We decline Griggs' invitation to overrule our well-established rule which requires a motion for a new trial or for a judgment as a matter of law to be made in the trial court. Generally, we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 713 (N.D. 1996). "[A] losing party cannot, after a civil jury trial, `raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for the first time' to this Court." Id. (quoting Reisenauer v. Schaefer, 515 N.W.2d 152, 156-57 n. 6 (N.D. 1994)); see also Brawn v. Riskedahl, 150 N.W.2d 577, 581 (N.D. 1967) (overruled in part on different grounds); Hultberg v. City of Garrison, 79 N.D. 356, 358, 56 N.W.2d 319, 320 (N.D. 1952).
c. The date of service of any ex parte order in the case signed by the judge against whom the demand is filed. See also State v. Velasquez, 1999 ND 217, ¶ 3, 602 N.W.2d 693 (demand found untimely when filed more than ten days after assignment of judge); Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 712 (N.D. 1996). The demand for a change of judge was made over a year after the trial judge had been assigned to the case.
We conclude Roland's objection was not timely and his claim of error is without merit. See Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 711 (N.D. 1996). IV. Testimony of Minor and Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem
[¶ 6] Generally, an action must be brought in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of an action. N.D.C.C. § 28-04-05; see also Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 711 (N.D. 1996); Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 440 N.W.2d 704, 708 (N.D. 1989). The trial court has broad discretion to change the place for trial under N.D.C.C. § 28-04-07 when there is reason to believe a fair and impartial trial would be impossible in the county where the action is pending.
As we noted in Estate of Peterson, at ¶ 19, "[t]he purpose of an appeal is to review the actions of the trial court, not to grant the appellant the opportunity to develop and expound on new strategies or theories." [¶ 10] For similar reasons, we do not consider issues raised for the first time at oral argument on appeal. E.g., Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 713 (N.D. 1996); RLI Insurance Co. v. Heling, 520 N.W.2d 849, 854 (N.D. 1994). Issues raised on appeal should be fully briefed, with a fair and adequate opportunity for response from opposing parties. See RLI Insurance, 520 N.W.2d at 854.
" Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985). "Under our liberal pleading rules, the plaintiffs were not required to allege every element of their claim." Id.; accord, Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 712 n. 4 (N.D. 1996). [¶ 8] In their complaint, Kaler, Wolsky, and Kummer sought alternative relief of rescission of their agreement with Kraemer, damages for fraud, or "relief according to the agreement."
While the trial court is not required to receive any evidence from a defaulting divorce respondent who has appeared, as William has, the court may, in its discretion, do so to the extent it believes William's input will assist it in formulating the "appropriate judgment" by default. For an example, see Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 710 (N.D. 1996) (since they "were not in `total default' because they had answered and appeared," trial court proceeded with the jury trial in the absence of the defendants after they defaulted by leaving the trial as it began). [¶ 24] Therefore, we reverse this default judgment and remand with directions for the trial court to enter an appropriate default judgment by making independent findings and a property division that is equitable under the familiar Ruff-Fischer guidelines for a marriage of this duration, the contributions by each spouse, and the extent of the property accumulated during the marriage.
Accordingly, the court's scrutiny of the complaint should be deferential to the pleader, and the complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts which would entitle him to relief." Rolin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Mosbrucker, 544 N.W.2d 132, 135 (N.D. 1996); see also Isaac v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 547 N.W.2d 548, 550 (N.D. 1996); Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707, 711 (N.D. 1996). This court will generally reverse a judgment dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim whenever we can discern a potential for proof to support it. Lang v. Bank of North Dakota, 423 N.W.2d 501, 503 (N.D. 1988).
Subject to other specific exceptions in NDCC Ch. 28-04, venue for a civil action is generally "in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides at the time of the commencement of the action." NDCC 28-04-05; Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1996). An action may be tried in an improper venue "unless the defendant, before the time for answering expires, demands in writing that the trial be had in the proper county."
In determining a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(v), N.D.R.Civ.P., the court's scrutiny of the complaint is fairly relaxed and deferential to the pleader. A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(v), N.D.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts which would entitle him to relief. Varriano v. Bang, 541 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1996). On appeal, we view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.