Opinion
1:21-cv-172
12-22-2022
JEREMIAH LYLE VANTASSEL, Petitioner v. MICHAEL CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSH SHAPIRO, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ERIE COUNTY, Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF NO. 1)
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner Jeremiah Lyle Vantassel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, serving a sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania. It is respectfully recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed as untimely and that no certificate of appealability issue.
II. Report
A. Procedural history
A review of the record and the criminal docket for Petitioner's underlying convictions in Commonwealth v. Vantassel, No. CP-25-CR-0002154-2016 (Erie Cnty. Com. Pl.) reveals the following. On April 19, 2018, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of rape of a child and multiple other related crimes. On June 5, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term on 16/2 to 33 years' imprisonment.
On April 3, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. The petition was dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner appealed the dismissal; the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal on July 13, 2020. Commonwealth v. Vantassel, 239 A.3d 67 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum). Petitioner did not seek further review.
Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 6, 2021. ECF No. 1. A response was subsequently filed. ECF No. 16. Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 20.
Upon initial review of the petition, it appeared to the undersigned that Petitioner's claims were subject to dismissal under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. However, in the response to the petition, the Erie County District Attorney's Office calculated the limitations period and concluded that the petition is timely. ECF No. 16 at 3-5. The method by which this conclusion was reached was not clear from the response but, at a minimum, it was based on an inaccurate timeline.
The Court is not bound by the respondents' computation and may raise the issue sua sponte as long as the petitioner is given fair notice and an opportunity to respond and is not prejudiced. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205-10 (2006); United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 16170 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc). See also Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834 (2012). In order to provide Petitioner with the required notice and opportunity to respond, the undersigned issued a Show Cause Order, ECF No. 25, setting forth all relevant facts and law. Petitioner has filed a response to that order. ECF No. 28.
B. Analysis
AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners seeking federal habeas review. It is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this section.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). Caldwell v. Mahally, etal., 2019 WL 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. at *6. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id. at *8.
Petitioner asserts two trial-related grounds for relief in his petition. ECF No. 1 at 5-6. The “trigger date” for these claims is the date on which Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final. That date was July 5,2018, when the time for filing a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence expired. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review). The one-year limitations period for filing a habeas corpus petition was triggered on that date. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, Petitioner had to file any federal habeas petition concerning these claims on or before July 5, 2019.
The grounds for relief are: (1) “Petitioner was given the choice of defense attorneys who refused to defend or proceeding pro se,” ECF No. 1 at 5; and (2) “State trial judge vouched for prosecution witness,” id. at 6.
However, Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding. Petitioner's PCRA petition was pending for 497 days: from April 3, 2019, when he filed it, until August 12, 2020, at the expiration of the time for filing with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a petition for allowance of appeal from the Superior Court's order affirming the dismissal of the PCRA petition. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a), Swartz, 204 F.3d at 420-21. Tacking the tolled period of 497 days onto the original expiration date of July 5, 2019, Petitioner had to file his habeas petition by November 13, 2020. As set forth above, the instant petition was filed on July 6, 2021, more than seven months later.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that AEDPA's statute-of-limitation period “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows both that (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. Id. at 2562. See also United States v. Thomas, 2013 WL 1442489, *7-8 (3d Cir. Apr. 10, 2013); Ross v. Varano, 2013 WL 1363525, *9-11 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2013); Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 329-32 (3d Cir. 2012).
In his response to the Show Cause Order, Petitioner invokes equitable tolling, baldly asserting that he exercised “reasonable diligence” and that he “faced extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of timely filing.” ECF No. 28 at 1. However, Petitioner does not support these assertions. Instead, he sets forth multiple definitions of fraud upon the court and attaches a of witnesses or victims. Id. at 3-5; ECF No. 28-1. In the May 27,2021, private criminal complaint, Petitioner accused the prosecutor of witness tampering by using “a lot of facial expressions and talking with her hands” while questioning the victim. ECF No. 28-1 at 2. Petitioner asserts therein that he learned that this technique constituted witness tampering after an “experienced paralegal” reviewed the trial transcripts. Id.
Petitioner does not explain how the prosecutor's alleged witness tampering in any way prevented him from timely filing of a habeas petition which does not raise the witness tampering as a ground for relief. A generous reading of the response to the show cause order reveals an argument that the prosecutor's alleged actions at trial amounted to a fraud upon the court which rendered the verdict a nullity and thus the subsequent judgment of sentence never became final. ECF No. 28 at 4. This argument is wholly unavailing.
The petition is untimely and should be dismissed on this basis.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from ... the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,484 (2000). Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claims should be dismissed as untimely. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability should issue.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
Dated: December 22,2022 '
idCHAM) A. LANZILLO
Chief United States Magistrate Judge