Opinion
A-14139 7136
12-11-2024
ROBERT W. VANREENAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Jay A. Hochberg, Attorney at Law, Honolulu, Hawaii, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Kayla H. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks Trial Court No. 4FA-20-00748 CR Brent E. Bennett, Judge.
Jay A. Hochberg, Attorney at Law, Honolulu, Hawaii, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Kayla H. Doyle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ALLARD, JUDGE
Robert W.VanReenan was stopped for trespassing after police noticed his vehicle in a local cemetery after hours. During the stop, police discovered a shotgun with the serial number painted over and arrested VanReenan. Police then searched VanReenan's vehicle and discovered a handgun in the center console.
VanReenan was charged with two counts of third-degree weapons misconduct - one count for covering the serial number on the shotgun, and one count for possessing a concealable weapon as a felon. VanReenan filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained in connection with the stop, including the handgun. The superior court denied VanReenan's motion, concluding that police lawfully searched VanReenan's vehicle incident to his arrest on officer safety grounds.
AS 11.61.200(a)(5) and (a)(1), respectively.
The case proceeded to trial. VanReenan was convicted for possessing the handgun but acquitted for covering the shotgun's serial number. On appeal, VanReenan argues that the search of his car was not a valid search incident to arrest and that the superior court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress.
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the superior court erred in finding the search of VanReenan's vehicle was proper on officer safety grounds, but we nevertheless affirm on the alternative ground that the search was a lawful search incident to arrest for relevant evidence.
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009).
Background facts
Around midnight on March 20, 2020, VanReenan and his then-fiancee drove to a local cemetery. A Fairbanks police officer patrolling the area noticed the vehicle and stopped the couple for trespassing. The officer asked VanReenan for his driver's license and if he had any firearms in the vehicle. VanReenan stated there were no firearms in the vehicle and gave the officer his identification since he did not have a valid license.
After verifying the couple's information with dispatch, the officer told them they had to leave because the cemetery was closed, and instructed VanReenan to trade places in the vehicle with his then-fiancee, who had a valid license. When VanReenan opened his door, the officer observed a shotgun wedged between the seat and door and detained VanReenan. Upon inspection, the officer noticed the shotgun's serial number had been painted over and was illegible. After being advised of his Miranda rights, VanReenan admitted to painting the shotgun and was placed under arrest.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Another officer on scene searched VanReenan and found loose shotgun shells in his coat. The officer asked VanReenan if he had any more ammunition in his coat or anything that would get him in trouble at the jail. VanReenan stated he had "more shells in the -," but the officer cut him off before he could finish his sentence. Shortly after VanReenan's statement, the initial officer searched VanReenan's vehicle and found a box of shotgun shells on the driver's side floorboard and a handgun in the center console. The officer asked VanReenan about the handgun, and VanReenan stated he had bought it from someone in Anchorage a few weeks prior.
Based on VanReenan's admission that he had painted the shotgun, he was charged with one count of third-degree weapons misconduct for covering the manufacturer's serial number. And because VanReenan had a prior felony conviction, he was charged with an additional count of third-degree weapons misconduct for possessing a concealable weapon.
AS 11.61.200(a)(5).
AS 11.61.200(a)(1).
VanReenan filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter alia, that the handgun was discovered during an unlawful search. The State opposed, arguing, inter alia, that the search of VanReenan's vehicle was a lawful search incident to arrest. The superior court denied VanReenan's motion to suppress. Of relevance to this appeal, the court concluded that the search of VanReenan's vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest on officer safety grounds.
At trial, VanReenan was acquitted for covering the shotgun's serial number, but convicted for being a felon in possession of a concealable weapon. VanReenan now appeals.
Why we conclude that the search of VanReenan's vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest for relevant evidence
Because VanReenan was acquitted of the weapons misconduct charge related to the shotgun, the only issue before us on appeal is whether the officer's search of the car's center console after VanReenan was arrested was constitutional.
