We have held as much. Van Sickell v. Margolis, 109 N.J.Super. 14, 18, 262 A.2d 209 (App.Div.), aff'd o.b., 55 N.J. 355,262 A.2d 203 (1970). In prohibiting such use of inconsistent or alternatively pleaded facts to ensnare a pleader, the opinion in Van Sickell cited an out-of-state court whose reasoning resonates in the present appeal:
" Accord Van Sickell v. Margolis, 109 N.J. Super. 14, 262 A.2d 209 (1969); Jenkins v. Simmons, 472 S.W.2d 417 (1971); Johnson v. Flex-o-Lite Mfr. Corp., 314 S.W.2d 75 (1958); 4 Wigmore on Evidence, 1064, p. 70 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972); 29 Am. Jur.2d, Pleading, 692. Although we have not directly confronted this exact issue before, many of our decisions indicate that a plaintiff, who pleads claims in the alternative against two or more defendants when she is uncertain as to the true facts but believes she is entitled to recover from at least one of the defendants, is entitled to present evidence at trial to support both claims, and if she does, to submit both claims to the jury for a decision.
PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion per curiam in the Appellate Division, 109 N.J. Super. 14. For affirmance — Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN — 7.
We said many years ago that "the pleader's conclusions of law are not admissions of facts." Van Sickell v. Margolis, 109 N.J. Super. 14, 18 (App. Div. 1969). Furthermore,
Although a pleading may, as a general matter, be viewed as an admission, see N.J.R.E. 803(b)(3), our pleading practices, which permit the assertion of alternative claims, render problematic the use of a particular statement in a complaint — particularly one that is equivocal or that consists of a mixture of both facts and legal conclusions. See Shankman v. State, 184 N.J. 187, 205-06, 876 A.2d 269 (2005); see also Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that "to be binding, judicial admissions must be unequivocal"); Van Sickell v. Margolis, 109 N.J.Super. 14, 18, 262 A.2d 209 (App.Div. 1969) (holding that a "pleader's conclusions of law are not admissions of facts"), aff'd, 55 N.J. 355, 262 A.2d 203 (1970). Even assuming the usefulness of the paragraph of the complaint alluded to by the judge in light of these authorities, we find nothing in that paragraph that unequivocally demonstrates Laura and Robyn had the requisite knowledge of facts necessary to commence the running of the limitation periods applicable to their present claims.