Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County No. ECU02932, Christopher W. Yeager, Judge.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Petitioner and appellant Ray Anthony Vargas is an inmate in a state prison. He filed this "petition for writ of mandate and declaratory/injunctive relief," challenging the nature and enforcement of certain regulations and administrative manual provisions restricting the possession of personal property in prison. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1060, 526; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted.) He alleged that the various defendants, state and prison officials, had a mandatory duty to refrain from enforcing those restrictions, and he also claimed that declaratory and injunctive relief was justified to interpret the regulations and to prevent their enforcement to the extent that they exceeded statutory or regulatory authorization. (Pen. Code, §§ 2600, 5058; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3190.) The trial court denied his ex parte request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the regulations and then apparently dismissed the petition, although this is unclear from the record.
The named defendants and respondents include the then secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), Roderick Hickman, then assistant secretary of CDCR, Jeanne Woodford, the warden of Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria), Larry Scribner, and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.
We have reviewed the briefs and record and conclude that the trial court correctly denied preliminary injunctive relief. However, the pleading as amended contains sufficient references to declaratory relief requests, regarding Vargas's challenges to the subject regulations, in order to survive any purported dismissal without any noticed hearing on the substance of the requests in some form of a dispositive motion or proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the preliminary injunction but reverse the implied dismissal order for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Allegations of Petition and Supporting Declaration
On March 3, 2006, Vargas filed a 270-page petition for writ of mandate and declaratory/injunctive relief, including 240 pages of exhibits, against prison authorities, particularly at Calipatria, contending that their continued enforcement of prison regulations regarding the amount and type of personal property that he and other inmates could possess was unlawful. Some references to class action status are pled. On March 30, 2006, he filed an amended petition for the same relief. Vargas alleged that in March 2005, the CDCR revised chapter 5, article 43 of its Department Operations Manual (DOM), specifically section 54030.1 et seq., which provided changes to the amount and type of personal property inmates may possess, but allegedly these changes were more restrictive than the rules found in state regulations, such as California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3190, subdivision (c), permitting an inmate to possess six cubic feet of specified personal property items. Vargas also claimed the manual revisions constituted an "underground" regulation as defined by Government Code section 11340 et seq. (Administrative Procedures Act (APA)). Specifically, an underground regulation is one enacted or imposed by an agency without the proper authorization under the APA. (Gov. Code, § 11340.5, subd. (a) [requiring compliance with the procedures of the APA for imposition of rules]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 1, § 250.)
During the period between the filing of his original and his amended petition, there was a prisoner attack upon a staff member at Calipatria on March 20, 2006 (attempted homicide). Other such attacks had occurred since August 2005, and the Calipatria facility was on a modified program of additional security restrictions. In response to the March 20, 2006 incident, prison authorities sent out notices to prisoners that the property restrictions in DOM section 54030.1 et seq. would be enforced forthwith and searches of cells would be made and property confiscated. Also, a memorandum was sent to prisoners stating that inmate package delivery from the outside, including from approved vendors, was restricted and inmate canteen privileges were suspended. Inmates were allowed to ship possessions home if they could afford it. These allegations are laid out in Vargas's supporting declaration seeking a hearing.
In response, inmates at Calipatria filed various grievances within the prison to challenge the proposed revisions. Petitioner is alleging that these grievances were denied on all levels of review by the CDCR, effectively exhausting the inmates' administrative review process within the prison system.
B. Petitioner's Attempt to Procure Hearing
Originally, Vargas submitted a proposed alternative writ that was returned to him by the clerk because it contained blank spaces. On April 3, 2006, Vargas filed an ex-parte application for preliminary injunctive relief, which was scheduled to be heard on April 7, 2006. On April 7, 2006, the superior court held a telephonic conference with a representative from the Attorney General's office, but not petitioner, who remained confined and unavailable. The court adhered to the tentative ruling that preliminary injunctive relief was denied because Vargas could not show irreparable harm and the prison was acting within its authority to maintain security. The court prepared a minute order stating only that the motion was denied upon the finding that respondent was acting within its authority to maintain security. The Attorney General's office served a notice of the ruling.
On April 10, the trial court sua sponte took off calendar a previously scheduled case management conference that had been set for July 5, 2006.
On May 1, 2006, Vargas inquired of the court about obtaining a copy of the order denying the preliminary injunction. On May 10, the court clerk responded with a letter informing him the order had not yet been submitted by respondents, but also (incorrectly) that the minute order indicated that the matter had been "dismissed" by the court. Lastly, on May 24, the court denied his application for a copy of the order, citing California Rules of Court, rule 985(j). Vargas filed his notice of appeal on May 26, 2006.
