• 2 Similarly, we reject defendants' contention that there was no valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and Fanslow. It is well established that no particular form of words is necessary to engage the services of a real estate broker. ( Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 323, 314 N.E.2d 361, 367.) All that is required is action by the broker with consent of the principal; consent may be oral, written or implied by the conduct of the parties.

Defendant first contends the jury's finding that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the lease between Chelco and Walter Frank was against the manifest weight of the evidence. • 1 In general, a broker is entitled to a commission if he is the procuring cause of a consummated transaction which he was employed to negotiate ( Edens View Realty Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 480, 408 N.E.2d 1069), and a broker may be deemed the procuring cause if he brings together the parties who ultimately consummate the transaction ( Chiagouris v. Continental Trailways (1964), 50 Ill. App.2d 196, 200 N.E.2d 399) or if he is instrumental in its consummation ( Edens View Realty Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc., 87 Ill. App.3d 480, 485, 408 N.E.2d 1069, 1074; Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 314 N.E.2d 361; Doss v. Kirk (1956), 8 Ill. App.2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49). Various means have been recognized as constituting a bringing together of the parties. See, e.g., Cowan v. Day (1910), 156 Ill. App. 105 (evidence that at request of broker, a third party informed ultimate purchaser that property was for sale, so that broker neither communicated with purchaser nor showed her the property); Adams v. Decker (1889), 34 Ill. App. 17 (broker merely sent to principal the party who ultimately purchased the property).

That consent may be written or oral, or it may be implied from the acts of the parties. See, e.g., Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 323, 314 N.E.2d 361, 367. Thorne seeks his commission from the corporate defendants as the sellers of the Muncaster and Royal properties. The corporate defendants may be held liable for the commission: (1) if they had an exclusive agency agreement with Thorne and the property was sold while the agreement was in effect ( Bolger v. Danley Lumber Co. (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 207, 395 N.E.2d 1066; (2) if Thorne produced a buyer who was ready, willing and able to meet defendants' terms ( Ellis Realty v. Chapelski (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 1008, 1011, 329 N.E.2d 370, 373); or (3) if the sale was procured or effected through Thorne's efforts.

It is well settled in Illinois that no particular form of words is necessary to engage the services of a real estate broker; rather, the essential prerequisite is action by the broker with the consent of the principal and such consent can manifest itself either in writing, orally or by implication from the conduct of the parties. ( E.g., Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co., 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 323, 314 N.E.2d 361, 367; Dickerson Realtors, Inc. v. Frewert, 16 Ill. App.3d 1060, 1063, 307 N.E.2d 445, 447.) Moreover, whether a broker has attained his principal's consents is determined from the facts and circumstances of each case. ( Bennett v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 13 Ill. App.3d 528, 532, 301 N.E.2d 155, 158.

Each of these obligation was subject to an implied promise to make "good faith" efforts to obtain what he sought. See e.g., Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill.App.3d 736, 31 Ill.Dec. 926, 394 N.E.2d 1303 (1979); Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co., 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 314 N.E.2d 361, 366 (1974). Under Illinois law, such efforts constitute full performance of the obligations.

It also gives the broker the right to a commission if a sale is made by someone else during the period of the listing. Galbraith v. Johnston, 92 Ariz. 77, 81, 373 P.2d 587 (1962); and see Van C. Angiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co., 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 314 N.E.2d 361, 366 (1974). But the fact that a broker's contract is exclusive does not give him the right to a commission upon a sale which was not consummated during the listing period.

The Beemans' affidavits, stating that the notice was never received, fail to overcome the affidavit attesting that it was sent. The Beemans cite Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co., 20 Ill. App. 3d 315, 320 (1974), for the proposition that testimony showing that a letter was mailed and a denial that it was received raises a question to be resolved by the trier of the fact. While this may be true, at issue in that case was whether certain letters were both mailed and received.

A broker is deemed to be the procuring cause if he brings together the parties who then consummate the transaction ( Chiagouris v. Continental Trailways (1964), 50 Ill. App.2d 196, 200 N.E.2d 399; see also Cowan v. Day (1910), 156 Ill. App. 105; Adams v. Decker (1889), 34 Ill. App. 17) or if he is instrumental in the ultimate consummation of the deal. Edens View Realty Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 480, 485, 408 N.E.2d 1069; Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 314 N.E.2d 361; Doss v. Kirk (1956), 8 Ill. App.2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49. Conversely, a broker may be deemed the procuring cause because of the negotiations he conducts in arranging the transaction, although he had not initially introduced the parties to the transaction or personally introduced them to one another.

( Palausky v. Landers (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 985, 987, 385 N.E.2d 751, 752.) However, instructions that incorrectly state the law and mislead the jury should not be given. ( Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 322, 314 N.E.2d 361, 366.) Reversible error is committed when an instruction imposes a greater duty than that actually required under the law, when the instruction relates to the appropriate degree of skill. ( Pappas v. Peoples Gas Light Coke Co. (1953), 350 Ill. App. 541, 547, 113 N.E.2d 585, 589.

As such, the clause was not an extension of the entire exclusive listing agreement but rather a condition of the original employment contract. ( Van C. Argiris Co. v. Caine Steel Co. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 315, 319, 314 N.E.2d 361.) Thus, the extension clause generated no rights or duties not already present in the listing agreement itself.