The Legislature did not so pen West Virginia Code ยง 15A-4-17(i)(2) and "we cannot rewrite the statute โฆ nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words." VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988).
Furthermore, this Court " โcannot rewrite a statute so as to provide relief ... nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.โ VanKirk v. Young , 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988)."
Worley v. Beckley Mech., Inc., 220 W.Va. 633, 643, 648 S.E.2d 620, 630 (2007) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added; internal quotations and citations omitted). See also VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988) (โWhile it is unfortunate that the legislature did not foresee the situation now before us, we cannot rewrite the statute so as to provide relief ..., nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.โ). Thus, to the extent that the prevailing statute, W. Va.Code ยง 38โ1โ3, addresses the manner in which trustee sales are to be conducted, but is silent as to what should be done when the trustee sale proceeds are not sufficient to fulfill the balance of the remaining indebtedness, it is for the Legislature to address this consequenceโnot this Court.
Worley v. Beckley Mech., Inc., 220 W.Va. 633, 643, 648 S.E.2d 620, 630 (2007) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added; internal quotations and citations omitted). See also VanKirk v. Young, 180 W.Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988) (โWhile it is unfortunate that the legislature did not foresee the situation now before us, we cannot rewrite the statute so as to provide relief ..., nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.โ). Thus, to the extent that the prevailing
We have held on a number of occasions that "[t]his court `cannot rewrite [a] statute so as to provide relief . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.'" McVey v. Pritt, 218 W. Va. 537, 540-41, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302-03 (2005) (quoting VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988)). Accord Dunlap v. Friedman's, Inc., 213 W. Va. 394, 398, 582 S.E.2d 841, 845 (2003) ("[T]his Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature and significantly rewrite the statute."
This court "cannot rewrite [a] statute so as to provide relief . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words." VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988). Since there is no ambiguity in the first provision of W. Va. Code ยง 17C-5A-2, which unequivocally refers to previous suspensions, as well as previous revocations, of a person's driver's license under W. Va. Code ยง 17-C-5A-1 or under W. Va. Code ยง 17-C-5A-2, and since McVey's previous suspension falls within the time period specified, the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles has no discretion. The Commissioner "shall" revoke the person's driver's license for a period of ten years according to the clearly expressed legislative intent in W. Va. Code ยง 17C-5A-2(i).
It is only in rare instances that we will negate the meaning of a plain and unambiguous statute, and the City raises none of these exceptions. Indeed, "[w]hile it is unfortunate that the legislature did not foresee the situation now before us, we cannot rewrite the statute so as to provide relief . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words." Van Kirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20, 375 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1988). See, e.g., Frazier, 193 W. Va. at 24, 454 S.E.2d at 69 ("Although courts should not ordinarily stray beyond the plain language of unambiguous statutes, we recognize the need to depart from the statutory language in exceptional circumstances.").
Syllabus point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959)." Syllabus point 1, VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988). Syl. pt. 3, Webster County Comm'n v. Clayton, 206 W. Va. 107, 522 S.E.2d 201 (1999).
Therefore, we must apply, rather than construe its terms. See Syl. pt. 1, VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988). A strict application of W. Va. Code ยง 55-7B-8 in the year 2000 is problematic, though, because the legislative intent of allowing a maximum recovery of one million dollars cannot be achieved.
Syllabus point 5, State of West Virginia v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). Syl. pt. 1, VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 375 S.E.2d 196 (1988). See also Syl. pt. 4, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. West Virginia Dev. Office, 206 W. Va. 51, 521 S.E.2d 543 (1999) (same).