Former California Rules of Court, rule 985(j), referring to proceedings in forma pauperis, is now covered in substance in rules 3.50-3.63.
DISCUSSION
We will first address procedural issues about the method in which the injunction request was denied and the dismissal of the petition was accomplished. We then discuss the extent to which the "petition for writ of mandate and declaratory/injunctive relief" adequately pled any request for relief regarding the merits of Vargas's arguments against the enforcement of subject regulations.
I
APPEALABLE ORDERS
Where a trial court's denial of a petition for a writ of mandate effectively disposes of all issues raised in the action or pleading, by completely resolving all essential allegations, then it amounts to a final judgment that is appealable. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com'n (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 698.) In a petition for ordinary mandamus under section 1085, the courts will examine whether the petition has made its prima facie case of entitlement to the relief requested, by adequately alleging the duties and the rights asserted. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Administrative Proceedings, § 117, p. 1162.) Administrative rulemaking is subject to review in mandamus, and relief will be issued if the agency or official has a clear, present ministerial duty regarding the rule, and the petitioner has a clear, present and beneficial right to performance of the duty. (Ibid.) Where an agency has clearly abused its discretion, relief in mandamus is available. (Ibid.)
Likewise, a party may seek declaratory relief if a proper subject for such relief is pled, and there is an actual controversy about the rights and obligations of the party. (§ 1060.) The validity of an administrative regulation is a proper subject of declaratory relief. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 815, pp. 270-272; Charles L. Harney, Inc. v. Contractors State License Board (1952) 39 Cal.2d 561, 564.) A court may issue a declaration of rights if the pleading states sufficient facts, even if the plaintiff did not appropriately label the complaint or cite to section 1060. (Knox v. Wolfe (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 494, 505; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 810, p. 265.) Witkin observes that no particular forms of action are prescribed for declaratory relief requests. (Ibid.; see Faunce v. Denton (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 191, 194-195.)
In Escamilla v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511, this court cited authorities to the effect that the label given to "a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative; rather, the true nature of a petition or cause of action is based on the facts alleged and remedy sought in that pleading. [Citations.]" The proper inquiry should be whether the facts alleged in the pleading are sufficient to support a claim for the type of specific recovery sought. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court activity consisted of (1) an ex-parte hearing initiated by petitioner, and an order denying injunctive relief; (2) the court clerk's communications by letter in response to petitioner's inquiries about copies of the orders; and (3) a court order denying a transcript. In Kingston v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1961) 271 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 (Kingston), the trial court dismissed a petition "out of hand" because it appeared on the face of the petition that a preliminary writ could not be granted. (Id. at p. 552.) The court exercised its discretion to deny injunctive relief, determined no further issues remained, and summarily dismissed the petition. (Ibid.)
Here, however, more than a request for a writ of mandate is fairly encompassed by both the caption and the substance of these pleadings. Clearly, it would have been the better practice for the trial court to recognize that the denial of the provisional remedy, a preliminary injunction, did not dispose of the issues encompassed by the pleading as a whole. The court could have directed the clerk to give some form of notice of any proposed court decision to dismiss the action, such as at the planned case management conference, through an order to show cause or otherwise.
The only semblance of a dismissal order in the record is the trial court's denial of an application for a copy of the order, based on the fee waiver claim (former Cal. Rules of Court, rule 985(j)). Even though the denial of the request for an injunction is properly appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6), we are reluctant to construe these orders and letters as also constituting a final judgment of dismissal that may be appealed under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1), in light of the several references in the petition to a declaratory relief request. Instead, the proper approach is to review the order regarding the injunction on its merits, and then consider whether any colorable requests for declaratory relief remain for resolution under a proper reading of the petition, and in light of the questionable dismissal practices used here. We will accordingly address the substantive challenges to the regulation, both in terms of the injunction and the pleading as a whole.
II
MERITS
With respect to the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, this court must determine whether Vargas showed an immediate need for relief, in light of the balance of the equities. The trial court's order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. v. Marriott Hotels, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 615, 624.)
Vargas claims section 54030.1 et seq. of the DOM, found in chapter 5, article 43, Inmate Property, imposes unwarranted limitations on a wide variety of inmate possessions, beyond the scope allowed by California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3190, thus constituting an underground regulation as proscribed by the APA. DOM section 54030.1 et seq. establishes inmate personal property volume limits; establishes permissible methods of acquisition of personal property; lists approved criteria; and describes the approval process for vendors, among other things. Vargas claims DOM section 54030.1 et seq. results in the seizure of property without proper reimbursement and amount to a violation of due process, in light of his indigent status. He refers to items such as CD players, CD's, radios, toiletry products and clothing in excess of maximum numbers allowed under DOM section 54030.1 et seq. and its "Authorized Personal Property Schedule," which is found in DOM section 54030.17.
