Opinion
No. CV 06 5000751-S
July 16, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The matter presented arose out of an automobile accident occurring on December 8, 2005, in North Haven, Connecticut. The plaintiff, Andrew Vallombroso, was operating his vehicle in front of the defendant Rosemary Serfilippi, who was operating her vehicle in front of the defendant Michael Formica. Vallombroso's vehicle was struck twice from behind and he alleges personal injuries and property damage as a result. Formica's vehicle was owned by the defendant Elrac, Inc. (Elrac) and operated permissively by Formica under a lease.
Elrac has moved for summary judgment as to count two of Vallombroso's amended complaint dated January 15, 2008. Count two alleges that "[a]t all times relevant hereto, the defendant, ELRAC, INC., was the owner of the 2004 Dodge automobile which was operated by the defendant, Michael Formica who was a permissive user and within the scope of his authority to operate said vehicle. At all times relevant hereto the defendant, Michael Formica did not maintain an automobile insurance policy. The defendant, ELRAC, INC., is liable to the plaintiff, Andrew Vallombroso for all damages sustained on or about December 8, 2004 pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-154a."
It should be noted that Elrac only states that it is moving "for summary judgment in its favor." It does not indicate which count it is moving for summary judgment on. As count two is the only count to name Elrac as the defendant, it is presumed that Elrac is moving for summary judgment as to this count.
Elrac moves for summary judgment arguing that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 preempts § 14-154a and bars the plaintiff's action for vicarious liability where no independent negligence or criminal wrongdoing is alleged on the part of Elrac. Vallombroso objects, arguing that § 14-154a(b)(1) is a financial responsibility law imposing specific liability limitations of $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident, and that this statute is within the exception found in 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2). Vallombroso admits in his objection that "[i]t is undisputed in this case that the operator of the leased vehicle maintained coverage in the amount of $20,000.00 per person/$40,000.00 per occurrence." Elrac replies that § 14-154a is not a financial responsibility law and not within the 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) exclusion because "the $100,000 insurance coverage permitting relief from vicarious liability is not the financial responsibility or insurance standard necessary to register a motor vehicle or an imposition of liability for failure to meet Connecticut's financial responsibility and liability insurance requirements of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident."
The defendant Amica Mutual Insurance Company's (Amica) has moved for summary judgment as to count four of Vallombroso's amended complaint. Count four alleges that Vallombroso "is entitled to recover uninsured or underinsured benefits pursuant to the terms of his insurance policy and pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. section 38a-336."
Amica moves for summary judgment arguing that "there is no doubt that the vehicle operated by Michael Formica was owned by a self-insurer. As such, there is no coverage provided for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits for such a motor vehicle under the policy at issue and summary judgment should be granted . . ." Vallombroso argues in objection that "the applicability of the exclusions spelled out in Insurance Regulation § 38a-334-6(c), are only applicable if there is coverage in the first instance available to the tortfeasor's vehicle. If the self-insured ELRAC's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, then coverage would not be made available to the plaintiff as it would be an uninsured vehicle . . . [T]here is simply no liability coverage to be exhausted."
ELRAC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) provides: "In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."
49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) provides: "Financial responsibility laws. Nothing in this section supersedes the law of any State or political subdivision thereof (1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle; or (2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law."
General Statutes § 14-154a(a) provides: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damages to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner."
General Statutes § 14-154a(b) provides in relevant part: "The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to: (1) Any person, with respect to the person's lease to another of a private passenger motor vehicle, if the total lease term is for one year or more and if, at the time damages are incurred, the leased vehicle is insured for bodily injury liability in amounts of not less than one hundred thousand dollars per person and three hundred thousand dollars per occurrence and the vehicle is not subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection . . ."
"Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
The case of Dorsey v. Beverly, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5004081 (March 7, 2007, Clarence, J.) [ 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 51], is most directly on point. In Dorsey, the defendant car lessor Elrac, Inc., moved for summary judgment "on the ground that federal law expressly prohibits an action for vicarious liability against a rental car company and Connecticut law requiring minimum insurance coverage does not impose any additional liability on rental car companies." Id. In that case, the plaintiff opposed summary judgment, arguing that the application of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 "is limited by subsection (b) [of] § 30106, which provides that the statute does not supercede each state's financial responsibility laws," and "rental car companies are liable for injuries and damages up to the amount of minimum insurance coverage mandated by General Statutes §§ 38a-334 to 38a-343 because General Statutes § 38a-371 requires an owner of a private passenger car to provide security in accordance with those statutes." Id. The court stated the issue as "whether subsection (b) of § 30106 allows an action against rental car companies by limiting the scope of subsection (a) of § 30106, which expressly prohibits such an action for vicarious liability. The issue involves both the construction of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 and the analysis of Connecticut law imposing financial responsibility or insurance requirements on rental car companies." Id.
