Opinion
NO. 4-13-0065
09-05-2013
HENRY VAN BROUGHTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director; KEITH ANGLIN, Warden; JUDY OAKLEY; and VIRGIL TUTWILER, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Sangamon County
No. 08MR497
Honorable
Peter C. Cavanagh,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Pope concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Where plaintiff failed to show he was entitled to mandamus relief, the trial court did not err in granting defendants' motions to dismiss. ¶ 2 In July 2008, plaintiff, Henry Van Broughton, filed a pro se petition for mandamus relief against defendants, Roger E. Walker, Jr., Keith Anglin, and Judy Oakley. Plaintiff also named John and Jane Doe as defendants. In March 2009, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. On appeal, this court dismissed the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction. In June 2010, defendant, Virgil Tutwiler, filed a motion to dismiss. In December 2012, the trial court granted the motion. ¶ 3 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 Plaintiff is currently imprisoned at Dixon Correctional Center and serving a sentence of 75 to 150 years for first degree murder. In April 2008, plaintiff was imprisoned at Danville Correctional Center. At that time, Walker was the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (Department), Anglin was the assistant warden of operations at Danville, Oakley was the chairperson of the adjustment committee, and Tutwiler was a reviewing officer on two of plaintiff's prison disciplinary reports.
¶ 6 A. Sexual Misconduct
¶ 7 On April 3, 2008, L. Rhoden, a correctional officer, reported observing plaintiff in the visiting room "licking his female visitor's fingers in a sexually arousing manner after his female visitor had just exited the bathroom." Rhoden indicated plaintiff had been warned on previous occasions about having excessive contact with his female visitor. Rhoden issued a disciplinary ticket to plaintiff for violating a prison rule banning sexual misconduct. ¶ 8 On April 13, 2008, the adjustment committee held a hearing. Plaintiff provided the committee with a written defense statement, stating a video surveillance tape would clear him of any sexually explicit behavior and a logbook would show no previous incidents of excessive conduct. Plaintiff told the committee he was "only kissing" his visitor's hands at the visiting room table. The committee noted plaintiff was given a warning in March 2008 about excessive contact. ¶ 9 The committee found plaintiff guilty of sexual misconduct based on plaintiff's admission he had his mouth to his visitor's hand, Rhoden's observation of the incident, and the previous warning of excessive contact. Plaintiff was punished with three months of C-grade status, three months in segregation, three months of commissary restrictions, and an inter-prison disciplinary transfer.
¶ 10 B. Misuse of State Property
¶ 11 On April 7, 2008, C. Erickson, a correctional officer, issued a disciplinary ticket to plaintiff for misuse of state property. Erickson observed a Qur'an had been flushed down the toilet in plaintiff's cell, plugging the main line. Erickson indicated plaintiff admitted flushing the Qur'an. ¶ 12 On April 13, 2008, the adjustment committee held a hearing. Plaintiff pleaded guilty, stating he flushed Qur'an inserts and papers down the toilet. Plaintiff was punished with one month of C-grade status and one month of commissary restrictions, and he was ordered to pay $28 in restitution.
¶ 13 C. Grievances
¶ 14 On April 25, 2008, plaintiff filed grievances on the sexual-misconduct charge and the property-damages charge. In each case, the grievance officer recommended the grievances be denied after a review of all available information. In July 2008, the chief administrative officer concurred in the recommendations.
