t. Co., 529 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. App. 1975); Faries v. ACF Industries, Inc., 531 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1975); Freeman v. Callow, 525 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. 1975); Smith v. Plaster, 518 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. 1975); Saale v. Alton Brick Co., 508 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1974); Roux v. Dugal's Big Star Food Store, 510 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. App. 1974); Russell v. Southwest Grease Oil Co., 509 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App. 1974); Selvey v. Robertson, 468 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. App. 1971); Howard v. Fred Weber, Contractor, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App. 1971); Pate v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., Division of Swift Co., 428 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. App. 1968); Lawson v. Lawson, 415 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1967); Luketich v. Krey Packing Co., 413 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App. 1967); Shireman v. Rainen Home Furnishers, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. App. 1966); Johnson v. Simpson Oil Co., 394 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1965); Cotton v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 392 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. App. 1965); Dixon v. Art Bunker Motors, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. App. 1964); Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., 370 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. App. 1963); Smith v. American Car Foundry Division, A.C.F. Industries, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. App. 1963); Cross v. Crabtree, 364 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1962); Love v. Land, 356 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App. 1962); Smith v. Cascade Laundry Co., 335 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. App. 1960); Atterberry v. Porter De Witt Const. Co., 333 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. App. 1960); Fisher v. Hennessey, 329 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. App. 1959); Barton v. Western Fireproofing Co., 326 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1959); Heaton v. Ferrell, 325 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. App. 1959); Williams v. Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App. 1958); Anderson v. Pickwick Hotel, Inc., 313 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1958); Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., 308 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. App. 1957); Blair v. Armour Co., 306 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. App. 1957); Hance v. Johnson, Stephens Shinkle Shoe Co., 306 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App. 1957); Garrison v. Campbell '66' Exp., Inc., 297 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. 1956); McCaleb v. Greer, 267 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. App. 1954).
And note Valdon v. Industrial Com. of Arizona, 6 Ariz. App. 532, 434 P.2d 648, 654 (1967) [vacated on other grounds, 103 Ariz. 547, 447 P.2d 239 (1968)] stating, "[I]t is the established law of this state that doctors may not express their opinions as to the capacity of a workman to perform specific industrial labor unless they are shown to have special knowledge with reference thereto." See also Davis v. Brezner, 380 S.W.2d 523, 528 (Mo.App. 1964); and Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Construction Company, 370 S.W.2d 156 (Mo.App. 1963), holding that lay witness testimony as to the nature, cause and effect of an employee's disability may be allowed where supported by some medical evidence. The two experts Jeans and Schroeder are distinguished professors of law with extensive experience in the legal education field and in the practice of law.
The statute, ยง 287.020(8), and some of our cases attempt to define total disability. Groce v. Pyle, Mo.App., 315 S.W.2d 482; Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Construction Co., Mo.App., 370 S.W.2d 156; Kateman v. Zink et al., 238 Mo.App. 253, 180 S.W.2d 253. If the claimant was prevented by bodily infirmities from performing a part of the usual and customary duties of her occupation or of any other occupation for which she was reasonably suited so that her earning power was thereby affected, or more specifically if she was thereby caused to work only part time, โ she was partially disabled, industrially. See Wilhite, supra.
Id. at 217. The Southern District of this Court was confronted with a situation very similar to the case at hand in Vandaveer v. Reinhart DonovanConstruction Co., 370 S.W.2d 156 (Mo.App.S.D. 1963). In Vandaveer, the Employee was declared permanently and totally disabled by the Commission and awarded benefits accordingly.
The Commission, as trier of the facts, may draw from the evidence such inferences as are reasonably permissible. Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., 370 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Mo.App. 1963). Except as to the issue of the precise calculation of the medical expenses (discussed below), the Court finds the award of medical expenses was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The language is taken from ยง 287.470, RSMo 1969. That statutory section relates, however, only to the powers of the Commission to modify the amount of awards in light of changes in conditions of the employee, Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., 370 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Mo.App. 1963); Winschel v. Stix, Baer Fuller Dry Goods Co., 77 S.W.2d 488 (Mo.App. 1935) and State ex rel. Seiv. Haid, 332 Mo. 1061, 61 S.W.2d 950 (1933). Another section of the statute, ยง 287.480, is the general statutory authorization for the Commission's review of the referee's determination.
Our statement of facts accords appropriate and required recognition to that basic principle of judicial review in this category of cases. Selvey v. Robertson, 468 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo.App. 1971); Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., 370 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Mo.App. 1963). Claimant Freeman, 25 years of age at the time of accident, had been employed as "assistant manager" of Uptown Shell Service (hereinafter "the station") since October 1968, or for some eight or nine months prior to the accident.
Our statement of facts accords appropriate and required recognition to that basic principle of judicial review in this category of cases. Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., Mo.App., 370 S.W.2d 156, 158; Heaton v. Ferrell, Mo.App., 325 S.W.2d 800, 802. Darrell D. Robertson operated a milk processing plant and store in Lamar, Missouri.
Manning v. Manor Baking Co., Mo.App., 356 S.W.2d 505. Our review is limited to the statutory matters set forth in Sec. 287.490 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., and we accept the findings of fact of the Commission if supported by competent evidence. Vandaveer v. Reinhart and Donovan Construction Co., Mo.App., 370 S.W.2d 156. We are not concerned with whether the award of the referee had support in evidence, but only whether that of the Commission did.
Cotton, supra note 7, 392 S.W.2d at 434; Davis v. Brezner, Mo.App., 380 S.W.2d 523, 529; Slider v. Brown Shoe Co., Mo.App., 308 S.W.2d 306, 310(6); Blair v. Armour Co., Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 84, 89. Williams, supra note 8, 332 S.W.2d at 299-300; Johnson v. Simpson Oil Co., Mo.App., 394 S.W.2d 91, 97(12); Vandaveer v. Reinhart Donovan Const. Co., Mo.App., 370 S.W.2d 156, 163; Barton v. Western Fireproofing Co., Mo.App., 326 S.W.2d 344, 349(5), and cases there collected in note 3. What we have written in the foregoing discussion of the controlling principles in assault cases is equally relevant to, and similarly dispositive of, claimant's alternative theory that the accident resulted from a "special hazard" peculiar to her employment.