Opinion
No. 02-4180-SAC
November 20, 2002.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Earlier this month, the plaintiff Dennis Wayne Van De Mark appearing pro se filed this action under the federal civil rights statute of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the defendant was denying him constitutional rights in a criminal prosecution for telephone harassment in "Case No. 02DV506 in the District Court of Johnson County," Kansas. (Dk. 1, pp. 1-2). The plaintiff also has filed a "Motion to Stay Execution" of the judgment entered in that state criminal case and of the arrest warrant issued also for revocation of his probation. (Dk. 3). The plaintiff also seeks to enjoin further prosecution of the state criminal case. Id.
The plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of Nebraska and that he was arrested and incarcerated in the Johnson County Jail on April 20, 2002, on a domestic violence charge of telephone harassment. Van De Mark most strenuously challenges the constitutionality of the state court's use of a "video-arraignment" procedure saying it denied him the right to appear before the judge in person and to have personal contact with his counsel. According to the complaint, Van De Mark appeared in state court on May 3, 2002, and entered a guilty plea to the charges. He was sentenced to sixty days in jail, but this period of incarceration was suspended and he was placed on nine months of probation and ordered to complete an anger management class and to pay fees and costs.
As reflected in pleadings attached to the Van De Mark's complaint, the State of Kansas has filed a motion to revoke his probation for failure to pay court costs and to provide proof of completion of anger management class. The plaintiff asks the federal court to enjoin the state court from proceeding with the state criminal case until there has been a ruling in the federal forum on his allegations of constitutional violations. The plaintiff also seeks actual damages and punitive damages for the same alleged violations.
At the outset, this court must decide whether to invoke the Younger doctrine and decline to hear this case. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "[C]ourts may address application of the Younger doctrine sua sponte." Kingston v. Utah County, 161 F.3d 17, 1998 WL 614462, at *2 (10th Cir. Sep. 8, 1998) (Table) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10 (1976); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1143 (1997)). Generally, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court must decline to interfere with pending state proceedings where important state interests are involved. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45. Under Younger, federal courts will not interfere with ongoing criminal proceedings being carried out by a state government, even in the face of alleged constitutional violations. Id. The Younger doctrine is invoked when three elements are present: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings; (2) the state proceedings offer an adequate forum to hear the plaintiff's federal claims; and (3) the state proceedings implicate important state interests. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997). This doctrine is mandatory and non-discretionary; absent extraordinary circumstances, it must be invoked once these three conditions are met. Joseph A. ex rel Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir. 2002)
As established by the plaintiff's pleadings, there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding which the plaintiff wants this court to enjoin. This state court forum is adequate to review the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the procedures being used there. The court has no basis for believing the state court system will not entertain Van De Mark's constitutional challenges, directly and collaterally, both at the district court level and on any necessary appeal therefrom. The state has an important interest in seeing its criminal statutes enforced and its state criminal procedures followed. It would be extremely disruptive for this court to interfere with the state court's oversight of both. The broad and straightforward standards of the Younger abstention doctrine govern this case. In this situation, it is only under extraordinary circumstances that a federal court may interfere with state proceedings. Those circumstances are: 1) where irreparable injury is both "great and immediate," Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; 2) where the state law is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions," id. at 5; or 3) where there is a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief," id. at 54. There is no evidence or allegations to indicate that any of these exceptions apply here.
The court must invoke the Younger doctrine and decline to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. As to Van De Mark's claim for monetary damages, a district court ordinarily should stay rather than dismiss a claim for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the pending state court proceeding. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). However, the injury for which Van De Mark seeks damages appears to be his period of pretrial detention, his surrendered property, and his possible incarceration. If his conviction in state court is sustained, no action will lie under § 1983 to recover for damages "caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid" unless the conviction is successfully challenged via some other means. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Therefore, in light of this uncertainty, the court finds it appropriate to dismiss the plaintiff's damages claim. See, e.g., Pettit v. Whetsel, 188 F.3d 519, 1999 WL 586998, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999) (Table).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the case is dismissed without prejudice under the Younger doctrine and Heck v. Humphrey.