One decision held that the 2015 amendment did in fact foreclose the bringing of opt-in collective actions under the DCMWA. SeeVasquez v. Grunley Constr. Co. , 200 F.Supp.3d 93, 101–03 (D.D.C. 2016), superseded by statute , Wage Theft Prevention Clarification and Overtime Fairness Amendment Act of 2016, D.C. Law 21–266, sec. 2(f)(1), § 8(a)(1), 64 D.C. Reg. 2140, 2144 (Feb. 24, 2017) (codified at D.C. Code § 32–1308(a)(1) ). In 2017, the D.C. Council responded by revising the statute to make clear that collective-action procedures are still available.

In Turner, Judge Kane analyzed the history and intent behind the FLSA § 216(b) process and concluded that there was unnecessary confusion between, and conflation of, FSLA "conditional" certification and "class certification" under Rule 23. See also Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 222–27 (3d Cir. 2016) ; Va s quez v. Grunley Const. Co., 200 F.Supp.3d 93, 97–98 (D. D.C. 2016) ; Perez v. De Domenico Pizza & Rest., Inc., 204 F.Supp.3d 494, 495–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ; McClendon v. U.S., No. 12–81c, 2013 WL 285584 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 24, 2013) ; 7B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1807 (3d ed. 2011) ; Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second–Class "class action": How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying "class action" Rules, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 523 (2012) ; Allan G. King, Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction: The "Class Certification" Decision in FLSA "collective action's, 24 Lab. Law 267 (2009) A. Certification