The denial of a plea in bar as to the statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Van Dam v. Gay , 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480, 481 (2010). In Virginia, actions for legal malpractice are actions for breach of contract and are thus governed by the limitations periods prescribed for contract claims.
As an initial matter, the parties are correct that an "injury" is necessary for a claim to accrue under Virginia law (even as to contract-oriented or professional negligence claims). See Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Thompson Masonry Contractor, Inc., 292 Va. 695, 791 S.E.2d 734, 740 (2016) ; Thorsen v. Richmond SPCA, 292 Va. 257, 786 S.E.2d 453, 465 (2016) ; Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 699 S.E.2d 480, 482-83 (2010). And, "a statute of limitations usually commences to run when injury is incurred as a result of a wrongful act."
Absent a genuine issue of material fact, a circuit court’s "denial of a plea in bar as to the statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Thorsen v. Richmond SPCA , 292 Va. 257, 277, 786 S.E.2d 453 (2016) (citing Van Dam v. Gay , 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480 (2010) ). Because there are no facts in dispute, we decide this appeal entirely on governing principles of law.
Accordingly, we review the circuit court's ruling on the pleas in bar as to the statute of limitations de novo. Van Dam v. Gay , 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480, 481 (2010). B. Waiver of the Statute of Limitations
However, Code § 8.01–249 continues to employ the phrase “cause of action.” The phrases “cause of action” and “right of action” are not synonymous. See Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480, 481 (2010). When interpreting and applying a statute, we “assume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute, and we are bound by those words.”
Code § 8.01-230 provides that "the right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person." Thus, it is well established in Virginia that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is injured, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury. See Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 813, 146 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1966); see also Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460 n. 2, 699 S.E.2d 480, 481 n. 2 (2010) (noting that the Virginia General Assembly has consistently declined to adopt such a "discovery rule"). The continuing treatment rule operates as an exception.
A circuit court’s "decision on a plea in bar of the statute of limitations involves a pure question of law that we review de novo." Radiance Cap. Receivables Fourteen, LLC v. Foster, 298 Va. 14, 19, 833 S.E.2d 867 (2019) (quoting Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480 (2010)).
3% cap on Fluor's G&A costs did not give rise to a new or distinct injury: Fluor's entire harm flowed directly from PAE's initial decision to cap G&A costs. That Fluor's alleged damages increased over the course of the contract does not alter the fact that the breach was single and continuous. Virginia law makes clear that "the running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date." Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 168 S.E.2d 257, 260 (Va. 1969); see also Van Dam v. Gay, 699 S.E.2d 480, 482 (Va. 2010) ("[I]t is immaterial that all the damages resulting from the injury do not occur at the time of the injury."). Fluor's suit, filed twelve years after this breach accrued, clearly falls outside the governing five-year statute of limitations.
For this reason, "it is immaterial that all the damages resulting from the injury do not occur at the time of the injury." Id. (quoting Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 482, 699 S.E.2d 480 (2010)). This precedent makes clear that under the VWPL, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the alleged retaliatory action occurs, even if the consequences of the retaliation are not felt until later.
Damages stemming from a single act of abuse are not divisible, which means that only one limitations period applies even if certain damages do not manifest themselves for several months or years. See Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 463, 699 S.E.2d 480, 482-83 (2010). However, each separate act of sexual abuse constitutes a separate injury, so a separate limitations period applies each time unlawful contact occurs.