Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-711
11-01-2022
DAVID ALLEN VANHORN, Plaintiff v. COLLEEN MANCUSO, Defendant
MARIANI, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
David Allen Vanhorn (“Plaintiff”), an inmate confined in the Monroe County Correctional Facility, has filed a complaint asserting claims related to his state court criminal proceeding against the judge in his case, M.D.J. Colleen Mancuso. Plaintiff sought and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 13).
Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because he has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
After reviewing Plaintiff's pleading, the Court finds that he seeks relief from a Defendant who is immune, and that granting leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, it will be RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this case.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 16, 2022, Plaintiff lodged a complaint. (Doc. 1). In that complaint, Plaintiff asserts a civil rights claim against Colleen Mancuso, a magisterial district judge in Monroe County, Pennsylvania.
In support of his claim, Plaintiff alleges:
I was arrested on 11/9/2021 taken to M.C.C.F. then on 12/3/2021 was picked up at M.C.C.F. by officer John A. Heffner taken to preliminary hearing at Mancuso office. The witness didn't show up the charges were dismissed.
Then on 2/4/2022 officer Rau wake me up and told me to go to intake. At intake officer Miller had me go into a room and Judge Mancuso come on a skreen [sic] for another preliminary I asked for a continuance because my lawyer wasn't present she denied me.
I was never rearrested on those charges. Never got mail from Mancuso office check the jail. I feel I was malicious prosecution.(Doc. 1, pp. 2-3) (errors in original). As relief, Plaintiff requests one million dollars in punitive damages.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8: Requirements For A Complaint
A civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs that a complaint must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Under this rule, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. It requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
Furthermore, a document filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se is “to be liberally construed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
B. Statutory Screening Obligation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by a plaintiff who has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis and must dismiss a case sua sponte if: (i) the allegation of poverty is untrue, (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious, (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As observed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “[s]ome form of the IFP statute has been in existence for over a century,” in order to ensure “that no person is barred from ‘pursuing meaningful litigation' solely because of an inability to pay administrative court fees.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In creating this procedure, however, Congress also “recognized that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (cleaned up). The screening provisions in the PLRA were designed to both “preserve the resources of both the courts and the defendants in prisoner litigation” and “ensure fewer and better prisoner suits.” Id. (cleaned up).
When conducting this screening analysis, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At this early stage of the litigation, the district court must:
See, e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
“accept the facts alleged in [a plaintiff's] complaint as true,” “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in [his or her] favor,” and “ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.”A court need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions,' and does not need to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged.
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015); Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 336, 374 (3d Cir. 2021).
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him to relief.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred by Judicial Immunity
Absolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process. This immunity was and still is considered necessary ‘to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.”
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006).
McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts. The Supreme Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have .... [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.Forrester v White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988) (citations omitted).
The Court must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. First, because immunity applies only to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, the court must determine whether the challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. The relevant factors “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his [or her] judicial capacity.' “Our task is to ‘draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts.”
Id. at 211 F.3d at 768.
Id. at 768-69 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
Id. at 769 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” In this regard, “we must distinguish between acts in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in ‘excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection.” Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. “In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such ‘specifics' as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision.”
Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6).
Id.; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 4, 2022, he appeared before MDJ Mancuso for a preliminary hearing. Presiding over a preliminary hearing is clearly a judicial act. Nothing in the complaint suggests the judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against MDJ Mancuso should be dismissed.
B. Leave to Amend
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Dismissals of frivolous claims, however, do not require leave to amend.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-113 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Third Circuit has held that claims barred by judicial immunity are legally frivolous and that amendment of such claims is futile. Therefore, leave to amend should be denied.
See Martinez v. United States, 838 Fed.Appx. 662 (3d Cir. 2020).
C. Remedy for Judicial Misconduct
If the Plaintiff believes that a State Court Judge has committed misconduct, he should file a complaint with the Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board. The information on how to file a complaint against a judge can be found on the Board's website: http://judicialconductboardofpa.org/ which states:
“To have a Confidential Request for Investigation form sent to you, please contact the office at (717) 234-7911 or email contactus@jcbpa.org. If you have a printer, you may download the Confidential Request for Investigation form available under the “Filing a Complaint” tab on this website.”
This court does not have the authority to remove a state court judge, even if her conduct was discriminatory. That authority rests with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court using a procedure involving the Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline.
Pa Constitution, Article V, Section 18; 42 Pa.C.S. §2101 et. seq.; Code of Judicial Conduct (Effective July 1, 2014).
V. RECOMMENDATION
After reviewing Plaintiff's pleading, the Court finds that he seeks relief from a Defendant who is immune, and that granting leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.