¶ 15 D. Mandamus
¶ 16 In July 2008, plaintiff filed a pro se petition for mandamus, naming Walker, Anglin, Oakley, and John and Jane Doe. Plaintiff alleged John and Jane Doe were the hearing investigative officer and the reviewing officer. Plaintiff alleged defendants violated his constitutional rights by finding him guilty of prison disciplinary violations without sufficient evidence. Plaintiff claimed the reviewing officer failed to perform the ministerial duty of reviewing the allegations to determine whether a disciplinary hearing should be held. Plaintiff also claimed the hearing investigator failed to perform the ministerial duty of conducting an investigation into the incidents resulting in disciplinary charges. Further, he alleged the prison transfer denied him equal protection as it was arbitrary and made to "mask" the "egregious errors" of prison officials. ¶ 17 In March 2009, defendants Anglin, Oakley, and Walker filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2008)). Defendants argued plaintiff failed to state a claim for mandamus based on violations of his due-process rights because those rights were not implicated. Defendants also argued the petition should be dismissed because prison officials followed the rules and due-process requirements in the disciplinary process. ¶ 18 In April 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the motions. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, finding no liberty interest had been implicated and no showing had been made that the rules and due-process requirements of the disciplinary procedures were violated. ¶ 19 On appeal, this court found the trial court's April 2009 order was not final and appealable because it did not dispose of the claims against unnamed and unserved defendants John and Jane Doe. Broughton v. Walker, No. 4-09-0357 (Dec. 14, 2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Thus, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 20 E. On Remand
¶ 21 In June 2010, after plaintiff obtained service of process upon defendant Tutwiler, Tutwiler filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)). Tutwiler argued plaintiff failed to state a claim for mandamus and he received due process in his disciplinary proceedings. ¶ 22 In December 2012, the trial court held a telephone conference on Tutwiler's motion to dismiss and the State's oral motion to dismiss Jane Doe. The court granted the motions. This appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 A. Standard of Review
¶ 25 In the case sub judice, the trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss under section 2-619.1. A motion under section 2-619.1 allows a party to "combine a section 2-615 motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiff's substantially insufficient pleadings with a section 2-619 motion to dismiss based upon certain defects or defenses." Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164, 788 N.E.2d 740, 747 (2003). On appeal, the trial court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2-619.1 is reviewed de novo. Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc., 392 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402, 911 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (2009).
¶ 26 B. Mandamus
¶ 27 An allegation of a due-process-rights violation can state a cause of action for mandamus. Knox v. Godinez, 2012 IL App (4th) 110325, ¶ 16, 966 N.E.2d 1233. "Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty." People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 464, 804 N.E.2d 546, 552 (2004). A petition for mandamus will be granted " 'only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ.' " Hadley v. Montes, 379 Ill. App. 3d 405, 407, 883 N.E.2d 703, 705 (2008) (quoting People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002)). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a clear, legal right to the requested relief and must set forth every material fact necessary to prove he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. Lucas v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998, 812 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2004).
¶ 28 1. Sexual Misconduct
¶ 29 Plaintiff argues he is entitled to mandamus relief because his due-process rights were violated in his prison disciplinary proceeding on the sexual-misconduct charge when defendants (1) refused to obtain or consider exonerating evidence during the disciplinary hearing, (2) failed to follow Department rules concerning prehearing investigation of the charges, (3) failed to provide a written reason for disregarding exculpatory evidence, and (4) simply adopted the charging officer's report as the disciplinary decision and failed to provide a written reason for believing the charging officer over plaintiff. ¶ 30 An inmate is entitled to due process at his disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974).
