Van Sweden v. Van Sweden

19 Citing cases

  1. People v. Jahner

    433 Mich. 490 (Mich. 1989)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that a "consistent principle of statutory construction is that the express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things (expressio unius est exclusion alterius)"

    Another pertinent rule of statutory construction provides that "inclusion by specific mention excludes what is not mentioned." Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241; 230 N.W. 191 (1930). Statutory exceptions are to be accorded limited, rather than expansive construction:

  2. Shimkus v. Hickner

    417 F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Mich. 2006)   Cited 3 times

    The Attorney General wrote: You have, in separate letters, requested my opinion on several questions concerning the implementation of the unified form of county government in Bay County. . . . You have asked whether . . . the following county agencies survive: . . . 3. Housing Commission . . . A familiar principle of statutory construction is that inclusion by specific mention excludes what is not mentioned. Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238; 230 NW 191 (1930). This principle applies to the question of whether the Bay County Housing Commission survives upon the implementation of the optional unified form of county government in Bay County. The Bay County Housing Commission is a commission formed by the county commission to provide a governmental service to the citizens of the county. Housing commissions are not specifically designated as the type of agency that was intended to survive upon the implementation of the optional unified form of county government. If the Legislature had intended that housing commissions operating within a single county survive, it would have included housing commissions in the list of county agencies intended to continue separate existence under the optional unified form of county government. It is therefore my opinion that the Bay County Housing Commission is abolished on the date the optional unified form of county government becomes effective and its powers are to be carried on as provided i

  3. Sebewaing Industries v. Sebewaing

    337 Mich. 530 (Mich. 1953)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that a statutorily-created entity may exercise powers “impliedly conferred by statute”

    Express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things. Perry v. Village of Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 250; Weinberg v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 Mich. 246; Marshall v. Wabash Railway Co., 201 Mich. 167 (8 ALR 435); Taylor v. Public Utilities Commission, supra; Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238. When a statute creates an entity, grants it powers and prescribes the mode of their exercise, that mode must be followed and none other.

  4. Ficano v. Lucas

    133 Mich. App. 268 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 8 times
    In Ficano v Lucas, 133 Mich. App. 268; 351 N.W.2d 198 (1983), the Court stated that the grant of 'home rule' status to a municipality was not meant to serve as a broad grant of plenary power; rather, a charter county remained subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.

    The appointment procedure advocated by defendants is not enumerated therein. Under established rules of statutory construction, where some items are included by specific mention, other items must be treated as having been intentionally excluded, Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241; 230 N.W. 191 (1930). In the present case, the Legislature's complete failure to mention the topic of vacancy appointments supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to grant permission to a charter county to provide for CEO appointment of sheriff's office vacancies.

  5. People v. Hoye

    307 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    Furthermore, use of a specific word in the statute indicates an intent to exclude that which is not included. Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241; 230 N.W. 191 (1930). The doctrine "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" requires that we construe the words chosen, rather than expand upon the class of defendants covered.

  6. Beach v. City of Saline

    300 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)

    Because the cost of the land is well over $5,000, application of the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius suggests that such purchase is properly subject to referendum. See Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241; 230 N.W. 191 (1930). This conclusion, however, would fail to take into account the historical meaning of the word "referendum".

  7. State Farm v. Ruuska

    90 Mich. App. 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 23 times

    This writer agrees. It is a general rule of statutory construction that the inclusion of a thing by specific mention excludes that which is not mentioned. Van Sweden v Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241; 230 N.W. 191 (1930). The very grant of specific powers under restrictions is an exclusion of other powers in reference to the same subject matter not granted by the legislation.

  8. Valenti Homes v. Sterling Heights

    61 Mich. App. 537 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 7 times

    Express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things. Perry vVillage of Cheboygan, 55 Mich. 250 [21 N.W. 333 (1884)], Weinberg v. Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 Mich. 246 [56 N.W. 605 (1893)], Marshall v. Wabash Railway Co, 201 Mich. 167 [167 NW 19], 8 ALR 435 [1918], Taylor v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238 [ 230 N.W. 191 (1930)]."

  9. DeKorse v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    5 T.C. 94 (U.S.T.C. 1945)   Cited 4 times

    In his brief petitioner cites cases in which the Supreme Court of Michigan has so held. For instance he quotes in his brief from Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238; N.W. 191, as follows: The right of a father to the services of a minor son is unquestioned.

  10. Gray v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co.

    354 Mich. 1 (Mich. 1958)   Cited 2 times

    Such clauses are properly construed in accordance with the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius. As we held in Van Sweden v. Van Sweden, 250 Mich. 238, 241: "The statute does not include a carpenter's helper in its mention of business callings, unless the language `or any person coming within the provisions of this act,' serves as a catch-all. If such were its purpose, it could have been made plain by omitting special mentioned callings and stating that the act applies to every employer.