Opinion
Case No. 2:04-CV-002 DAK.
March 7, 2005
ORDER
Before the court is an action filed by Plaintiff, Brad J. Vanzant, asking the court to reverse the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (hereafter referred to as "DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (hereafter referred to as "SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 401-433, § 1381-1385 (2003 Supp. 2004). Plaintiff's application was denied because the Administrative Law Judge (hereafter referred to as "ALJ") found that although Plaintiff is unable to return to his past relevant work, he is capable of making an adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, and therefore is not disabled. Plaintiff now challenges the ALJ's decision by arguing that it is legally erroneous and is not supported by substantial evidence.
The court has carefully reviewed the memoranda and the complete record in this matter and concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not legally erroneous. As a result, the ALJ's decision is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on November 20, 2001, alleging an inability to work beginning September 26, 2000. (File Entry #9, The Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Entire Record of the Administrative Proceedings Relating to Brad J. Vanzant (hereafter referred to as "Tr. ___") 14, 15.) Plaintiff's claim was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review. (Tr. 41-43, 47-49.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 39.) The hearing before the ALJ occurred August 13, 2002. (Tr. 217-259.)
In his September 24, 2002 decision, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim, finding that although Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work, Plaintiff was able to perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. (Tr. 19-21.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's subsequent request for review. (Tr. 4-6.)
On January 15, 2004, after receiving the Appeals Council's denial of his request for review, Plaintiff filed the instant action and the case was assigned to United States District Judge Dale A. Kimball. (File Entry #3.) On February 9, 2004, Judge Kimball referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (File Entries #4, 5.) Defendant then filed her answer along with the administrative record on April 23, 2004. (File Entries #8, 9.)
On October 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed his memorandum. (File Entry #19.) On November 8, 2004, Defendant filed her memorandum. (File Entry #21.) On January, 18, 2005, Plaintiff filed his reply memorandum. (File Entry #23.)
On May 11, 2004, the parties filed a joint statement consenting to have the magistrate judge conduct all proceedings and enter final judgement in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (File Entry #12.) Accordingly, on July 8, 2004, Judge Kimball referred to case to Magistrate Judge Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (File Entry #15.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court reviews the Commissioner's decision "to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether correct legal standards were applied." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003); accord Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003).
The Commissioner's findings, "if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (Supp. 2004). "`Substantial evidence' requires `more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance,' and is satisfied by such relevant `evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion.'" Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). "`Evidence is not substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) — or if it really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion."'" Id. at 805 (citations omitted); see also O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly contradicted by other evidence."); Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992) ("A finding of `"no substantial evidence" will be found only where there is a "conspicuous absence of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidence."'" (Citations omitted.)).
In conducting its review, the court "must examine the record closely to determine whether substantial evidence supports" the Commissioner's decision. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1019 (10th Cir. 1996). The court may "`neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.'" White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). However, the court is not required to mechanically accept the Commissioner's findings. See Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1992) ("By the same token, we must do more than merely rubber stamp the decisions of the [Commissioner]."). Rather, the court must "`examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the [Commissioner's] decision and, on that basis, determine if the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.'" Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The court's review of the record includes any evidence Plaintiff presented for the first time to the Appeals Council. See O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 858-59.
The court typically defers to the ALJ on issues of witness credibility. See Hamilton v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, "`[f]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence.'" Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1020 (citation omitted).
The court's review also extends to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000). Besides the lack of substantial evidence, reversal may be appropriate where the Commissioner uses the wrong legal standards or the Commissioner fails to demonstrate reliance on the correct legal standards. See Glass v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1392, 1395 (10th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993); Andrade v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence and is legally erroneous. Plaintiff specifically presents three arguments in his challenge to the ALJ's determination. Plaintiff argues that: 1) the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity; 2) the ALJ erred in failing to properly analyze Plaintiff's allegations of chronic pain; and 3) testimony provided by the Vocational Expert was flawed and thus cannot stand as substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. After consideration of these arguments and careful review of the record, the court concludes Plaintiff's arguments lack merit.A. Residual Functional Capacity Determination
In making a determination regarding Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity (hereafter "RFC"), the ALJ must "include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports" the ultimate conclusion. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *7. The RFC assessment must not be expressed initially in terms of the exertional categories such as "sedentary [or] light"; rather, a correct RFC evaluation must include a function-by-function analysis of Plaintiff's ability to perform work-related activities. Id. at *3.Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made conclusory and incomplete findings regarding Plaintiff's RFC by failing to "specifically assess the `physical demands of work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions. . . .'" (File Entry #23, at 5 (citation omitted.)) After thorough review of the entire record, the court finds Plaintiff's argument unsubstantiated.
The ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiff maintains the RFC to perform "sedentary work at the unskilled level with an option to sit/stand at will." (Tr. 18.) Although in a somewhat oblique manner, the ALJ did provide a function-by-function assessment within his discussion prior to his pronouncement of this determination. (Tr. 15-20.) In his discussion of Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ addresses the opinions of Plaintiff's physical therapists. The ALJ specifically identifies the therapists' conclusions regarding Plaintiff's ability to perform work "wherein he could be seated at least 50% of the work day with the opportunity to alternate between sitting and standing throughout the day" and lifting no more than thirty pounds. (Tr. 17, 176-177.) Additionally, the ALJ discussed physical therapists' notes that indicate Plaintiff's ability to perform numerous physical therapy exercises without difficulty or complaint of knee pain. (Tr. 17, 141, 142, 145, 152.)
The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff's treating physician's determination that Plaintiff has the capacity to perform "light work at a desk with the ability to frequently ambulate to prevent stiffness and pain in his knee." (Tr. 17, 211.) Moreover, the ALJ specifically references the report provided by the state agency's physician in his discussion of Plaintiff's RFC determination. (Tr. 18, 198-209.) The scope of this medical report incorporates all elements of the functional analysis required in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, including limitations on Plaintiff's ability to: lift and/or carry with frequency, sit and walk with normal breaks, and push and pull. Additionally, the analysis included postural and manipulative limitations including reaching, handling, and fingering. (Tr. 198-202). Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff's claim that the "weight of the medical evidence . . . is contradictory to the state agency physician['s] findings," Plaintiff's medical history supports the ALJ's determination and provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination regarding Plaintiff's RFC. (File Entry #23, at 10); see Forson v. Commissioner of the Social Sec. Admin., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1248-1249 (D. Kan. 2003) (ALJ's direct narrative and discussion of specifically identified medical sources regarding the limitations included in RFC assessment provides substantial evidence for RFC analysis). As a result, the court rejects Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ's RFC assessment was deficient.
B. Chronic Pain Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the "ALJ's evaluation of [Plaintiff's] complaints of disabling pain was nonexistent." (File Entry #19, at 25.) In advancing this argument, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination regarding Plaintiff's credibility is not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ did not cite or discuss in depth any factors contradicting his credibility. The court finds this argument unsupported by the record.
"`Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and [a reviewing court] will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.'" Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[F]indings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings." (Citation omitted.)). After reviewing the record in its entirety, the court finds no error regarding the ALJ's credibility findings.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's "statements concerning his impairments and their impact on his ability to work are not entirely credible." (Tr. 17.) In support of this finding, the ALJ points to Plaintiff's own description of his daily activities and lifestyle, "the degree of medical treatment required, discrepancies between the [Plaintiff's] assertions and information contained in the documentary reports, the medical history, the findings made on examination and the [Plaintiff's] assertions concerning his ability to work." (Tr. 18.) Specifically, the ALJ noted no treating or examining physician indicated that Plaintiff was disabled or had limitations greater than those incorporated by the ALJ in his determination. (Tr. 18.) Additionally, the ALJ cited Plaintiff's testimony that his pain is only a two, on a scale of one to ten, when taking his medication as directed. (Tr. 18, 234.) Therefore, the ALJ provided specific, credible reasons for finding Plaintiff's statements not entirely credible. In such a case, it is impermissible for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, and the court denies a request to do so. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1371 (10th Cir. 2000). As a result, the court rejects Plaintiff's argument.
C. Vocational Expert Testimony
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ failed to describe all of Plaintiff's claimed impairments in the hypothetical question presented to the Vocational Expert (hereafter "VE") and thus the VE's response to the inquiry cannot stand as substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not elicit positive support from the VE regarding apparent inconsistencies between the VE's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (hereafter "DOT"). The court concludes this argument lacks merit.
Upon a thorough review of the record, this court finds the ALJ did specifically inquire regarding the consistency of the VE's testimony and information contained within the DOT. (Tr. 257.) Moreover, the court has previously rejected Plaintiff's challenge to the ALJ's RFC assessment. The information contained in the ALJ's hypothetical to the VE included all the limitations the ALJ ultimately included in his RFC assessment. See Qualls at 1373. Plaintiff's hepatitis condition, hearing limitation and alleged difficulties regarding manual dexterity did not rise to the level of significance for inclusion in that determination. (Tr. 17, 196.) Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, this court finds the hypothetical question posed to the VE was founded upon substantial information in the medical record. The VE's answer provided proper support for the ALJ's decision regarding Plaintiff's disability status. See Qualls at 1373. The court rejects Plaintiff's argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, the court concludes that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and is not legally erroneous. As a result, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Plaintiff's request for reversal or remand be DENIED and the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.