The appellate court stated the Ciscos' case was distinguishable from the cases relied on by Illinois Farmers. Illinois Farmers relied on Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 731 (1994), Shefner v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 243 Ill. App.3d 683 (1993), Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hecker, 183 Ill. App.3d 13 (1989), and on remand and reconsideration, Luechtefeld v. Allstate Insurance Co., 167 Ill.2d 148 (1995). In these cases, the insured in question owned multiple vehicles and obtained insurance coverage for the vehicles.
Further, the construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that this court determines de novo, with the purpose of ascertaining and effectuating the intention of the parties. Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 731, 735 (1994). In determining if a policy provision is ambiguous, we consider the policy in its entirety.
On appeal, a decision by the trial court to grant such a motion is reviewed de novo. Toombs v. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App.3d 580, 583, 615 N.E.2d 50, 51 (1993). In reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court must determine whether the allegations in the complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 731, 732, 644 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1994). If no set of facts can be proved under the pleadings that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, the reviewing court should affirm the trial court's order. Mount Zion State Bank Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill.2d 110, 115, 660 N.E.2d 863, 867 (1995); Vanek, 268 Ill. App.3d at 732, 644 N.E.2d at 421.
Construction of an insurance policy is a question of law to be determined by this Court, with the purpose of ascertaining and effectuating the intent of the parties through interpretation of the policy as a whole. Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 268 Ill.App.3d 731, 735, 205 Ill.Dec. 863, 867, 644 N.E.2d 419, 423 (1994); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 Ill.2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992). Ambiguity is the only relevant bar to direct application and enforcement of language found in an insurance policy:
Kopier, 291 Ill.App.3d at 141 (citing Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill.App.3d 731, 735 (1994)). If the language of the insurance policy is ambiguous, such that it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, then a court construes that language strictly against the insurer.
Smith v. Armor Plus Co., 248 III. App. 3d 831, 839 (1993). The construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that this court determines de novo. Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 III. App. 3d 731, 735 (1994). ¶ 7 Two or More Cars Insured Provision
As more than 10 years had elapsed, we find that Dial's action was time-barred. As we rely on the 10-year statute of limitations and may affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis shown in the record (Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 731, 736, 644 N.E.2d 419 (1994)), we do not address whether the trial court was correct in enforcing the policy's two-year period of limitations. We also note that the 10-year statute of limitations period is not tolled by operation of section 143.1 of the Illinois Insurance Code. ( 215 ILCS 5/143.1 (West 1996)).
The plaintiff has cited a number of decisions in support of the proposition that policy provisions which do not completely deny uninsured motorist benefits up to the statutory minimum mandated by section 143a are consistent with Illinois public policy. See Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 268 Ill. App.3d 731, 644 N.E.2d 419 (1994); Shefner, 243 Ill. App.3d 683, 611 N.E.2d 626; Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hecker, 183 Ill. App.3d 13, 538 N.E.2d 1277 (1989); Makela v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 147 Ill. App.3d 38, 497 N.E.2d 483 (1986). Each of these cases, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant action.
The plaintiff has cited a number of decisions in support of the proposition that policy provisions which do not completely deny uninsured motorist benefits up to the statutory minimum mandated by section 143a are consistent with Illinois public policy. (See Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. (1994), 268 Ill. App.3d 731, 644 N.E.2d 419; Shefner, 243 Ill. App.3d 683, 611 N.E.2d 626; Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hecker (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 13, 538 N.E.2d 1277; Makela v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1986), 147 Ill. App.3d 38, 497 N.E.2d 483.) Each of these cases, however, is readily distinguishable from the instant action. In each case the plaintiff cites, the injured party was the owner of multiple vehicles insured by the same carrier but with varying levels of uninsured motorist coverage.
Under this language, the trial court in Shefner determined that the language was unambiguous and only entitled plaintiff to the uninsured-motorist coverage provided by the insurance policy on the car in which she was in, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The trial court's determination was upheld on appeal, and Shefner has since been followed in Vanek v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. (2d Dist. June 14, 1994), No. 2-93-0203. Although we agree that there is no ambiguity in this case, we find that construing the policy to allow plaintiff to recover only the uninsured-motorist coverage provided by the Pekin policy violates public policy.