Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-CV-02391
06-28-2021
RUSSELL LEE X VANCE, Plaintiff, v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK United States Magistrate Judge
This matter was initiated by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Russell Lee X Vance (hereinafter referred to as “Vance”) on December 21, 2020. (Doc. 1). On March 16, 2021, the Court performed its statutorily-mandated screening of Vance's Complaint and determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims but that Vance should be granted leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 5; Doc. 6). The Court granted Vance 30 days to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 6). Now before the Court is an Amended Complaint filed by Vance on April 5, 2021. (Doc. 7). The Amended Complaint fails to cure the deficiencies contained in the original Complaint and it is recommended that the matter be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed.Appx. 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A applies. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F.Supp.2d at 471; Banks v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Vance's Request Falls Outside the Court's Power
Vance asserts that Defendant, through General Sherman, agreed to provide his ancestors 40 acres of land in 1865, and that this grant of land has yet to be perfected. (Doc. 7, at 2-3). Plaintiffs who bring such claims face the challenge of establishing standing. See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006). Judge Posner, writing for the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, first signaled that the political-question doctrine, which “bars the federal courts from adjudicating disputes that the Constitution has been interpreted to entrust to other branches of the federal government, ” presents an obstacle to “[a] case that sought reparations for the wrong of slavery[.]” African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 758.
Furthermore, relief in the form of restitution - “the transfer of the wrongdoer's gain to his victim” - is precluded by the remoteness of the injury. African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 760. Vance would only be able to collect for the wrong done unto his ancestors if he were the authorized representative to bring suit on behalf of his enslaved ancestors. African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 760. There is no indication that this is his position; rather, it appears that Vance, as in African-American Slave Descendants, is “suing to redress harms to third parties ([his] ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties.” African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 760. Finally, and perhaps most applicable to the matter at hand,
It is possible that had the ancestor not died when he did he would have become a wealthy person and left bequests so immense that his remote descendant, the plaintiff, would have inherited more money from his parents or grandparents than he actually did. But that is too speculative an inquiry to provide a basis for a federal suit.African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 761. The Seventh Circuit held that any descendant who was not a representative of the ancestor's estate lacked standing to bring suit. African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 762.
Here, Vance does not allege that he brings suit as the representative of his ancestor's estate. (Doc. 7). Though his Amended Complaint is vague, he appears to be seeking reparations for his enslaved ancestors. (Doc. 7). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals advises that any case which seeks reparations for the wrong of slavery is precluded by the political-question doctrine and is best remedied by the other branches of government, thus Vance's request is fruitless. See African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 758. Insofar as Vance sues for restitution, the injury to his ancestors is too speculative and remote for Vance to hold standing. See African-American Slave Descendants, 471 F.3d at 761. For the foregoing reasons, it shall be respectfully recommended that Vance's Amended Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
C. Leave to Amend
Keeping in mind that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed” and further, that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, any further leave to amend would be futile. Vance seeks reparations for the wrongful slavery of his ancestors, a request that is political in nature. The law on the subject establishes that Vance has no avenue to remedy the wrongs of which he complains. It is respectfully recommended that leave to amend not be granted.
II. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over Vance's claim. (Doc. 7). It is respectfully recommended that this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of jurisdiction.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 28, 2021. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.