Opinion
A24-0423
11-20-2024
Van Binsbergen & Associates Inc, Respondent, v. Melissa May Clapp, Appellant.
Lyon County District Court File No. 42-CV-24-104
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Jon Schmidt, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2018, appellant-tenant Melissa May Clapp and respondent-landlord Van Binsbergen &Associates, Inc. entered into a residential lease agreement. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) subsidized Clapp's housing.
2. Clapp obtained an attorney from Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid to help facilitate communication between her and Van Binsbergen. In November 2023, the Legal Aid attorney emailed with Van Binsbergen's Chief Compliance Officer about a possible settlement. The Legal Aid attorney accepted a settlement on Clapp's behalf:
We spoke earlier today and you conveyed through me an offer to Ms. Clapp. Ms. Clapp would like to accept the offer.
The terms of your offer were that Ms. Clapp may stay with her children at [her apartment] in Marshall, MN . . . until
December 31, 2023 if Ms. Clapp pays $364 by December 15, 2023. If she does not pay $364 by December 15, 2023, you will give her a 5 day notice to vacate otherwise you will file an eviction action against her. If Ms. Clapp does not move out by December 31, 2023, you will give her a 5 day notice to vacate otherwise you will file an eviction action against her.(emphasis omitted). Clapp paid the amount due by December 15, 2023, but did not vacate the apartment by December 31, 2023.
3. On January 10, 2024, Van Binsbergen mailed Clapp a "Five Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit." The notice stated that Clapp must pay the full delinquent balance for the unpaid January rent within five days or she needed to vacate the premises. Clapp paid the outstanding balance on January 15, 2024.
4. On January 16, 2024, Van Binsbergen mailed Clapp a document that stated Clapp had five days to vacate the premises or Van Binsbergen would commence an eviction action against her. Clapp did not vacate.
5. Van Binsbergen filed an eviction complaint asserting that Clapp was a holdover tenant and breached the terms of the settlement agreement by failing to vacate the premises by December 31, 2023.
6. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it found, in part, that Van Binsbergen proved by a preponderance of the evidence that "[n]otice to vacate was properly given and [Clapp] failed to vacate said property." The court entered judgment for Van Binsbergen to recover the premises.
7. Clapp appeals. She argues that the district court erred by (1) finding that the notice to vacate was properly served; (2) failing to dismiss the eviction complaint; (3) denying Clapp's requested continuance during the eviction hearing; and (4) not properly appointing counsel under Minn. Stat. § 504B.268, subd. 2 (Supp. 2023). Clapp raises additional arguments related to attorney fees, treble damages, and statutory costs.
8. An eviction action is a summary proceeding "to remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property[.]" Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2022); see Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn.App. 2014) ("Eviction actions are summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate only the limited question of present possessory rights to the property."). On appeal from an eviction judgment, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and we will uphold the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Nationwide Hous. Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Minn.App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2018).
9. We first address Clapp's argument that the district court erred in determining that Van Binsbergen properly served the notice to vacate. Clapp contends Van Binsbergen did not comply with service requirements under federal regulations. See 24 C.F.R. § 247.4(b) (2024). Van Binsbergen contends that we should decline to address the notice issue because Clapp did not present the argument to the district court and did not note it in her statement of the case in this appeal.
10. Contrary to Van Binsbergen's contentions, the record demonstrates that the district court considered the notice issue by making a specific finding that Van Binsbergen proved "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the "[n]otice to vacate was properly given and [Clapp] has failed to vacate said property." In addition, "[t]he statement of the issues contained in an appellant's statement of the case does not limit the reviewability of issues on appeal." May v. May ex. rel. May, 713 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 2006) (quotation omitted). Instead, "[t]he nature of the appeal and the course of the trial court proceedings determine our scope of review." Id. The notice issue is, therefore, properly before us on appeal.
11. Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations applies to HUD-regulated housing. 24 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2024). Section 247.4(b) addresses the service requirements for a notice of termination of tenancy to a tenant residing in HUD-subsidized housing:
The notice provided for in paragraph (a) of this section [Requisites of Termination Notice] shall be accomplished by: (1) Sending a letter by first class mail, properly stamped and addressed, to the tenant at his or her address at the project, with a proper return address, and (2) serving a copy of the notice on any adult person answering the door at the leased dwelling unit, or if no adult responds, by placing the notice under or through the door, if possible, or else by affixing the notice to the door. Service shall not be deemed effective until both notices provided for herein have been accomplished. The date on which the notice shall be deemed to be received by the tenant shall be the date on which the first class letter provided for in this paragraph is mailed, or the date on which the notice provided for in this paragraph is properly given, whichever is later.24 C.F.R. § 247.4(b).
12. The district court did not directly address the two requirements under the federal regulations to effect proper service of a notice in HUD-regulated housing. Instead, the district court broadly found that the notice to vacate "was properly given[.]"
13. In our review, the record shows that Van Binsbergen sent the notice to vacate by certified mail to Clapp's address. At the eviction hearing, Clapp testified that she received the notice by mail and a Van Binsbergen employee testified that the company's procedure for delivering a notice to vacate is to send the notice by certified mail. Therefore, the first federal notice requirement is met. Id.
14. The record does not, however, demonstrate that the notice was appropriately served at Clapp's door as required by the federal regulation. Id. Nothing in the record, either documented or transcribed, supports an implicit finding that a copy of the notice to vacate was handed to any adult person answering Clapp's door, that the notice was placed under or through her door, or that the notice was affixed to her door. As such, the district court's determination that the notice "was properly given" is clearly erroneous because Van Binsbergen did not comply with the second portion of the federal regulation. We must, therefore, reverse the eviction judgment entered in favor of Van Binsbergen.
15. Because we reverse the district court's eviction judgment on the notice issue, we do not reach many of the other issues raised by Clapp that similarly seek reversal of the eviction judgment. We must, however, address Clapp's arguments about attorney fees, treble damages, and statutory costs because these issues may allow for additional relief to Clapp beyond reversal of the eviction judgment.
16. First, Clapp argues that Van Binsbergen is improperly requiring her to pay its attorney fees by masking the fees as rent. There is nothing in this record on appeal, aside from Clapp's assertions, that she has been required to pay Van Binsbergen's legal fees or that Van Binsbergen has billed Clapp for any legal fees associated with the eviction proceeding. And the district court's order makes no mention of an award of attorney fees for either party. "An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities" is forfeited "unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection." Schoepke v. Alexander Smith &Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971). Because the alleged errors are not obvious on mere inspection, Clapp's argument is forfeited.
17. Second, Clapp requests that this court award her treble damages for expenses she alleges resulted from the eviction proceeding. Clapp, however, provides no legal analysis, citation, or support for why she is entitled to such damages and we are unaware of any authority that would support such an award. Appellate courts will not address issues that are inadequately briefed. See State Dep't of Lab. &Indus. by the Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to reach inadequately briefed issue); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.App. 2001) ("Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.").
18. Third, Clapp asserts that she is entitled to statutory costs that allow $200 in costs to a meritorious defendant in a district court proceeding and $300 to the prevailing party on appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 549.02, subds. 1, 2 (2022). Because Clapp did not prevail in the district court action, Clapp was not entitled to the $200 costs which would be awarded for prevailing in district court. Id., subd. 1.
19. But given our reversal, Clapp may be entitled to the $300 statutory costs for prevailing on appeal. Id., subd. 2. Before she can recover such costs, however, Clapp must "serve and file a detailed application for taxation of costs and disbursements with the court administrator" within 45 days of the entry of judgment. Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04 (b). We have not yet entered judgment on the appeal and, as such, the 45 days to apply for taxation of costs has not yet started. Once judgment is entered, Clapp may file and serve an application for the statutory costs within 45 days. Id.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's eviction judgment is reversed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.