General Statutes § 38a-334, entitled "[m]inimum provisions in automobile liability policies," is the general provision requiring the adoption of minimum provisions for automobile liability insurance policies by the Insurance Commissioner.
General Statutes § 38a-343 pertains to notice of cancellation of an automobile insurance policy.
General Statutes § 38a-371 pertains to the mandatory security requirements for owners of private passenger motor vehicles.
In deciding the issue, the court examined "[s]ubsection (b)(1) of § 30106 [which] plainly states that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 does not apply to any state law imposing insurance standards or financial responsibility on owners of a motor vehicle. It merely declares that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 does not affect such state law. Its plain language covers General Statutes § 38a-371 requiring the owner of a private motor vehicle to provide security in accordance with §§ 38a-334 to 38a-343, inclusive. The mere existence of those statutes, however, does not impose liability on rental car companies for any injuries and damages caused by renters' use of their vehicles. Connecticut's insurance statutes place the responsibility to provide minimum security on the owner of the vehicle . . . The minimum amount of motor vehicle insurance coverage that will satisfy this statutory requirement is liability coverage of $20,000 per person for bodily injury or death and $40,000 per accident . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The Dorsey court went on to state that despite that requirement, "[a]n owner of a motor vehicle, such as a car rental company, however, is not required to provide insurance coverage for its renters . . . Moreover, Connecticut insurance regulations permit an insurer of a lessor to exclude entirely any liability coverage for customers of the lessor . . . [S]elf-insured rental car companies [may] refuse to offer liability insurance to their customers . . . Therefore, absent any other grounds for liability, Connecticut General Statutes requiring each owner of a motor vehicle to maintain minimum insurance coverage alone do not impose any liability on rental car companies." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court reiterated that "[s]ubsection (b)(2) of § 30106 permits states to make car rental companies liable for their failure to meet minimum insurance standards or financial responsibility under state law. Research has not revealed, however, any statutory provision or common law imposing liability on rental car companies for such reasons in a way that confers injured parties a right of action against them for any damages or injuries caused by renters' use of rented vehicles . . . In light . . . of the structure and purpose of [ 49 U.S.C. § 30106] as well as the plain meaning of the statute, subsection (b) of § 30106 should not be construed to provide exceptions . . . The primary purpose of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is to [eliminate] [vicarious] liability under state law for an owner of a motor vehicle . . . who is engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles . . . In this context, subsection (b) of § 30106 ensures that rental car companies should still maintain the required state limits of financial responsibility for each vehicle." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court concluded that "[i]f subsection (b) of § 30106 were to be construed to limit the scope of the statute and hold rental car companies liable for any injuries or damages up to the amount of minimum insurance coverage required by state law, the purpose of the statute would be undermined." Id. The court thereby granted summary judgment stating that "there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs seek to impose vicarious liability upon the defendant, pursuant to § 14-154a, and that they do not allege any negligence or criminal wrongdoing by the defendant . . . [A]s a matter of law, Title 49 U.S.C. § 30106 bars this lawsuit against [the defendant Elrac, Inc.]." Id.
In Rodriguez v. Testa, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5002252 (December 11, 2008, Brunetti, J.), the plaintiff alleged vicarious liability for an injury caused by an automobile owned by the defendant automobile leasing company. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 "statutorily excludes the owners of commercially leased vehicles from liability from incidents involving the lessor and the leased vehicle." Id. The plaintiff objected by relying "on General Statutes § 14-154a and the exception to the federal statute preventing liability against the owners of leased vehicles found in 49 U.S.C. § 30106 [(b)(2)] . . ." Id. The plaintiff argued that "§ 14-154a places liability on the owner of a leased vehicle when the lessor does not maintain certain minimum insurance coverage on the vehicles it owns" and that the 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) exception does not preempt state law when the financial responsibility requirements of that state are not met. Id. Citing to Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9, 923 A.2d 673 (2007), and Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006), the court held that the "plaintiff's arguments fail as 49 U.S.C. § 30106 clearly preempts the ability of a party to bring a claim against a lessor for liability for the damage caused by the vehicle and or the lessee . . . [T]here is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff seeks to impose vicariously liability upon [the defendant lessor], pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a, and that the plaintiff does not allege any negligence or criminal wrongdoing by [the defendant lessor]." Id. The court therefore granted summary judgment because 49 U.S.C. § 30106 barred the plaintiff's action against the defendant lessor.
