cites Veillon v. Combined Insurance Company of America (La. App.), 166 So.2d 307, and Standard Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Hardee (Tex. Civ.App.), 330 S.W.2d 544. In the Veillon case, a milk deliveryman, after stopping his truck in front of a customer's house, with the truck's motor idling, got up out of the driver's seat, took a step or two toward the truck's cooling compartment to get milk to carry to the customer's house, and was injured when, in the process of opening the cooling compartment's door, he struck his elbow on some hinges protruding from the door.

However, we note the following cases from other jurisdictions, viz.: Recovery has been allowed in the following situations: Where the deceased died from carbon monoxide poisoning when his car stalled in a mud hole on a cold day, Johnson v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 60 N.D. 397, 234 N.W. 661; where a man injured his leg when his car door slammed on it, Fowler v. First National Life Ins. Co., 71 N.M. 364, 378 P.2d 605; where a milk truck driver was injured while getting milk from the cooler compartment of his immobile truck and while he was inside the truck, Veillon v. Combined Ins. Co., La. App., 166 So.2d 307; where a girl died from carbon monoxide poisoning while parked on a road with her boy friend, Brown v. Hearthstone Ins. Co., 19 A.D.2d 578, 240 N.Y.S.2d 239; and, where the insured jumped from a car which was rolling out of control down a hill, Wright v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 10 F.2d 281, 46 A.L.R. 225 (3d Cir. 1926). Recovery was denied in the following cases: Where an insured was hit by another vehicle while outside his car putting gas into his vehicle, Goodman v. Mutual Benefit Health Ace. Assoc., Sup., 214 N.Y.S.2d 591; where the insured apparently committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning inside a car in a closed garage (the court there said "driving" an automobile did not include this accident since driving means to urge forward under guidance, compel to go in a particular direction, urge onward, and direct the course of), Mould v. Travelers' Mutual Casualty Co., 219 Iowa 16, 257 N.W. 349; and where an insured motorist drove into a pole causing an electric wire to fall ac

However, "driving or riding" has been interpreted at least to include the act of stopping and getting in and out of the vehicle. In Veillon v. Combined Insurance Company of America, La. App., 166 So.2d 307, the plaintiff was a truck driver for a milk company. He stopped his truck, got out of the driver's seat and took a step or two toward the cooling compartment.

Both sides have cited cases in various jurisdictions throughout the United States. This court held in Veillon v. Combined Insurance Co. of America, La. App., 166 So.2d 307 (1964), that a milk truck driver was "driving or riding in" the delivery truck, within coverage of the insurance policy, when he stopped the truck at a customer's home and was injured while stepping back inside the truck toward the cooling compartment to open the door. In the Veillon case, the driver had not actually left the truck at the time he was injured.

Thus, as in the case at bar, where recovery is sought under the standard medical indorsement not only is the question of negligence irrelevant (as was noted in the Goetz case, supra), but the question of whether or not the accident which caused the injury and resulting medical expenses arose out of or was directly connected with the operation or use of the covered vehicle should also be considered immaterial (see Provident Life Acc. Ins. Co., v. Nitsch, 123 F.2d 600; Dorsey v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 52 S.W.2d 775 [Texas]; Veillon v. Combined Ins. Co. of Amer., 166 So.2d 307 [La.]). Indeed, this conclusion seems apparent from the face of the policy in suit.