A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance, not by a standard of errorless counsel or by hindsight. Veasley v. State, 275 Ga. 516 (5) ( 570 SE2d 298) (2002). Inasmuch as appellant cannot show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), this enumeration lacks merit.
His failure to object to the introduction of a photograph of the victim in his military uniform and his decision not to inform the jury that the State initially indicted Lamar for only aggravated assault were reasonable tactical decisions made about the presentation of evidence and the chosen lines of defense based on discussion with Lamar and the strength of the evidence against him. See Veasley v. State, 275 Ga. 516 (5) ( 570 SE2d 298) (2002). Finally, we note that a ruling on a motion in limine brought by the State precluded Lamar's trial counsel from informing the jury that the victim had cocaine in his system.
(Citation omitted.) Veasley v. State, 275 Ga. 516, 518 (3) ( 570 SE2d 298) (2002). Judgment affirmed. Smith, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.
(Citation omitted.) Veasley v. State, 275 Ga. 516, 519 (5) ( 570 SE2d 298) (2002). While Jackson was naturally displeased when the trial judge accepted his blind plea and then sentenced him to the maximum 20 years to serve on the burglary charge, such a sentence does not render his counsel ineffective.
Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 275 Ga. 516, 570 S.E. 2d 298.