Opinion
HHDCV186088321S
09-20-2019
Anibal VAZQUEZ v. PRATT & WHITNEY SERVICES, INC. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
CESAR A. NOBLE, J.
The defendant, Roberge Painting Company, Inc., moves for summary judgment as to count two of the second amended complaint of the plaintiff, Anibal Vazquez, on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding liability. The plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred when he attempted to move a plastic tarp that was secured to a live electrical wire with metal clamps, resulting in electrocution. The defendant argues that it did not perform any work in the area of the building where the plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred. The defendant further argues that it had completed its work and turned possession and control of the work area to Pratt & Whitney months before the plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred, and that it therefore did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care. The plaintiff responds that the defendant has a duty to anyone, including the plaintiff, who could foreseeably be injured by the work the defendant performed. The plaintiff further argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant performed work in the area where the plaintiff was allegedly injured.
The plaintiff has alleged negligence against United Technologies Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Division (United Technologies) in count one. JCJ Services, LLC, (JCJ Services) the plaintiff’s employer, is a third-party defendant. For convenience, all references to the defendant in this order are to Roberge Painting Company, Inc.
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 414, 195 A.3d 664 (2018). "A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. West Hartford, 328 Conn. 172, 191-92, 177 A.3d 1128 (2018).
In the present case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant performed work in the area where the plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred, including whether the defendant erected the relevant tarp in question. This is highlighted in the discovery responses of United Technologies and JCJ Services. United Technologies states in its response to the plaintiff’s interrogatories that the "Plaintiff’s Complaint is vague and ambiguous as to where the injury occurred," but that "upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred in Building M. The relevant enclosure/curtain in Building M would have been erected by Plaintiff’s employer JCJ ... or Roberge Painting Co., not Pratt & Whitney." JCJ Services states in its response to the plaintiff’s and defendant’s interrogatories that "[u]pon information and belief, the relevant enclosure/curtain in Building M was erected by Roberge Painting Co." Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant hung the tarp in question.
In addition, the parties disagree over the applicability of Minton v. Krish, 34 Conn.App. 361 (1994) to the present matter. In Minton, the court adopted the rule of foreseeability with respect to independent contractor liability and found that a contractor’s liability was not precluded by a foreseeable injury stemming from their work, despite the fact that the injury occurred several months after their work had been completed and accepted. Id., 361-62. Thus, in the present matter, it is irrelevant whether the defendant had possession or control of the work area at the time of the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged defective condition arose from the work performed by the defendant, the applicability of Minton will ultimately depend on the plaintiff’s ability to show whether the defendant erected the tarp in question.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant hung the tarp in question. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.