Such consent need not be expressly given, but may be implied from the surrounding circumstances or from his conduct." Vanguard Construction Company, Inc. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1977).          Where a continuing guaranty expressly provides that the time of payment of the underlying debt may be altered or other guarantors released from time to time without notice, the guarantors thereunder have consented to such alterations of their guaranty and have waived any right to a discharge because of them. U.S. Home Acceptance Corp. v. Kelly Park Hills, Inc., 542 So.2d 463 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1989).

The appellate court should defer to a trial court's well-reasoned equitable findings. See Vanguard Constr. Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Nevertheless, the conduct constituting the unclean hands, which the court uses as a basis to reduce the deficiency judgment, must generally be connected with the matter in litigation and must affect the adverse party.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Taylor v. Prine, 101 Fla. 967, 132 So. 464 (1931); Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175 (Fla. 1925); Valcin v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 473 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Vanguard Construction Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Washington Federal Savings Loan Association v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp., 414 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), review denied, 424 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1982); Larsen v. Allocca, 187 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) cert. denied, 195 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1966); Matlack v. Owen, 181 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).

The record below sufficiently establishes that the issue, whether Barnett could be held liable to JNB in the absence of some court order or other process establishing JNB's right to funds in Perfecta's checking account with Barnett, was posed by the court and treated by the parties as within the issues being tried by the trial court. Rule 1.190(b), Fla.R.Civ.P.; Vanguard Construction Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Pike v. National Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 377 So.2d 973, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The fact that Barnett presented this argument in terms of common law rules espoused in Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, supra, and similar cases does not preclude consideration of the statute for resolution of this appeal. Where a party intends to rely on a specific statute before the trial court, it is preferable to plead the specific statute, but it is not necessary to do so if the facts pleaded are sufficient to bring the case within it since the court takes judicial cognizance of all public statutes.

Thus, an exercise of sound judicial discretion consonant with equity in the light of the facts should not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of a clear abuse of sound judicial discretion. (Citations omitted). See also Carlson v. Becker, 45 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1950); Flagship State Bank of Jacksonville v. Drew Equipment Co., 392 So.2d 609 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Vanguard Construction Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla.1st DCA 1977); Sohn v. Cominole, 253 So.2d 898 (Fla.1st DCA 1971); and Section 702.06, Florida Statutes (1979). Sub judice the foregoing evidence amply supports the trial court's decision.

Waiver and estoppel were therefore obviously tried by the "implied consent of the parties," and are therefore properly "treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(b); Vanguard Construction Co., Inc. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Titusville Enterprises, Inc. v. Newkirk, 205 So.2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). Even assuming arguendo that a formal amendment to the pleadings was appropriate, there was no basis, in view of the manifest lack of prejudice to the defendant, for the trial court's failure to grant the plaintiff's motion to do so below. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(a), (e); Florida Sunshine Coast Development Co., Inc. v. McClung, 352 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Carmichael v. Shelley Tractor Equipment Co., 300 So.2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

Recently in Taines v. Capital City First National Bank, 344 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), we held that certain accommodation parties were not discharged because at the time they executed their endorsements they consented to any extensions or renewals of this note. More recently in Vanguard Construction Company, Inc. v. Lewis State Bank, 348 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), we held that three accommodation parties who endorsed a corporate note and consented to "any extensions or renewals without further notice" were not discharged because they did not later individually execute an extension agreement between Vanguard and the bank. Although our opinion in Vanguard turned upon issues other than whether the endorsers had consented in advance to further extensions and renewals, we noted, "the absence of their physical endorsements of the extension agreement is not conclusive on the issue of their consent, which may be established by other evidence."