This suit is therefore clearly distinguishable from both those in which complainant is a stake-holder and those in which one of several defendants assumes the position of a stake-holder, and prays that the rights of the parties may be determined. Carter v. Cryer, 68 N.J. Eq. 24; Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Trusewicz, 128 N.J. Eq. 467. A bill in the nature of an interpleader is one in which the complainant asks some relief over and above a mere injunction against suits by the contesting party and states facts which entitle him to such relief independent of the fact of the adverse claims of the several defendants. Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253 (at p. 257). Now, in the instant suit, other than the claim of the complainant upon the funds in the possession of the insurance company, there are no equitable grounds of relief set forth.
On a bill of interpleader, a complainant simply prays that the hostile claimants be required to cease from troubling him and to settle their dispute among themselves, while on a bill in the nature of an interpleader, a complainant may ascertain and establish his own rights and may have affirmative relief. Illingworth v. Rowe, 52 N.J. Eq. 360. Vice-Chancellor Pitney said: "A bill in the nature of an interpleader is one in which the complainant asks some relief over and above a mere injunction against suits by the contesting parties and states facts which entitle him to such relief independent of the fact of the adverse claims of the several defendants." Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253; see, also, Story Eq.Jur. § 824. The two cases cited are examples of bills in the nature of an interpleader.
(2) The judgment of the circuit court allowing the claim and certifying the same to the probate court for classification did not merge the Illinois judgment into the judgment of the circuit court and did not destroy the vitality of the Illinois judgment. Wolford v. Scarbrough, 21 S.W.2d 777; Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Stonemann, 163 Cal. 632, 129 P. 483, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 360, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 364; Weeks v. Pearson, 5 N.H. 324; Bates v. Lyons, 7 Paige, 85; Armour Bros. Bkg. Co. v. Addington, 1 Ind. T. 304, 37 S.W. 100; Wells v. Schuster-Hax Natl. Bank, 23 Colo. 534, 48 P. 809; Griswold v. Hill, Fed. Cas. No. 5836; Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253, 34 A. 400; Springs v. Pharr, 131 N.C. 193, 42 S.E. 590, 92 Am. St. Rep. 775; In re Williams, 298 N.Y. 32, 101 N.E. 853, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 719. (3) The judgment of the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, under the decisions of this court, and under the provisions of Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, is entitled to full faith and credit and must be treated as though the Illinois judgment were rendered by a Missouri court of competent jurisdiction.
ker, 336 Mo. 1187, 83 S.W.2d 583; Matlack v. Kline, 280 Mo. 139, 216 S.W. 323; Roselle v. Farmers' Bank of Norborne, 119 Mo. 84, 24 S.W. 744; State ex rel. Mulvihill v. Kumpff, 62 Mo. App. 332; Glasner v. Weisberg, 43 Mo. App. 214; City of Los Angeles v. Amador, 140 Cal. 400, 73 P. 1049; Conner v. Bank of Bakersfield, 183 Cal. 199, 190 P. 801; Wakeman v. Kingsland, 46 N.J. Eq. 113, 18 A. 680; Wainright v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co., 73 Fla. 130, 74 So. 8; 33 C.J. 461, 464, sec. 52. (a) In denying to plaintiff a judgment, and an order of interpleader, the court lost all equitable jurisdiction, and accordingly erred in refusing to dismiss said proceedings, and in further entertaining said cause and defendants' cross-bills. Brown v. Curtain, 330 Mo. 1156, 52 S.W.2d 387; State ex rel. Reid v. Barrett, 118 S.W.2d 33; Miller v. St. Louis K.C. Rys. Co., 162 Mo. 424, 63 S.W. 85; Ebel v. Roller, 21 S.W.2d 214; Winer v. Wagner, 323 Mo. 1156, 20 S.W.2d 650; Granite Paving Co. v. Stange, 37 S.W.2d 460; Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253, 34 A. 400; Michigan Trust Co. v. McNamara, 165 Mich. 200, 130 N.W. 653, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 986; 33 C.J. 421, sec. 2. (b) The court erred in refusing to strike the portions of said answers and cross-bills, and in failing to sustain the demurrers filed to the separate and independent causes of action, requesting affirmative relief, for the reason there was a misjoinder of party defendants, and causes of action, and that the same were not cognizable in these proceedings. Ballew Lbr. Hardware Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 288 Mo. 478, 232 S.W. 1015; Mo. District Telegraph Co. v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 338 Mo. 692, 93 S.W.2d 19; Wakeman v. Kingsland, 46 N.J. Eq. 113, 18 A. 680.
