Where, as here, the affidavits in support of Section 144 recusal are insufficient to compel disqualification, a district judge has a duty to preside over the case. See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 54 (3d Cir. 1976); Vangarelli v. Whitco Corp., 808 F. Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1992). B. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). There is as much an obligation for judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is. United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1992), on remand 809 F.Supp. 851, certiorari denied 507 U.S. 1033 (1993); see also Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F.Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1992) (Just as judge should remove him or herself from case if moving party raises sufficient allegations regarding judge's bias, judge has affirmative duty not to recuse him or herself if movant fails to establish reasonable doubt concerning his or her impartiality). Recusal and reassignment of judge is not a matter to be lightly undertaken by a district judge; a judge in proper cases has a duty to recuse himself, but also has concomitant obligation not to recuse himself in absence of valid reason for recusal. Simonson v. General Motors Corp., 425 F.Supp. 574 (E.D.Pa. 1976).
See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548. As such, because 28 U.S.C. § 455 does not set forth a specific procedure for seeking a judge's recusal, "courts look for guidance to the procedural requirements of § 144."Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F. Supp. 387, 389 (D.N.J. 1992) (Rodriguez, J.). The submission of affidavits pursuant to § 455, although not required, is commonplace.
As a district judge, I am sworn to adjudicate all cases which come before me unless proper grounds for disqualification exist. See, e.g., Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F. Supp. 387, 389 (D.N.J. 1992). The duty to preside over cases in the absence of lawful grounds for disqualification is vital in the judicial district of the Virgin Islands, which encompasses somewhat more than 100,000 residents, with only two district judges.
(A-30). (31) In Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F.Supp. 387, 389-90 & n. 4 (D.N.J.1992) the district court was forced to " direct its resources to deciding ... a motion for recusal, when even a cursory investigation of the facts would have revealed the spuriousness of the allegations." Kramer claimed that former Governor Byrne, a member of defense counsel's firm, had appointed Judge Rodriguez to a commission, when, in fact, Judge Rodriguez had been appointed by another governor.
Rather, such bias must be one of a personal nature, "not one arising from a judge's view of the law . . . A judge's views on legal issues may not serve as a basis for motion to disqualify." Id. (citing Hale v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); In re M. Ibrahim Khan, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1984); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F.Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1992). As explained by the Supreme Court of the United States in Liteky:
Rather, such bias must be one of a personal nature, "not one arising from a judge's view of the law . . . A judge's views on legal issues may not serve as a basis for motion to disqualify." Id. (citing Hale v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); In re M. Ibrahim Khan, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1984);Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 496 U.S. 543, 110 S.Ct. 2535, 110 L.Ed.2d 492 (1990);Vangarelli v. Witco Corp., 808 F.Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1992). As explained by the Supreme Court of the United States in Liteky:
Any alleged bias that arises from facts that are a matter of record, which a judge learned from his involvement in a case is not sufficient to warrant a recusal. Vangarelli v. Whitco Corn., 808 F. Supp. 387 (D.N.J. 1992). Although certain statement made by a trial judge might have been "intemperate" such statements did not show extrajudicial bias as to warrant recusal.