All property held by the parties, whether it is held individually or jointly, is deemed marital property, and the court must determine the property's total value before making an equitable distribution. McCarthy, 2014 ND 234, ¶ 9, 856 N.W.2d 762. Separate property, even if it is inherited, must initially be included in the marital estate, but the property's origin may be considered when equitably dividing the estate. See Paulson v. Paulson, 2010 ND 100, ¶ 17, 783 N.W.2d 262; see also van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D.1994). “Marital property must be valued as of the date of trial.”
" Id. Moreover, marital property "may be divided at the time of divorce by either awarding the present value of the benefits, or when there are insufficient assets for a present division or when present valuation is too speculative, by awarding a percentage of future payments." van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1994). Cheryl Paulson argues the trial court erred in its property valuation and distribution of the Mark Paulson Trust, Mark Paulson's cash withdrawals, and a round table and china cabinet. A
Sommers, 2003 ND 77, ¶ 15, 660 N.W.2d 586. When awarding spousal support, the trial court is to apply the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 100 (N.D. 1994). A trial court's determination of spousal support is reviewed as a finding of fact and will only be overturned if it is clearly erroneous.
Corbett v. Corbett, 2001 ND 113, ¶ 19, 628 N.W.2d 312. The health and physical conditions of the parties are also significant factors to consider in awarding spousal support. See Theis v. Theis, 534 N.W.2d 26, 28 (N.D. 1995); van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 101 (N.D. 1994). [¶ 13] Spousal support determination must be made in light of the income and needs of the disadvantaged spouse and of the supporting spouse's needs and ability to pay.
An asset accumulated while spouses are still married is includable in the marital estate even though the spouses are separated. Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978). However, the source of the property is a factor for the court to consider in making an equitable distribution. Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 344 (N.D. 1996); van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D. 1994). [¶ 4] Equitable distribution of marital property is based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Zuger v. Zuger, 1997 ND 97, ¶ 6, 563 N.W.2d 804 (citing N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24; Volson v. Volson, 542 N.W.2d 754, 756 (N.D. 1996)).
Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1978). As Linrud, 552 N.W.2d at 344, and van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 96 (N.D. 1994), illustrate, the source of the property is only one factor for the court to consider in making an equitable distribution. [¶ 9] In this case, although Mary did not make a direct contribution to this contingent fee, it was accumulated during the marriage.
[¶ 34] In van Oosting v. van Oosting, the parties were married for twenty-four years. 521 N.W.2d 93, 95 (N.D. 1994). At the time of the divorce, the wife was forty-four years of age, had not attended college, had very limited work experience, and suffered from multiple sclerosis. Id. at 100.
[¶ 16] A trial court may grant parties a percentage of the marital or nonmarital estate in a property division if, at the time of the trial, there are insufficient assets for a division or the valuation is too speculative. Zander v. Zander, 470 N.W.2d 603, 605 (N.D. 1991) (the trial court awarded the wife a percentage of the husband's retirement benefits); van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1994) (the trial court should award a percentage of one spouse's future payments from a vested credit trust, treated as inherited property, to the other spouse in a property distribution). We have cited decisions of the Supreme Court of Minnesota that prescribe "a rule for the equitable distribution of property rights which are difficult or impossible to evaluate — ordering apportionment of the future benefits only if and when such benefits are paid."
[¶ 18] This Court has explained "[i]f trial courts find no immediate need for awarding permanent spousal support, they should retain jurisdiction to do so beyond a temporary award, when facing uncertainty about the need for permanent support" thereby "leaving the award open for later modification." van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 101 (N.D. 1994). [¶ 19] When there has been an initial award of spousal support, however, the trial courts retain jurisdiction and may modify the award "[a]t least as long as spousal support continues.
[¶ 17] Donald argues the trial court erred by not providing for the elimination or reduction of the spousal support award upon Donald's retirement. An award of permanent spousal support is subject to future modification. See van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 100 (N.D. 1994). A trial court's power to modify an award of spousal support is statutory and is not dependent upon any express reservation of continuing jurisdiction in the divorce judgment.