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Varley v. Varley

181 Conn. 58 (Conn. 1980)
Varley v. Varley

17 Citing cases

  1. Suffield Development A. v. Nat. Loan Investors

    60 Conn. App. 842 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 7 times

    Our Supreme Court has held that, if an appeal is pending and "there is reversible error, the final judgment is that of the appellate court." Preisner v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 415, 525 A.2d 83 (1987); see Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 61 n. 4, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); see also Saunders v. Saunders, 140 Conn. 140, 146, 98 A.2d 815 (1953). Preisner and the cases cited therein did not, however, involve circumstances in which the judgments of the trial court were reversed and the cases were remanded for new trials.

  2. Summerville v. Warden

    229 Conn. 397 (Conn. 1994)   Cited 338 times
    Holding that "a substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by the petitioner of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his criminal trial"

    General Statutes 52-582. The three year period begins to run from the date of rendition of judgment by the trial court; Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); which, in a criminal case, is the date of imposition of the sentence by the trial court. State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86, 89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987).

  3. Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Winters

    225 Conn. 146 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 45 times
    Interpreting Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Section 52-141 (West 1991), entitled "Set-off in action for trespass or tort"

    We have previously decided that, at the time a judgment is rendered in the trial court, it becomes final for the purpose of triggering a statute of limitations. Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 60-61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980). Varley is not controlling here, however, because the twenty-four hour filing requirement of General Statutes 52-141 (b)(4) is not properly considered a statute of limitations, despite that characterization of it by the Appellate Court. Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 26 Conn. App. 322, 325, 600 A.2d 1048 (1991).

  4. Capalbo v. Planning Zoning Board of Appeals

    208 Conn. 480 (Conn. 1988)   Cited 100 times
    In Capalbo, as in the present case, the clerk of the municipality was served with process but was not named in the citation.

    In light of this legislative history, and the legislature's undoubted intent to validate zoning appeals that had run into Simko difficulties, we reject the defendants' argument that the legislature meant to exclude cases on timely appeal from the ambit of Public Acts 1988, No. 88-79. A functional construction of the term "final judgment" is consistent with usage that we have found appropriate in other cases. "In the absence of universally applicable rules, we have recognized that the relationship between a pending appeal and a judgment depends upon the nature of the issue that is to be addressed. Accordingly, a trial court judgment has been held to be final, despite a pending appeal, insofar as the issue was the triggering of the statute of limitations; Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 60-61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); the continuing validity of interlocutory alimony orders; Saunders v. Saunders, 140 Conn. 140, 146, 98 A.2d 815 (1953); or the applicability of the rules of res judicata. Salem Park, Inc. v. Salem, 149 Conn. 141, 144, 176 A.2d 571 (1961).

  5. Preisner v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co.

    203 Conn. 407 (Conn. 1987)   Cited 47 times
    In Preisner v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 412-13, 525 A.2d 83 (1987), we determined the effect of a trial court's judgment on the contractual entitlement of an accommodation comaker of a promissory note to indemnification when that accommodation party settled with the holder of the note during the pendency of an appeal by the underlying obligor from the trial court's judgment of liability No statutory construction, therefore, was involved.

    In the absence of universally applicable rules we have recognized that the relationship between a pending appeal and a judgment depends upon the nature of the issue that is to be addressed. Accordingly, a trial court judgment has been held to be final, despite a pending appeal, insofar as the issue was the triggering of the statute of limitations; Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 60-61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); the continuing validity of interlocutory alimony orders; Saunders v. Saunders, 140 Conn. 140, 146, 98 A.2d 815 (1953); or the applicability of the rules of res judicata. Salem Park, Inc. v. Salem, 149 Conn. 141, 144, 176 A.2d 571 (1961).

  6. Varley v. Varley

    189 Conn. 490 (Conn. 1983)   Cited 24 times
    In Varley v. Varley, 189 Conn. 490 (1988), where one party had had exclusive use of the property and the other party had received no benefit from the property, the court stated that it was "appropriate to make an equitable adjustment for that fact.

    The validity of that ruling and other matters concerning this divorce were thereafter reviewed by this court and no error was found. Varley v. Varley, 170 Conn. 455, 365 A.2d 1212 (1976); Varley v. Varley, 180 Conn. 1, 428 A.2d 317 (1980); Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 434 A.2d 312 (1980). The plaintiff commenced the present action seeking a sale of the Edward Street property and a division of the proceeds.

  7. Enfield Federal Savings Loan Assn. v. Bissell

    184 Conn. 569 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 50 times
    Defining judgment as "final" when a case "has so far concluded the rights of the parties" that it would be unjust to allow them to be readjudicated

    4, p. 534; See also 2 Freeman, Judgments (1925) 727. In Connecticut, this court has held the judgment of a trial court to be final, despite a pending appeal, When the issue was the triggering of the statute of limitations; Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); the continuing validity of interlocutory alimony orders; Saunders v. Saunders, 140 Conn. 140, 146, 98 A.2d 815 (1953); or the applicability of the rules of res judicata. Salem Park, Inc. v. Salem, 149 Conn. 141, 144, 176 A.2d 571 (1961).

  8. Theonnes v. Theonnes

    181 Conn. 111 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 26 times

    In cases of fraud where certain conditions precedent are met, a judgment, fair on its face, may be examined in its underpinnings. Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); see Casanova v. Casanova, 166 Conn. 304, 348 A.2d 668 (1974). Because there has been no showing of fraud in the present case and because the May, 1979 judgment was not void, the court was not justified in reviewing the merits of the earlier judgment, however erroneous.

  9. Randolph v. Mambrino

    216 Conn. App. 126 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that three year limitation period of General Statutes § 52-582 may be tolled by showing of fraudulent concealment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-595

    "The three year period [of § 52-582 ] begins to run from the date of rendition of judgment by the trial court; Varley v. Varley , 181 Conn. 58, 61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980) ; which, in a criminal case, is the date of imposition of the sentence by the trial court. State v. Coleman , 202 Conn. 86, 89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987)."

  10. Holliday v. State

    111 Conn. App. 656 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 11 times
    In Holliday v. State, 111 Conn.App. 656, 960 A.2d 1101 (2008), cert. denied, 291 Conn. 902, 967 A.2d 112 (2009), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff's petition for a new trial, which was filed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-270, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

    Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 426-27, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994). The three year period begins to run from the date of rendition of judgment by the trial court; Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980); which, in a criminal case, is the date of imposition of the sentence by the trial court. State v. Coleman, 202 Conn. 86, 89, 519 A.2d 1201 (1987).