California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3190, establishes general policies for the amount and type of personal property items that inmates shall be permitted to possess, both state issued and private property, according to their level of privileges "and/or assigned security level and/or institution mission."
California statutes provide authority to restrict a prisoner's rights so long as the restriction reasonably relates to legitimate penological interests. (Pen. Code, §§ 2600, 2601, 5058; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3190.) Toward this end, restrictions can be enacted and imposed upon inmates in order to maintain the security and safety of the prison. (In re Alcala (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 345, 360-361; Thompson v. Dept. of Corrections (2001) 25 Cal.4th 117, 131-133.) According to the declaration provided by Vargas, Warden Scribner began imposing restrictions based on this portion of the DOM and enforcing them to a greater degree than had previously been done, directly in response to a particular prisoner's attempted homicide on a prison staff member on March 20, 2006. Other such attacks had previously been made at the facility.
On this record, we cannot determine that the enforcement of the provisions of DOM section 54030.1 et seq., by Warden Scribner in light of all the circumstances at the time, in an effort to maintain the security of prison conditions and staff, was unwarranted or excessive, in light of his interpretation of his official duties. (Alcala, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 361.) Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Vargas had failed to demonstrate an immediate need for or right to the relief requested, since both statutory and regulatory provisions generally allow an inmate's rights to be restricted in order to maintain the safety of the prison.
Escamilla, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 498, is not controlling on the merits here because it deals with different duties of a governmental entity to return claimed property to its owner, pursuant to Penal Code section 2085 and Government Code section 26640. (Escamilla, supra, at p. 510, fn. 10.) Such duties will remain subject to the limitations of Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601, related to legitimate penological interests, the same issue presented here. (Escamilla, supra, at p. 510, fn. 10.)
With respect to the trial court's ruling that evidently dismissed the petition as a whole, we next seek to determine whether the court properly denied all further hearings or relief concerning the allegations in the petition, after the preliminary injunction request was denied. In his amended petition, Vargas contends the amendments to DOM, chapter 5, article 43, section 54030.1 et seq. are invalid because they are more restrictive than those prescribed by California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3190. Apparently, Vargas is arguing that he could be in compliance with those state regulations while still violating the manual's level of restrictions (e.g., possession of personal hygiene articles, clothing, and other necessities in certain quantities). As an attachment to the original petition, he includes his declaration outlining the property that he claims was unlawfully confiscated.
Vargas also contends the amended regulation as applied is invalid because it imposes on him, an indigent, an undue financial burden in violation of due process, and it is being enforced in a capricious manner by the warden of Calipatria. His petition sought not only relief in mandamus but also declaratory relief on the basis that there is an actual controversy regarding the respective rights and duties of petitioner and respondent, and petitioner seeks "a declaration invalidating certain provisions of the Policy (D.O.M. section 54030.1 et seq.) . . .," before any continued enforcement of the policy.
We disregard any purported class action allegations in the pleading at this time because no such issues are currently before us. We express no opinion on the merits of any of Vargas's suggested amendments in his supplemental brief.
The Attorney General responds only that Vargas chose a petition in mandamus to challenge the regulation, but mandamus is inappropriate if another adequate remedy at law is available. (§ 1086.) We believe this response is too narrow an approach and incorrectly disregards the declaratory relief language and facts pled in the petition. In addition, the summary dismissal was not accomplished by the trial court in a procedurally correct method. The record does not show that the trial court was provided with any appropriate requests for dismissal. The court abused its discretion in denying further hearings because this case does not fit within the rule that a court may dismiss a petition out of hand when the writ is denied and there are no other available legal remedies that have been implicated. (See, Kingston, supra, 271 Cal.App.2d 549, 552.) Here, the petitioner made a colorable attempt to plead entitlement to declaratory relief, which is an alternative remedy, and it cannot be determined at this point as a matter of law whether the imposition and enforcement of these regulations amounted to a denial of due process under all the circumstances.
Finally, we emphasize that we have evaluated this record only in light of what the trial court had before it. We decide only the issues before us and based on well-accepted liberal rules of pleading, we reverse the purported judgment of dismissal and direct the trial court to reinstate the previously scheduled case management conference to evaluate the current status of the pleadings, and to entertain any appropriate requests for amendment or dismissal of the amended petition's current request for declaratory relief.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the preliminary injunction is affirmed and the judgment of dismissal is reversed, with directions to the trial court to reinstate the previously scheduled case management conference to evaluate the current status of the pleadings and to entertain any appropriate request for amendment or dismissal of the amended petition's request for declaratory relief. No costs on appeal shall be awarded.
WE CONCUR: AARON, J., IRION, J.