"A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." One recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest - i.e., the search of an arrestee's person and immediate surroundings that usually occurs shortly after they are arrested.
Crawford v. State, 138 P.3d 254, 258 (Alaska 2006) (citing Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 514 (Alaska 1973)).
Id. (citing McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 130 (Alaska 2006)); Johnson v. State, 88 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Alaska App. 2004) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-36 (1973)).
Prior to 2009, the search of VanReenan's vehicle incident to arrest for officer safety purposes would have been considered proper under the United States Supreme Court's then-existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which had been "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search." Similarly, although Alaska recognized greater restrictions on the scope of such searches (that is, which parts of a vehicle could be searched), we were consistent with federal courts in permitting them even when the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009).
Compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that police can "examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment" (emphasis added)), with Crawford, 138 P.3d at 261 (limiting the search of containers found in a vehicle pursuant to a search incident to arrest to those containers "immediately associated with the person"). We note that Crawford held that a center console is "immediately associated" with the driver of a vehicle. Crawford, 138 P.3d at 259. It is therefore clear that if police were permitted to search VanReenan's vehicle as part of a search incident to arrest, they were permitted to search the center console. But see Pitka v. State, 378 P.3d 398, 405 (Alaska App. 2016) (Mannheimer, C.J., concurring) (arguing that Crawford "is in conflict" with our supreme court's earlier jurisprudence on the topic).
See Crawford, 138 P.3d at 261-62 (holding that a search of the defendant's center console was a proper search incident to arrest even when the defendant "was handcuffed in the back seat of a police car").
But federal law on this issue changed in 2009 with the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant. In Gant, the Supreme Court rejected the widely understood interpretation of its prior cases as allowing a vehicle search incident to the arrest even when the arrestee could not gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. Instead, Gant held that police were authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest in only two circumstances: first, "when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" (i.e., on officer safety grounds); and second, "when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.'"
Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
Id. at 341-43.
Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
It is clear the first circumstance is not applicable here. As the State concedes, VanReenan was handcuffed in the back of a police car when the search was conducted and thus was not "within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." Accordingly, we conclude the superior court erred in finding the search of VanReenan's vehicle was proper on officer safety grounds.
See Deemer v. State, 244 P.3d 69, 71 (Alaska App. 2010) ("Because [the defendant] was sitting handcuffed in the back of a trooper patrol car at the time of the search, it is obvious that the search of [the defendant's] vehicle can not be justified as a search for weapons under the Fourth Amendment (as construed in Gant).").
This leaves us to determine whether it was reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime that VanReenan was arrested for might be found in the vehicle.
When this issue was litigated in the superior court, the State argued it was reasonable to believe the paint VanReenan used on the shotgun might be found in the center console. The superior court rejected this argument, concluding that "searching for paint, without more facts, [was not] a proper justification to search a vehicle incident to arrest for covering or altering a serial number."
We conclude that we need not address whether there was adequate reason to believe that there was spray paint in the center console because the police also had additional information that made it reasonable to believe that other indicia of possession or ownership such as ammunition was in the car. The police discovered loose shotgun shells on VanReenan when they first searched him, and when police asked VanReenan if he had more ammunition in his coat, VanReenan said he had "more shells in the -," before being cut off.
Based on this interaction, we conclude that the totality of facts available to the officers was sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that ammunition would be found in VanReenan's vehicle. The police were therefore justified in searching the vehicle under Gant's exception to the warrant requirement for evidence relevant to the crime, and we affirm on this alternative ground.
See Pruitt v. State, 829 P.2d 1197, 1199 n.1 (Alaska App. 1992) (explaining that an appellate court may affirm a trial court decision on alternative grounds revealed by the record (quoting Wright v. State, 824 P.2d 718, 720 (Alaska 1992))).
Conclusion
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude the search of VanReenan's vehicle was lawful. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.