This court notes that, even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was injured solely as a result of jumping out of the way to avoid being struck by the falling jib, defendants would still be liable under Labor Law § 240 (1) ( Lopez v Boston Properties, Inc., 41 AD3d 259 [1st Dept 2007]; Suwareh v State of New York, 24 AD3d 380 [1st Dept 2005]; Van Eken v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 AD2d 352 [2d Dept 2002]).
The court correctly determined that the defendants and Flintlock and City Limits established, prima facie, that Labor Law § 240(1) is inapplicable to the facts of this case, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 267). Accepting arguendo the plaintiff's contention that his injuries flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity upon the falling ductwork (see generally Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 604; Van Eken v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 352, 352-353), the court correctly determined that the ductwork, which was part of the preexisting building structure and was not being actively worked on at the time of incident, was not an object that required securing for purposes of the undertaking (see Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 268-269; Djuric v City of New York, 172 A.D.3d 456, 456; Marin v AP-Amsterdam 1661 Park LLC, 60 A.D.3d 824, 825-826).
Here, the safety equipment provided to plaintiff did not prevent him from falling; thus, the core objective of Labor Law § 240(1) was not met (seeGordon, 82 N.Y.2d at 561, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127, 626 N.E.2d 912 ). Plaintiff's injury was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the failure of the safety equipment (seeid. at 562, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127, 626 N.E.2d 912 ; see alsoVan Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 352, 353, 742 N.Y.S.2d 94 [2d Dept. 2002] ).
In opposition, the respondents failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560). In particular, the respondents failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the foreman's act of stepping on the back of the plaintiffs ladder just before it broke was a "of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuated from the statutory violation as to constitute a superseding cause sufficient to relieve [them] of liability" ( deSousa v Dayton T. Brown, Inc., 280 AD2d 447, 448; see Quinteros v P Deblasio, Inc., 82 AD3d 861; Montalvo v J. Petrocelli Constr., Inc., 8 AD3d 173, 175; Van Eken v Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, 294 AD2d 352, 353; Cordero v Kaiser Org., 288 AD2d 424, 426; Mooney v PCM Dev. Co., 238 AD2d 487). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action as asserted against the respondents.
Supreme Court erred in finding that plaintiff's action of reaching for the bucket in order to save his coworker was the sole proximate cause. The risk that an elevated worker might become injured while trying to save a coworker below from injury is not so unforeseeable as to be a superseding cause ( see Van Eken v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 AD2d 352, 353; see also Skow, 240 AD2d at 194). The record does not support Supreme Court's interpretation that plaintiff leapt off the building, but rather shows that he reached for the bucket.
We further agree with plaintiff that the court erred in granting that part of defendants' motion with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, and thus we modify the order accordingly. There is an issue of fact whether plaintiff was exposed to the requisite elevation-related hazard within the meaning of that section ( see generally Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267-268; Ortlieb v. Town of Malone, 307 AD2d 679; Van Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 AD2d 352; Panattoni v. Inducon Park Assoc., 247 AD2d 823). We agree with defendants, however, that the court should have granted that part of their motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action in its entirety, and thus we further modify the order accordingly.
The accident occurred when the plaintiff's co-worker hit a section of pipe with a hammer causing the pipe to fall striking the plaintiff in the face. It is undisputed that no protective device designed to catch the falling pieces of pipe was utilized in connection with the work. Contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff was exposed to a gravity-related hazard within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) ( see Salinas v. Barney Skanska Constr. Co., 2 A.D.3d 619; Heidelmark v. State of New York, 1 A.D.3d 748; Thomas v. 2 Overhill Rd. Assoc., 1 A.D.3d 174; Van Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co of New York, 294 A.D.2d 352, 353). Furthermore, the plaintiffs met their prima facie burden of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the absence of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute proximately caused the plaintiff's injury ( see Salinas v. Barney Skanska Constr. Co., supra; Orner v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 293 A.D.2d 517) . In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320).
The pipe had been laid out along the trench to be installed as a water line and, thus, was "a load that required securing for the purposes of the undertaking" (id. at 268). Accordingly, plaintiff was exposed to an elevation-related hazard because his work site was positioned below the level where the pipe was secured and his injury was the result of "being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted or inadequately secured" (Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra at 501; see Van Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 352, 353; Orner v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 293 A.D.2d 517, 517-518; Outar v. City of New York, 286 A.D.2d 671, 672-673; Panattoni v. Inducon Park Assoc., 247 A.D.2d 823, 823). The cases relied upon by defendant involving the collapse of trench walls are distinguishable inasmuch as they involved the ordinary dangers of a construction site, rather than elevation-related risks (see O'Connell v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 276 A.D.2d 608, 609-610; Vitaliotis v. Village of Saltaire, 229 A.D.2d 575, 575;Staples v. Town of Amherst, 146 A.D.2d 292, 294; see also Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 487, 490-491).
(see Albuquerquev City of New York, 188 A.D.3d 515, 515 [1st Dept 2020]; Barriosv 19-19 24th Ave. Co. LLC., 169 A.D.3d 747, 748-749 [2d Dept 2019]; Passos v Noble Constr. Group, LLC, 169 A.D.3d 706, 707-708 [2d Dept 2019]; Rutkowski, 146 A.D.3d at 686; Gikas v 42-51 Hunter St., LLC, 134 A.D.3d 987, 988 [2d Dept 2015]; Pritchard, 82 A.D.3d at 730-731; Mendoza, 38 A.D.3d at 506; see also McCallister v 200 Park, L.P., 92 A.D.3d 927, 928-929 [2d Dept 2012]). The fact that the post was being lowered by hand does not preclude recovery under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Gutierrezv Harco Consultants Corp., 157 A.D.3d 537, 537-538 [1st Dept 2017]; Rutkowski, 146 A.D.3d at 686; Escobarv Safi, 150 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 [2d Dept 2017]; Gikas, 134 A.D.3d at 988; Pritchard, 82 A.D.3d at 730-731; Van Eken v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 294 A.D.2d 352, 353 [2d Dept 2002]; cf Outarv City of New York, 286 A.D.2d 671, 673 [2d Dept 2001], affd5 N.Y.3d 731 [2005]).
Campisi v. Epos Construction Corp., 299 A.D.2d 4, 747 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., 2002) and Blandon v. Advance Construction Co., 264 A.D.2d 550, 659 N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y.A.D. 1. Dept., 1999). There is no need to establish the plaintiff was actually struck with an item falling from an elevated height to allow recovery under the labor law. It is not unforeseeable that worker might be injured as a consequence of the falling object. Van Eken v. Consolidated Edison Co., of N.Y., 294 A.D. 2d 352, 742 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y.A.D. 3. Dept., 2002). Labor Law §241 (6), requires that the plaintiff establish a nondelegable duty of the owner and contractors to provide "reasonable and adequate protection and safety" for construction workers.