Opinion
2:24-CV-04066-WJE
05-23-2024
CODY R. VAUGHAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRIAN K. STUMPE, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WILLIE J. EPPS, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiffs Cody R. Vaughan and Jessica L. Vaughan (the Vaughans), pro se litigants, filed Applications for Leave to File Action Without Payment of Fees with Affidavits of Financial Status in Support. (Doc. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court denied the Motions, and the Vaughans have not paid the requisite filing fee. (Doc. 4). Included with the applications was a proposed complaint. (Doc. 1-2 at 1-8). For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Vaughans' case be dismissed, without prejudice.
I. Background
The Vaughans' proposed complaint contains the following allegations. On March 13, 2024, Ms. Vaughan was at Court for “what was supposed to be a trial” over which Brian K. Stumpe, a Cole County Circuit Court Judge, was presumably presiding. (Id. at 2, 6). Mr. Vaughan was appearing as a witness for Ms. Vaughan. (Id.). Judge Stumpe confronted the Vaughans “about a phone call that was made to a clerk” and Ms. Vaughan “tried to state that she was not rude on the phone.” (Id.). Judge Stumpe then told Mr. Vaughan that “if [Mr. Vaughan] continued to mock him, that he would hold [him] in contempt.” (Id.). Mr. Vaughan states that he did not say anything and walked out of the courtroom to wait for Ms. Vaughan. (Id.). As they were leaving the courthouse, “the Marshall [sic] began yelling [Mr. Vaughan's] name and stated that [he] was under arrest for contempt.” (Id.). The Vaughans asked why and “the Marshall [sic] did not answer either of [them].” (Id.). The Vaughans were brought back into the courtroom, and Judge Stumpe “mumbled into the microphone” as to why Mr. Vaughan was being arrested for contempt. (Id. at 7). He then then ordered Mr. Vaughan to serve seven (7) days in jail “with no hearing or attorney to represent him.” (Id.). Mr. Vaughan filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement which was denied, and “there was never an answer to [his] appeal of [Judge Stumpe's] decision to place [him] in jail for seven (7) days.” (Id.).
The Vaughans allege that the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and “Title 18 U.S.C. 242, 1512, and 14141” are at issue in this case. (Doc. 12 at 4). They are seeking punitive damages for “the unlawful 7 day imprisonment of [Mr. Vaughan],” as well as “any costs for therapy for [him], the emotional distress to [the Vaughans'] children, as well as missed work by [Ms. Vaughan] and the hardship it caused her during the imprisonment of [Mr. Vaughan].” (Id. at 6). They further elaborate that they are seeking “$100,000 for loss of work and ability to obtain work, physical and mental suffering and anguish, and undue financial burden.” (Id. at 8).
II. Standard Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Upon the determination of the applicant's ability to pay the requisite fee, the Court must review the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) states:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-
(B) the action or appeal-
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While a pro se pleading is to be liberally construed, it still must allege some facts, which if proven true, would entitle the plaintiff to some specific legal remedy against the named defendant(s), based on some established rule of law. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), courts may dismiss as frivolous claims that are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or “whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. at 327.
“Generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.” Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “A judge is immune from suit . . . in all but two narrow sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 1090-91.
III. Discussion
The Vaughans' proposed complaint suffers from numerous deficiencies, including sparse and vague allegations that are both frivolous and seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The Vaughans allege that “Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 242, 1512, and 14141” are at issue in this case. (Doc. 1-2 at 4). The Court construes the proposed complaint as asserting violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (now codified as 34 U.S.C. § 12601), and 18 U.S.C. § 1512. None of these statutes offer the Vaughans a private right of action under which they may file suit. “Only the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 . . . These statutes do not give rise to a civil action for damages.” See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 846 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is “part of the obstruction of justice framework” and does not provide a private cause of action. Horde v. Elliot, 2018 WL 987683, at *18 (D. Minn. 2018). Lastly, there is no private right of action under 34 U.S.C. § 12601, as only the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this statute. See 34 U.S.C. § 12601(b); see also Thompson v. Creve Coeur Police Dep't, No. 4:19-CV-2138-SNLJ, 2019 WL 3860073, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019). These claims are frivolous and should be dismissed.
Liberally construing the remainder of the Vaughans' proposed complaint, it appears that they are also asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their constitutional rights. However, the proposed complaint seeks monetary relief against Judge Stumpe, who is immune from such relief. See Woodworth, 891 F.3d at 1090. This is a fatal deficiency in their proposed complaint. Because the Vaughans attempt to seek monetary relief from Judge Stumpe, their claims are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,” and should be dismissed. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (1989). Additionally, the Vaughans' proposed complaint is devoid of any facts indicating that Judge Stumpe acted absent jurisdiction or that his conduct involved nonjudicial acts, such that he would not be immune. See Woodworth, 891 F.3d at 1090. Accordingly, the Vaughans' case should be dismissed in its entirety because the claims asserted are frivolous and seek monetary relief against Judge Stumpe, who is immune from such relief.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE
RECOMMENDED that the District Judge, after making an independent review of the record and applicable law, enter an order dismissing this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Objections to this report may be filed with the District Judge within fourteen days of receipt of a copy of the report. A failure to file and serve objections by this date shall bar an attack on appeal of the factual findings in the Report and Recommendation which are accepted or adopted by the District Judge, except on the grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.