Opinion
No. CIV 04-843 MCA/ACT.
August 18, 2005
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Pedro Flores-Valles' Motion to Intervene [Doc. No. 40] and the Motion for Admission of Diane F. Barger to Appear Pro Hac Vice [Doc. No. 41] on behalf of Mr. Flores-Valles. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that Pedro Flores-Valles' motion does not meet the requirements for intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24, and therefore his motion to intervene is denied. The motion for pro hac vice admission of Diane F. Barger is denied as moot.
Intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 is only permitted "[u]pon timely application." A timely application to intervene as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) also requires a showing that "the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action[,] . . . the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest," and the applicant's interest is not "adequately represented by the existing parties." A timely application for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b) requires a showing that the "applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common" and consideration of "whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."
In this case, Mr. Flores-Valles' motion fails to meet the threshold requirement of timeliness. "The timeliness of a motion to intervene is assessed `in light of all the circumstances, including the length of time since the applicant knew of his interest in the case, prejudice to the existing parties, prejudice to the applicant, and the existence of any unusual circumstances.'" Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984)).
With respect to the first factor, Mr. Flores-Valles knew of his interest in the case by no later than January 12, 2005, the date he received notice of the denial of his claim for purposes of exhausting administrative remedies. [Ex. B, C, D to Doc. No. 52.] He provides no satisfactory explanation of why he waited almost six months, until June 22, 2005, to file his motion to intervene.
With respect to the degree of unfair prejudice to the existing parties, I note that although discovery and pretrial deadlines were recently extended, the existing parties are very close to completing discovery, with a final deposition scheduled for August 15, 2005 [Doc. No. 47, 54], and a settlement conference scheduled on September 1, 2005 [Doc. No. 46.] Meanwhile, Mr. Flores-Valles has not filed a reply brief on his motion to intervene within the time limits for briefing prescribed in D.N.M. LR-Civ. 7.6(a). He has not shown good cause for extending the deadline for completion of briefing on his motion.
More importantly, there is little or no overlap between discovery regarding Mr. Flores-Valles' claims and the discovery of the existing Plaintiffs' claims because Mr. Flores-Valles allegedly was riding in a different van, with a different driver, and sustained injuries which are different in kind and in degree from those alleged by the existing Plaintiffs. [Ex. B, C to Doc. No. 52; Doc. No. 53.] Thus, adding Mr. Flores-Valles' claims to this action provides no benefit to this case in terms of judicial economy or avoidance of duplication, and is likely to delay resolution of the existing Plaintiffs' claims for no good reason.
Mr. Flores-Valles' motion does not assert that he meets the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), and there is no basis for concluding that he can meet these requirements. Because Mr. Flores-Valles alleges distinct injuries to his person that were allegedly incurred while riding a different van than the existing Plaintiffs, his interests do not meet the requirement that they be sufficiently "related to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action" so as to create a risk of "impair[ing] or imped[ing] the applicant's ability to protect that interest." Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2).
For similar reasons, Mr. Flores-Valles' motion also fails to meet the requirements for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). Mr. Flores-Valles contends that his claim shares a common question of law or fact with those of the existing Plaintiffs because they were all involved in the "same accident." The only thing in common between the two accidents, however, is that the driver of the van in which Mr. Flores-Valles was traveling slowed down abruptly in response to the blown tire and rollover of the other van in which the existing Plaintiffs were traveling. There is no allegation that the two vans collided or that the other van itself caused Mr. Flores-Valles' van to lose control. [Ex. B, C to Doc. No. 52; Doc. No. 53.]
The reason why the driver of Mr. Flores-Valles' van slowed down is not essential to any of the elements of his claim against Defendant and does not provide a common question of law or fact that has any legal significance. Rather, the essential elements of Mr. Flores-Valles claim against Defendant depend almost entirely on the events occurring within the van in which he was traveling. Since those events have no bearing on the existing Plaintiffs' claims, it would unduly delay the proceedings to extend the pretrial deadlines in this case to accommodate Mr. Flores-Valles' desire to intervene.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Flores-Valles' motion to intervene is untimely and meets neither the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) nor the requirements for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b). Having concluded that Mr. Flores-Valles is not permitted to intervene, the motion for pro hac vice admission of his counsel, Diane F. Barger, is denied as moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Pedro Flores-Valles' Motion to Intervene [Doc. No. 40] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Admission of Diane F. Barger to Appear Pro Hac Vice [Doc. No. 41] is DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.