Opinion
No. 3D20-0107
02-19-2020
Damian J. Vaz, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Damian J. Vaz, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SALTER, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Yanez v. State, 170 So. 3d 9, 11 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2015) ("[T]o state a claim for relief under Padilla, a movant must establish the following: (1) that the movant was present in the country lawfully at the time of the plea; (2) that the plea at issue is the sole basis for the movant's deportation; (3) that the law, as it existed at the time of the plea, subjected the movant to "virtually automatic" deportation; (4) that the "presumptively mandatory" consequence of deportation is clear from the face of the immigration statute; (5) that counsel failed to accurately advise the movant about the deportation consequences of the plea; and (6) that, if the movant had been accurately advised, he or she would not have entered the plea."); Facey v. State, 143 So. 3d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("Here, appellant entered his plea with eyes wide open and aware of the risk of deportation. He now faces the very consequences that he fully acknowledged understanding when he accepted the plea.").
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010).