"Principles of due process require an inmate receive (1) notice of disciplinary charges at least 24 hours prior to a hearing, (2) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied upon to support a finding of guilt." Ford v. Walker, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1125, 888 N.E.2d 123, 127 (2007).¶ 31 To successfully claim a due-process violation, a plaintiff must show a deprivation of life, liberty, or property interest. See Webb v. Lane, 222 Ill. App. 3d 322, 326, 583 N.E.2d 677, 681 (1991). As to inmates, due-process interests are generally limited to sanctions which impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). For example, a disciplinary sanction that results in the loss of good-conduct credit requires due process. Wolff 418 U.S. at 564-66. ¶ 32 In Taylor v. Frey, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 1113, 942 N.E.2d 758, 760 (2011), the plaintiff received the following sanctions: (1) disciplinary segregation for 22 months; (2) reduction to C-grade status for 22 months; (3) restricted commissary for 25 months; and (4) loss of one-month of good-conduct credit. The Taylor court held the loss of good-conduct credit required due process, but the plaintiff's remaining sanctions did not. Taylor, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 1119, 942 N.E.2d at 765. ¶ 33 On the sexual-misconduct charge, plaintiff received the following sanctions: (1) three months of C-grade status; (2) three months of segregation; (3) three months of commissary restrictions; and (4) an inter-prison disciplinary transfer. He also claimed his female visitor was placed on "permanent visitor restriction." However, he was not denied any good-conduct credit. Moreover, the sanctions he did receive did not result in an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Montes v. Taylor, 2013 IL App (4th) 120082, ¶ 20, 985 N.E.2d 1037 (finding no state-created liberty interest in visitation); Washington v. Walker, 391 Ill. App. 3d 459, 465, 908 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (2009) (finding "[i]nmates do not have a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding a transfer"); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding demotion to C-grade status, segregation, and transfer did not implicate due-process concerns). Without the loss of a protected liberty interest, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a viable due-process claim that would entitle him to mandamus relief. See Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Where there is no liberty interest, there can be no due process violation"). ¶ 34 Plaintiff also argues he stated an equal-protection claim regarding his disciplinary transfer to another prison. He claims the transfer "was approved to mask errors" of prison officials in the investigation process, he was treated differently than similarly situated inmates, and his female visitor was denied visiting privileges in retaliation for his filing of the lawsuit. ¶ 35 Here, plaintiff failed to set forth an equal-protection claim. Plaintiff has not shown any errors in the disciplinary process resulting in a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest without due process. He has not established he was entitled to a transfer hearing on disciplinary transfers. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 503.140 (2003) (stating transfers may be recommended by the adjustment committee after a finding of guilt). Finally, the evidence indicates plaintiff was denied visitation privileges with his female visitor based on his sexual-misconduct violation and not as retaliation for his lawsuit. Moreover, visitation privileges are within the discretion of prison administrators. Montes, 2013 IL App (4th) 120082, ¶ 27, 985 N.E.2d 1037 (visitation decisions by prison officials are discretionary and not subject to mandamus). Plaintiff failed to state an equal-protection claim that would entitle him to mandamus relief.
¶ 36 2. Misuse of State Property
¶ 37 On the charge of misuse of state property, plaintiff received the following sanctions: (1) one month of C-grade status; (2) one month of commissary restrictions; and (3) $28 in restitution. Because the disciplinary sanction included a deprivation of a property interest, i.e., restitution of $28, the disciplinary proceeding was required to afford him due process. ¶ 38 Plaintiff argues defendants did not provide him the process he was due because the adjustment committee report changed the initial disciplinary report, which charged "202 Misuse of State Property" to "202 Damage or Misuse of State Property." However, plaintiff cannot show he was deprived of proper notice of the section of the Department regulations charged as a violation. Further, plaintiff was served with the disciplinary report on April 7, 2008, and the hearing was held on April 13, 2008. Thus, the exhibits show plaintiff received adequate notice of the charges more than 24 hours prior to the hearing as required by due process. ¶ 39 Also, plaintiff cannot claim there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the offense. Due process requires the findings of a prison disciplinary board be supported by "some evidence" in the record to prevent arbitrary deprivations. Knox, 2012 IL App (4th) 110325, ¶ 16, 966 N.E.2d 1233. A disciplinary report alone provides "some evidence" for the disciplinary decision where the report describes the incident in sufficient detail. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). ¶ 40 The correctional officer's report indicated he observed a Qur'an had been flushed down the toilet, causing the main line to clog. The report stated plaintiff admitted flushing the Qur'an. Before the adjustment committee, plaintiff pleaded guilty, stating he flushed some Qur'an inserts or papers down the toilet. There was more than "some evidence" of plaintiff's guilt here, and plaintiff cannot show he was deprived of due process on this offense.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment. ¶ 43 Affirmed.