For example, we hold today that a remand to an administrative agency to consider the effects of legislation enacted while the case was on appeal does not constitute securing relief on the merits. Vaughn v. Principi, No. 02-7019, slip op. 336 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. July. 24, 2003). So too we hold that a remand for consideration of new evidence discovered for the first time while the case was on appeal is not relief on the merits.

II. DISCUSSION The question of whether Davis is a "prevailing party" under the EAJA is a question of law that we review de novo. Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir.2003) (internal citation omitted). The EAJA is a fee-shifting statute that allows a party who prevails in a civil action brought by or against the government to recover attorney's fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Id. Now that the question has been decided in the first instance by the Veterans' Court, we have jurisdiction over and are required by statute to review all relevant questions of law. See Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming judgments denying prevailing party status because the Veterans' Court "applied the correct legal standard"). The Government also argues that Halpern should be precluded from relying on an argument in the present appeal that is contrary to his position in the previous appeal under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

The government also resists any award of interim fees, arguing that the remand order obtained by KCI provides "only the opportunity for further adjudication." Def.'s Reply at 3 (citing Akers, 409 F.3d at 1359, and Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). In this vein, the government asserts that KCI's success on the standing issue does not "materially alter the legal relationship between the parties."

Discussion We review the Veterans Court's interpretation of EAJA de novo. Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Our review is limited by statute, under which we "shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions."

The government adds that we have previously held that a party is not eligible for an award of attorney fees when a case is dismissed as moot. Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Although we may not review "a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case" in the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)(B), we review the Veterans Court's interpretation of EAJA de novo. Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Under EAJA, a court awards a "prevailing party" fees and expenses incurred in any civil action or judicial review of agency action brought against the United States, unless the position of the United States was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust.

Akers v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 430 (Table) (2003); Briddell v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 267 (2002). Because neither appellant is a "prevailing party" under the criteria established by Buckhannon Board Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855, and by Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003), this court affirms both decisions. I.

Instead, like in Davis , the court merely al-lowed Robinson to submit additional evidence to the Board in support of its new argument. See id. at 1364 ; see also Vaughn v. Principi , 336 F.3d 1351, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that remand to consider new evidence does not confer prevailing-party status); Yates v. Nicholson , 140 Fed.Appx. 954, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (granting motion for summary affirmance of a Veterans Court decision finding that the veteran was not a prevailing party, where the court exercised its discretion to allow the veteran "the opportunity to raise a new argument before the Board"); Gordon v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 221, 224 (2003) ("Because the Court found no error on this point but, rather, remanded the matter for the Board to consider the issue raised for the first time on appeal, such a ... remand does not, by itself, confer prevailing-party status on the appellant."). Robinson nevertheless argues that the Veterans Court implicitly recognized administrative error based on the Board's failure to consider and address in its decision all potentially applicable provisions of law and regulation.

Indeed, we have held that remands not rooted in agency error do not result in prevailing party status. Such remands include: a remand to address the impact of a newly-enacted statute on a case, Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2003); a remand to consider newly acquired evidence, Id. at 1354; and a remand where the Board of Veterans' Appeals arguably misapplies a federal regulation but where the Veterans Court does not “explicitly or implicitly predicate[ ]” the remand order on this alleged misapplication. Davis v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2007).