Opinion
01 C 6541
December 7, 2001
This is a voting rights action in which plaintiffs complained that the redistricting plan adopted by the Lake County Board diluted the voting power of Hispanic citizens. Count I of the Complaint alleged that the dilution of the Hispanic vote constituted a violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Count II alleged a claim based upon a violation of the Illinois Counties Code, 55 ILCS § 5/2-3002, which contains strict requirements regarding population equality in each voting district. There was also a claim that the map was not sufficiently compact.
Following settlement discussions, the County Board created and has, today, adopted a new map which the parties agree has remedied the § 2 issue and the population equality problem. After these core issues were resolved, there remained just three remaining issues: (1) the correct manner in which a new map may be validly adopted; (2) whether the map was compact; and (3) whether, even if the new map is valid, the traditional filing dates ought to be changed.
The compactness argument is no longer before this court. Perhaps this is so because of what the Illinois Supreme Court has recently said about the ease with which the constitutional compactness requirement can be achieved. See Cole-Randazzo v. Ryan, 2001 WL 1506465 (Ill. 2001) (J. Garman, dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion comes remarkably close to sounding the death knell to the constitutional requirement of compactness."). The challenge to the procedure for the adoption of the map is not pressed. I am left with the problem of what to do about the filing date.
The arguments before me were made on the premise that if the filing date were to be extended, it should be done in a way that did not interfere with the customary scheme for printing ballots. This is so because relatively early printing is necessary for the distribution of absentee ballots. We are informed by counsel that the customary filing date for sending ballots to the printer is January 22. Counting backwards, state election law requires that challenges to nominating petitions are to be heard not less than three days nor more than 5 days after receipt of the challenge. See 10 ILCS 5-10-10. Before that, there is a period of 5 business days following the close of the petition period for challenges to be made. See 10 ILCS 5/10-8. This brings us from January 22 to January 9. So I could conceivably move the nominating petition filing period from its present dates (December 10-17) to January 2-9.
Federal court intervention that disrupts the state electoral process in any way is a serious business, and is not to be taken lightly. See, e.g., Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 196 (3d Cir. 2001). I believe myself constrained to interfere as little as possible.
In deciding whether to interfere, and if so, to what extent, I must consider the fact that the map should have been adopted by July 1. If it had been adopted in accordance with the statutory schedule, candidates would have had about 160 days to assess whether to run, to determine the likely support and opposition, and to collect signatures. While many potential candidates certainly have started the process, it is difficult to see how they could complete it without knowing exactly what the districts will look like.
Furthermore, even if the determination was made to run in the election, there are certain filing requirements, which, while not particularly onerous, still must be performed (getting signatures, filing a statement of economic interest, a statement of candidacy, etc.). Between the date of the adoption of the map (December 7) to the petition deadline (December 10), there are two days, a Saturday and a Sunday, a weekend, moreover, on the cusp of the holiday season. Plaintiffs, I think, are clearly right that this is not enough time. There is another potential loss: the inability to file first and to get one's name on the ballot first, which I accept is something of value to a candidate. I am satisfied that the original petition filing period cannot stand, and I will extend it to January 2-9. Even this extended period is a great deal shorter than that which is ordinarily allowed under the statutory scheme. (I assume that plaintiffs ask for a relatively small amount of time, at least in part, because the districts deviate by a relatively small percentage from the original map.)
The motion to delay the petition filing deadline is granted. The motion for an expedited trial [15] [22] is denied as moot. The motion for judgment on the pleadings [13] is denied as moot due to the adoption of a new map.