Vega v. Ocwen Financial Corp.

9 Citing cases

  1. Weir v. CENLAR FSB

    16-CV-8650 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2018)   Cited 44 times
    Concluding that CAFA's "jurisdictional amount, like any other factual allegation," must be "supported by facts rendering it plausible"

    Few courts have considered whether charging mortgagors for allegedly unreasonable property inspections or other fees in the event of default, and accurately listing these charges on the bill, amounts to an FDCPA violation. See, e.g., Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 14-CV-4408, 2015 WL 1383241, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015); Benner v. Bank of Am., N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 338, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The logic regarding misrepresentation as an element of mail or wire fraud pleaded as a predicate act for civil RICO, however, is persuasive here.

  2. Castorina v. Bank of Am.

    2:21-cv-02004 WBS KJN (E.D. Cal. May. 5, 2022)

    “A plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Civil RICO statute by simply artfully pleading what is essentially a breach of contract claim.” Manos v. MTC Fin., Inc., No. SACV 16-01142-CJC, 2018 WL 6220051, *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2018) (quotations omitted); Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No 2:14-cv-04408-ODW, 2015 WL 1383241, *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (dismissing RICO claim which alleged that the defendant assessed fees in violation of the borrowers' mortgage agreement because the claim was premised on a breach of contract). The alleged conduct under plaintiff's RICO claim, of improperly charging borrowers for lender-placed insurance, is also the alleged conduct upon which plaintiff's breach of contract claim is premised.

  3. Evans v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

    18-CV-5985 (PKC) (SMG) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2020)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that plaintiffs who failed to make mortgage payments had failed to perform under their agreements and, as such, could not state a breach of contract claim

    The fact that [he] failed to make any mortgage payments is not dispositive." Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 14-CV-4408 (ODW), 2015 WL 1383241, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015). Courts have found that "[e]ven if a borrower has been charged but has not yet paid for the expense, the debt is an economic injury and lien upon his property sufficient to confer standing to assert a claim under the unfair competition law."

  4. Dress v. Capital One Bank (U.S.)

    Civil No. 1:19-cv-00343 (E.D. Va. Jul. 30, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    Further, it is well settled that mere disputes over the proper interpretation of a contract, like this one, do not create actionable fraud claims under either Massachusetts's Chapter 93A or California's Unfair Competition Law absent additional plausible allegations that the defendant's conduct was unfair or egregious, which Plaintiffs do not allege. See, e.g., Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that the facts underlying a Massachusetts Chapter 93A claim "must illustrate something beyond a mere good faith dispute . . . or simple breach of contract"); Ellis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2016 WL 5815733, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (holding that allegedly fraudulent statements related to the defendant's interpretation of its authority under mortgage agreements were not actionable under California's Unfair Competition Law), aff'd, 752 F. App'x 380 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2018); Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2015 WL 1383241, at *5, *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (rejecting a California Unfair Competition claim under the fraudulent prong because the plaintiff's theory of liability "is a breach of contract claim and nothing more," and "[t]here is simply no deception" because the defendant did not breach the contract); Conder v. Home Sav. of Am., 680 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ("Because a breach of contract claim cannot form the basis for a [California Unfair Competition Law] claim without additional unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct, Plaintiff's [California Unfair Competition Law] claim based on breach of contract fails as well."); Ji v. Bose Corp., 647 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D. Mass. 2009) (dismissing Massachusetts Chapter 93A claim where the defendant's conduct was within the scope of its contractual authority and thus the defendant "in no way acted immorally, unethically, oppressively or unscrupulously"); Santander Bank, N.A. v. Santilli Enters., Inc., 34 Mass. L. Rptr. 638, 2018 WL 1385430, at *6 (Mass.

  5. Crescenzo 1, L.P. v. Deutche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.

    Case No.: 3:17-CV-1018-CAB-JLB (S.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    An alleged "failure to concede breach of contract liability does not create RICO liability." Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-04408-ODW, 2015 WL 1383241, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015). To the extent Plaintiff's RICO claims are premised on a predicate act of extortion, they still fail to state a claim.

  6. Kirchner v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

    257 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    The Court also expressed skepticism in her Order that Plaintiffs would be able to state fraud-based claims under the facts of this case. Further, this Court acknowledged that the deficiencies in Plaintiffs' initial Complaint were similar to those considered by the district court in Vega v. Ocwen Financial Corporation , No. 2:14-cv-04408-ODW, 2015 WL 1383241, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015), where the court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice because the mortgage agreements at issue explicitly authorized property inspections while the borrowers were in default. The district court in Vega concluded that the factual allegations amounted to a breach of contract claim, at most, and the plaintiffs would be unable to bring a fraud claim in such a scenario.

  7. Tardibuono-Quigley v. HSBC Mortg. Corp.

    No. 15-CV-6940 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)   Cited 10 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Tardibuono-Quigley, this Court rejected in the civil RICO context an identical argument that "Defendants committed fraud by omitting a material fact, i.e., failing to disclose that the assessed fees were unnecessary," and considered whether charges listed as "AUTO PPTY INSPEC" constituted mail or wire fraud.

    In other words, Plaintiff contends that Defendants should have disclosed that they were breaching the Security Agreement by performing services that were unnecessary. The court in Vega v. Ocwen Financial Corp., No. 14-CV-4408, 2015 WL 1383241 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (Vega I), rejected a similar argument for reasons the Court finds persuasive. In Vega I, the plaintiff's "theory of wrongdoing [was] based on [the defendant's] failure to disclose that the imposed [property inspection] fees were 'unnecessary.'"

  8. Stitt v. CitiBank

    Case No.: 12-cv-03892 YGR (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    "The term 'reasonable' is quite broad" while "[i]f a particular act is only authorized when necessary, the prospective actor is held to quite a demanding standard before it can act." Vega v. Ocwen Financial Corp., 2015 WL 1383241, at *3, *5 (C.D.Cal. March 24, 2015); see also Gustafson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 294 F.R.D. 529, 542 (C.D.Cal. 2013) (declining plaintiffs' unsubstantiated invitation to construe "reasonable or appropriate" and "necessary" as equivalent mortgage terms). Plaintiffs' theory would therefore require a fact-finder to evaluate Citi's behavior based on at least two separate standards.

  9. Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.

    Case No: 2:14-cv-04408-ODW(PLAx) (C.D. Cal. May. 28, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    On March 24, 2015, the Court issued the Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 2:14-cv-04408, 2015 WL 1383241 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) ("Vega I"). In dismissing the Complaint, the Court granted Plaintiff Mary Lou Vega leave to amend, and on April 3, 2015, Vega filed her First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 63 ["FAC"].)