Opinion
22-CV-1225 (VB)
03-10-2022
DENISE M. VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. JAWANIO; TERRY PARKER; STEPHEN PELGRAM; CAROL ST. JOHN, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that her employer created a hostile work environment, retaliated against her, and terminated her from her job. By order dated March 3, 2022, Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by May 9, 2022.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). But the "special solicitude" mpro se cases, id. at 475, has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[f]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiff's employment with Jawonio, Inc., a social services organization located in New City, Rockland County, New York. Plaintiff, who resides in Garnerville, Rockland County, New York, filed her complaint by completing a form provided by the court titled, "Employment Discrimination Complaint." In the section of the form instructing Plaintiff to check the box next to the statute she claims Defendants violated, Plaintiff does not check any of the boxes. In the section of the form instructing her to identify any adverse employment action, she checks off the boxes next to the following options: "terminated my employment... provided me with terms and conditions of employment different from those of similar employees ... [and] harassed me or created a hostile work environment." (ECF 2, at 5.) In this same section, Plaintiff states: "Harrassment & Retaliation" and that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") "adopted [her] case." (Id.)
In the caption of the complaint, Plaintiff spells her employer's name "Jawanio," but in the body of the complaint, she spells it "Jawonio," which is consistent with the company's spelling. See jawonio.org. The Court will therefore refer to this defendant with the correct spelling and direct the Clerk of Court to change the caption of this action on the court's electronic filing system.
In Plaintiff's statement of facts, where she describes the events that transpired at her workplace, she alleges that in June 2021, she
reported to the Justice Center with concerns of the residents (Special needs) As well as filed complaints to managers for not training me started with Jawonio 3/8/2021. Jawonio created a hostile environment as well as staff and manager making me feel uncomfortable in my work zone. Filed complaints to Human Rights then EEOC adopted my case.
Terry Parker (Human Resources) was aware of all my concerns regarding Harrassment & Retaliation decided to have me be transferred to another site where our residents have acute behavioral issues. On June 21, 2021 she wanted me to sign a transfer to Rustic House I refuse to sign those papers for the fact of the Harrassment with managers and staff the problems were not handled properly to have me transferred I was disappointed. EEOC has all the documents to my case I will attach the letter by EEOC.(Id.) (errors in original).
The complaint indicates that Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. (See Id. at 6.) After filing her charge, Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter, issued by the EEOC on December 17, 2021. (ECF 3-1.) The EEOC indicated in its letter that it had "adopted the findings of the state or local fair employment practices agency that investigated the charge," (Id.).
In addition to naming Jawonio as a defendant, Plaintiff also names Terry Parker, from Human Resources, who Plaintiff alleges was aware of Plaintiff's complaints of harassment and retaliation. She also includes Stephen Pelgram and Carol St. John as defendants but does not state any facts suggesting their personal involvement.
Plaintiff seeks money damages in an unspecified amount.
DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a "federal question" is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. '"[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'" United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919 v. Center Mark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) ("[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.").
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff's claims must arise "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Acase arises under federal law if the complaint "establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 690 (2006)). Simply put, if a plaintiff invokes a court's federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must state facts suggesting that the named defendants violated a federal law.
In an employment discrimination action, several antidiscrimination statutes may apply, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. These statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it "confront[s]," "resist[s]," or "withstand[s]" unlawful actions). Protected characteristics include an individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or age.
Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order).
Plaintiff does not state any facts suggesting that Defendant Jawonio (1) violated a federal antidiscrimination statute by treating her differently because of her protected characteristics, or (2) retaliated against her after she opposed discriminatory practices. Although Plaintiff states that her employer created a hostile work environment, she does not allege that the employer created this environment because of hex protected characteristics. As the complaint does not suggest a violation of any federal law, it does not appear that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims.
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA do not create individual liability in coworkers or supervisors for their discriminatory conduct. See Raspardo v. Carlone, 110 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2014) (Title VII); Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (ADA); Cherry v. Toussaint, 50 Fed.Appx. 476, 477 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order) (ADEA claims). Plaintiff therefore cannot state a federal claim under these statutes against Terry Parker, Stephen Pelgram, and Carol St. John. Plaintiff arguably could assert a claim under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), see N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301, but she may be prohibited from doing so under NYSHRL's election of remedy provision, see Id. § 297.9. In any event, for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claim, the Court must first establish that it has jurisdiction over a federal claim.
C. Diversity Jurisdiction
Plaintiff also does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action. To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep t of Corn v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a "reasonable probability" that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006). A corporation is a citizen of both the state where it has its principal place of business and the state where it is incorporated. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010).
Plaintiff indicates in the complaint that she resides in New York, and that Jawonio is located in Rockland County. Although Plaintiff does not expressly state that Jawonio maintains a principal place of business in New York State, or is incorporated in New York, the complaint strongly suggests that the parties are not diverse. In the unlikely event that the parties are diverse, however, Plaintiff does not seek money damages exceeding the statutory jurisdictional amount of $75,000. Thus, the Court appears not to have diversity jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
For example, plaintiff's complaint suggests she is attempting to assert a claim pursuant to the New York Whistleblower Act, which provides that an employer may not retaliate against an employee who "discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of law, rule or regulation or that the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety." N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2).
D. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts "should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid federal discrimination claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to provide more facts about her claims. In the "Statement of Claim" section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may wish to contact the New York Legal Assistance Group ("NYLAG") for assistance. An informational flyer provided by NYLAG is attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit by May 9, 2022, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket number 22-CV-1225 (VB) . An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summonses will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed.
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to change the spelling of Jawanio to Jawonio.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-5 (1962).
Chambers will mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff to the address on the docket.
SO ORDERED. 10