Where owner of real estate contracts to sell it and places buyer in possession under agreement to settle controversy with a lien-holder and within two years to deliver to purchaser deed to property free from liens, failure of vendor to settle the controversy and tender deed within two years, and his conveyance of property to third party who takes with notice of the contract of sale, authorize the purchaser to file bill for specific performance against vendor, making lienholder and third party respondents. Upon payment of purchase price into court the bill may be framed so as to be considered as a bill of interpleader. Darden's Adm'r v. Burns' Adm'r, 6 Ala. 362; Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wend., N.Y., 442, 25 Am. Dec. 656; Haywood Clark v. McDonald, 5 Cir., 192 F. 890, 113 C.C.A. 368; Finn v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222 Ala. 413, 132 So. 632; Wilkes v. Teague, 224 Ala. 283, 140 So. 347; Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253, 34 A. 400. One respondent cannot take the point by demurrer that another respondent is improperly joined. Sims, Ch.Pr. 114, § 181; Hurst v. Smith, 227 Ala. 664, 151 So. 825; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Prouty, 149 Ala. 71, 43 So. 352; 21 C.J. 424; Code 1923, § 6526.
Only in a court of equity, and by a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, could the objection to the judgment be conclusively tried and determined; and we consider that the proper remedy. Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253; Illingworth v. Rowe, 52 N.J. Eq. 360; Board of Education v. Scoville, 13 Kans. 17. In our opinion, then, there was at the time of the filing of this bill, and has continued to be at least up to the decision of the cases on appeal, such a just apprehension of a double claim to half of the one debt, that the bill was maintainable by the debtor.
And see Fehrle v. Turner, 77 Ind. 530; 4 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., Sections 1362 and 1363; Simpson v. Hawkins, 1 Dana (Ky.) 303; Denny v. Wickliffe, 1 Met. (Ky.) 216; Cooper v. Singleton, 19 Texas 260[ 19 Tex. 260], 267, and Aleck v. Jackson, 49 N.J. Eq. 507, as to the granting of relief by injunction. And see, also, Harris v. Smith, 2 Dana, 10; Estell v. Cole, 52 Texas 170[ 52 Tex. 170]; Styer v. Sprague, 63 Minn. 414; Begole v. Hershey, 86 Mich. 130; Illingworth v. Rowe, 52 N.J. Eq. 360; Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253, and Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wend. 442, 450, as similar or in some respects analogous cases in which are enunciated principles as to equity jurisdiction worthy of consideration in the present case. It is true that it is generally held that a purchaser in undisturbed possession of land will not be relieved in equity against the payment of purchase money on the mere ground of defect of title.
[Davis v. Sanders, 25 App. (D.C.) 26.] By the clear weight of authority a judgment of a court of one state is not merged in a judgment entered upon it by the court of another state. [Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Soonemann, 163 Cal. 632; Weeks v. Pearson, 5 N.H. 324; Bates v. Lyons, 7 Paige 85; Armour Bros. Bkg. Co. v. Addington, 1 Ind. Terr. 304, 37 S.W. 100; Wells v. Schuster-Hax Nat. Bank, 23 Colo. 534, 48 P. 809; Griswold v. Hill, Fed. Cas. No. 5836; Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253, 34 A. 400; Springs v. Pharr, 131 N.C. l.c. 193, 42 S.E. 590; In re Williams, 208 N.Y. 32, 101 N.E. 853.] Ordinarily there is no reason why a man should have more than one judgment on one cause of action.
See 48 C.J.S., Interpleader, § 23, p. 70; 33 C.J. 448; 108 A.L.R. 267, 275; 30 Am. Jur. 223, 230; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 752; 50 Harv. L. Rev. 835; 47 Id. 1174, 1179; 37 Id. 388; 18 Id. 315; 49 Yale L.J. 377, 414; 45 Yale L.J. 1161, 1166; and the cases cited therein including in particular Phillips v. Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18 ( Ct. App. 1925); American Surety Co. v. Grays Harbor County, 187 Wn. 164, 60 P.2d 10 ( Sup. Ct. 1936); cf. Allegheny County v. Virgin, 367 Pa. 389, 80 A.2d 807 ( Sup. Ct. 1951), opening the judgment. See too Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J. Eq. 253 ( Ch. 1896). Suffice it here to hold that where there are two claims exposing a debtor to double liability, he cannot — once one of the claims is reduced to judgment against him — secure redress by way of interpleader unless he can be relieved of the judgment.
A bill in the nature of an interpleader is one in which the complainant asks some relief over and above a mere injunction against suits by the contesting party and states facts which entitle him to such relief independent of the fact of the adverse claims of the several defendants. Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N.J.Eq. 253, at page 257, 34 A. 400. Now, in the instant suit, other than the claim of the complainant upon the funds in the possession of the Insurance Company, there are no equitable grounds of relief set forth.