Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson

8 Citing cases

  1. Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co.

    143 N.J. 97 (N.J. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    See, e.g., Copeland v. MBNAAmerica Bank, N.A., ___ Colo. ___, ___, 907 P.2d 87 (1995). Courts and federal agencies have interpreted Section 521 as conferring on federally-insured state banks the same insulation from State usury laws that national banks have enjoyed for over 100 years under the NBA. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826-27 (1st Cir. 1992) (concluding that section 521 permits federally-insured state banks to "export" interest rates), rev'g 776 F. Supp. 21 (D.Mass. 1991); VanderWeyst v.First State Bank, 425 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn.) (concluding that section 521 gives federally-insured state banks "most-favored-lender" status), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 359 (1988); Smiley v. Citibank(South Dakota), N.A., 11 Cal.4th 138, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 465-66, 900 P.2d 690 (1995) (Arabian, J., dissenting); id.44 Cal.Rptr.2d at 467-68, 900 P.2d 690 (George, J., dissenting).

  2. Tafflin v. Levitt

    493 U.S. 455 (1990)   Cited 598 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO claims

    We hold that they do and accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Compare McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 201 (CA3 1989) (concurrent jurisdiction); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1193-1195 (CA4 1988) (same); Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 738-739 (CA9 1987) (same), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988); Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 530 N.E.2d 860 (1988) (same); Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wn.2d 48, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987) (same); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.3d 903, 710 P.2d 375 (1985) (same); County of Cook v. MidCon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 905, n. 4 (CA7 1985) (dictum); Dubroff v. Dubroff, 833 F.2d 557, 562 (CA5 1987) (civil RICO claims can "probably" be brought in state court), with Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280, 1286 (CA6 1988) (exclusive jurisdiction); VanderWeyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d 803, 812 (Minn.) (expressing "serious reservations" about assuming concurrent RICO jurisdiction), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988).

  3. Fogie v. Thorn Americas, Inc.

    95 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1996)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that by prevailing on the merits of its claim, "the plaintiff class has demonstrated that the four factors of this test overwhelmingly militate in favor of an injunction"

    However, if the fee is not related to any separate expenses but is compensation for the use of the money loaned, it must be considered interest. Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988). RAC contends the plaintiff class members agreed to pay the value of additional services because they each agreed to the general "cost of lease services" term in the written contracts.

  4. Hill v. Chemical Bank

    799 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    Holding a claim alleging excessive late fees and over limit fees completely preempted

    Given the similarity of language and the clearly expressed intent of Congress to create parity between state and national banks, § 521 should be interpreted consistently with sections 85 and 86. Other courts concur in this conclusion. See Gavey Properties/762 v. First Financial Savings Loan, 845 F.2d 519, 521 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting DIDA § 522, the analog to § 521 for savings and loans, to "harmonize fully" with § 85 of the National Bank Act); Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d 803 (Minn. 1988) (holding that DIDA § 521 grants federally insured, state chartered banks the most favored lender status enjoyed by national banks). The FDIC has similarly interpreted DIDA § 521 to provide state banks with the same interest rate authority as national banks.

  5. Sherman v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A.

    143 N.J. 35 (N.J. 1995)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that late fees were not "interest"

    The language of section 521 of DIDA essentially mirrors that of section 85 of the NBA. Courts and federal agencies have interpreted section 521 as conferring on federally-insured state banks the same insulation from state usury laws that national banks have enjoyed under the NBA. Id. at 826-27 (concluding that Section 521 permits federally-insured state banks to "export" interest rates); VanderWeyst v. First State Bank, 425 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn.) (concluding that section 521 gives federally-insured state banks "most favored lender" status), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 359 (1988).

  6. Smiley v. Citibank

    11 Cal.4th 138 (Cal. 1995)   Cited 143 times
    Looking to the definition of “interest” at time when the relevant act was passed

    Its purpose is "to achieve a measure of parity and competitive equity between national banks and" federally insured state banks and federally insured branches of foreign banks "by permitting" the latter "to enjoy the same `most favored lender' status that national banks enjoy." ( Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co. (1994) 272 N.J. Super. 526, 533 [ 640 A.2d 855], cert. granted (1994) 138 N.J. 270 [649 A.2d 1289]; accord, VanderWeyst v. First State Bank of Benson (Minn. 1988) 425 N.W.2d 803, 805-807.) There is no suggestion that "interest" in section 521 of DIDA is more restricted than in section 85. But if there were, it would be based on a fact peculiar to the former, viz., that it was enacted, in part, as a response to a situation that was greatly concerned with "interest" in the sense of a periodic percentage charge payableabsolutely by maturity: as a matter of national economic necessity, covered financial institutions could not prudently lend money unless they imposed charges that were relatively high ( Greenwood Trust Co. v. Com. of Mass., supra, 971 F.2d at p. 826); but as a matter of state law, they were required to impose charges that were relatively low ( ibid.).

  7. Denley v. Peoples Bank of Indianola

    553 So. 2d 494 (Miss. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    In the first place, the most favored lender status now extends to federally insured state banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1982); Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Minn. 1988). More important, nothing in the National Bank Act or the most favored lender doctrine has ever been construed to exempt national banks from state usury laws. More to the point, the doctrine will permit a national bank located in Mississippi to rebate unearned finance charges using the Rule of 78's because Miss. Code Ann. § 75-67-127(1)(c) and § 63-19-47 allow small loan companies and motor vehicle sales finance companies/retail sellers, respectively, to so rebate only to the extent that national banks engage in the small loan business or the motor vehicle sales finance business, or, in the words of the comptroller's regulation, only in the case of "such loans" where the national bank is engaged in head to head competition with a small loan company or a motor vehicle sales finance company. Bank and Amici misread the doctrine to provide that if any lender in the state may engage in a practice regarding interest rates or finance charges, a bank covered by the doctrine may seize upon the

  8. Hunter v. Greenwood Trust Co.

    272 N.J. Super. 526 (App. Div. 1994)   Cited 6 times

    Thus, under DIDA, federally insured state-chartered banks are "most favored lenders" and may charge interest at the rate permitted by any competing lending institution in their home states. See VanderWeyst v. First State Bank, 425 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1988) (stating that "[w]e conclude that the `rate allowed' clause should be construed as granting to federally-insured, state-chartered banks most favored lender status. We are persuaded that by using the same `rate allowed' language in . . . [the DIDA] that appears in [section 85 of] the National Bank Act, Congress intended to give that status to state insured banks"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943, 109 S.Ct. 369, 102 L.Ed.2d 359 (1988); accord, First Bank v. Miller, 131 Mich. App. 764, 347 N.W.2d 715, 718-20 (1984).