Vega v. La Movida, Inc.

15 Citing cases

  1. Jane Doe v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Greater Atlanta, Inc.

    321 Ga. App. 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 12 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment to employer on claim for negligent supervision where the record was “devoid of evidence” that the employee in question had ever engaged in similar behavior

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga.App. 311, 313(1)(a), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008). However,

  2. Doe v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Great Atlanta, Inc.

    A12A2097 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2013)

    (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 311, 313 (1) (670 SE2d 116) (2008). However,

  3. Pappas Rest. v. Welch

    362 Ga. App. 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 6 times

    There were crimes that occurred inside the restaurant, rather than the parking lot, or were between employees. Id. ; see also Vega v. La Movida , 294 Ga. App. 311, 314 (1) (a), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008) (in general, crimes that occur in different locations are not substantially similar, and incidents occurring in a parking lot cannot show there is a risk of danger inside the restaurant). Next, Welch submitted depositions from Pappas and Tactical employees.

  4. Raines v. Maughan

    312 Ga. App. 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 7 times
    Explaining that expert witness “was allowed to opine that the security measures at the complex were inadequate and deficient”

    We see no abuse of discretion here. (a) Raines complains that the trial court should have admitted evidence of a carjacking that occurred on a street that runs, Raines says, near the Venetian Hills complex. Maughan owed a duty to make reasonable efforts to protect Raines's son against the criminal acts of a third party only to the extent that those criminal acts were foreseeable, see Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga.App. 311, 312(1)(a), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008), so Raines had to prove at trial that the murder of her son was foreseeable. One way of proving that a crime is foreseeable is by proof that substantially similar crimes previously had been committed at or around the same location.

  5. B-T Two v. Bennett

    307 Ga. App. 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that an owner or occupier must protect invitees from the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties, but only when the owner or occupier has superior knowledge of that danger

    But as our Supreme Court and this Court have cautioned time and again, this standard of ordinary care does not mean that an owner or occupier of land is an insurer of the safety of his invitee. See, e.g., Days Inns of America v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235, 235 ( 454 SE2d 507) (1995); Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 (1) ( 405 SE2d 474) (1991); Ferguson v. Premier Homes, 303 Ga. App. 614, 616 ( 695 SE2d 56) (2010); Glynn-Brunswick Mem. Hosp. Auth. v. Benton, 303 Ga. App. 305, 307 ( 693 SE2d 566) (2010); Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1) (a) ( 670 SE2d 116) (2008). In light of our assumption that Buffalo's sponsored the party, we also assume for the sake of argument that Buffalo's is an "occupier" — as that term is used in OCGA § 51-3-1 — of the location at which the party occurred.

  6. Booker v. C. R. Bard, Inc. (In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig.)

    No. MDL 15-02641-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. Mar. 1, 2018)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    This reading is reinforced by the statute's express statement that it does not eliminate other defenses, and seems to comport with Georgia case law. See Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 670 S.E.2d 116, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that the defendant was entitled to argue that a nonparty's act was an intervening cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and noting that § 51-12-33 concerns apportionment of damages and therefore was inapposite). Third, to prevail on their intervening cause defense, Defendants must show that Dr. Kang's intervening act, or the intervening act of any other nonparty, (1) was not foreseeable by Bard, (2) was not triggered by Bard's act, and (3) was sufficient by itself to cause Ms. Booker's injury. See Zaldivar, 774 S.E.2d at 698.

  7. Shadow v. Fed. Express Corp.

    359 Ga. App. 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    Because of the significant differences in the location, nature and extent of those situations, none of them would have reasonably alerted the defendants to the foreseeability of a random mass shooting. See Cavender , 331 Ga. App. at 475 (1) (a), 771 S.E.2d 153 ; Brown , 265 Ga. App. at 895-896 (1), 595 S.E.2d 517 ; Vega v. La Movida, Inc. , 294 Ga. App. 311, 314 (1) (a), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008) (trial court properly excluded evidence of crimes that occurred outside bar because they were not substantially similar in location to show foreseeability that crime would occur inside bar). There are, however, three instances that require more consideration: in January 2011, a former employee entered the premises and made a statement about seeing who to shoot first; the following month, a package handler threatened to stab and kill someone; and a few weeks later, an employee threatened a manager and then grabbed the manager and pulled her hair in the parking lot.

  8. Fair v. CV Underground, LLC

    340 Ga. App. 790 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 15 times

    "But even if an intervening criminal act may have been reasonably foreseeable, the true ground of liability is the superior knowledge of the proprietor of the existence of a condition that may subject the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm." Ratliff v. McDonald , 326 Ga.App. 306, 313 (2) (a), 756 S.E.2d 569 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Vega v. La Movida, Inc. , 294 Ga.App. 311, 315 (2), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008). Specifically, when a person is injured in the course of mutual combat, the combatants are deemed to have superior knowledge of the risk of harm, because "by their voluntary participation, [the combatants] have selected the time, date, and place for the altercation."

  9. Holloway v. Kroger Co.

    335 Ga. App. 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    But we cannot conclude that expert testimony about the procedures and/or flooring here would have been inadmissible as a matter of law.Vega v. La Movida, 294 Ga.App. 311, 317(3), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008) (punctuation and footnote omitted). See id. (defense counsel's argument regarding plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony on sufficiency of security measures was “not so abominably inflammatory and prejudicial as to call for a mistrial”) (punctuation and footnotes omitted).

  10. Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1.

    323 Ga. App. 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 12 times

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 294 Ga.App. 311, 315(2), 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008). In this case, that condition is the propensity of Aydelotte to become violent when intoxicated, not his blood alcohol level, and the record reflects that both Whitfield and Tequila knew that Aydelotte was drunk and cursing and harassing customers.