In Ross v. Richardson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5006711 (October 19, 2007, Miller, J.), the plaintiff alleged vicarious liability for an injury caused by a car owned by the defendant Camrac, Inc. The defendant moved to strike the counts against it on the grounds that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 preempts § 14-154a liability. CT Page 12342 Id. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that "the defendant did not comply with the `Financial Responsibility' section of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)" in light of General Statutes § 14-154a(b)(1). Id. Without addressing the substantive arguments, the court held that keeping in line with "[t]he role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike . . . the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint . . . Since the plaintiff did not allege that the plaintiff did not comply with 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) in her complaint, but raised it for the first time in her memorandum of law, this argument cannot be considered by the court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"The law on the question of the effect of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is well settled. Connecticut can no longer impose vicarious liability on the owner of a rented or leased vehicle. See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9[, 923 A.2d 673] (2007); Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1 [, 911 A.2d 315] (2006)." Thompson v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 08 5015497 (October 1, 2008, Tobin, J.).
" 49 U.S.C. § 30106, which became effective for actions commencing after the date of its enactment on August 10, 2005 . . . preemptively eliminated the vicarious liability imposed by § 14-154a." Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9, 923 A.2d 673 (2007).
"[A]s of August 10, 2005, federal law preempts the state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies. 49 U.S.C. § 30106." Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006).
"A review of other Superior Court opinions show that the preemption of . . . § 14-154a(a) lessor liability claims by 49 U.S.C. § 30106 has been upheld . . . Moreover, the preemption of our state statute by the federal act has been recognized by both the Supreme and Appellate courts. See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9[, 923 A.2d 673] (2007); Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668[, 911 A.2d 315] (2006)." Doran v. Rivera, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5014989 (September 22, 2008, Keegan, J.); see also Murrelle v. Sloane, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5008945 (May 19, 2008, Elgo, J.) (granting motion to strike in absence of any allegation that car leasing company was itself negligent or engaged in criminal wrongdoing); Avelino v. Williams, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010476 (May 8, 2008, Elgo, J.) (same); Halligan v. Wallingford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5012748 (April 22, 2008, Corradino, J.) (granting motion for summary judgment and noting plaintiff did not allege claim of negligence or wrongdoing on part of rental car company); Axson v. Graham, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5100859 (February 26, 2008, Martin, J.) (granting motion to strike on same grounds); Mitchell-McKenna v. Tick, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 07 5003558 (January 25, 2008, Shaban, J.) (same); Carmichael v. M.I.B. Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 6000370 (January 11, 2008, Arnold, J.) [ CT Page 12343 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 824] (same for motion for summary judgment); Ruegg v. Allis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 06 5001822 (November 28, 2007, Pittman, J.) [ 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 551] (same for motion to strike); Iljazi v. Dugre, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5002684 (April 13, 2007, Gilligan, J.) [ 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 249] (same).
In the present case, Vallombroso alleges in his amended complaint that Elrac was the owner of the automobile at issue and that Formica was a permissive user who did not maintain an automobile insurance policy. Vallombroso thus claims that Elrac is vicariously liable pursuant to § 14-154a. Vallombroso does not allege that Elrac is liable because of its own direct negligence or criminal actions, nor does Vallombroso allege in his complaint that Elrac failed to meet minimum insurance standards or financial responsibility laws. As the owner of the vehicle at issue who is engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles, Elrac falls within the purview of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), and is thus excluded from vicarious liability under § 14-154a.
In his objection to the motion for summary judgment, Vallombroso later states that "[i]t is undisputed in this case that the operator of the leased vehicle [Formica] maintained coverage in the amount of $20,000.00 per person/$40,000.00 per occurrence."
Vallombroso's argument that § 14-154a(b) is a financial responsibility law that triggers the 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) exclusion from the vicarious liability preemption of § 30106(a) similarly fails. Elrac argues that § 14-154a is not a financial responsibility law and not within the 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b) exclusion because "the $100,000 insurance coverage permitting relief from vicarious liability is not the financial responsibility or insurance standard necessary to register a motor vehicle or an imposition of liability for failure to meet Connecticut's financial responsibility and liability insurance requirements of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident."
In discussing the statutes governing motor vehicle insurance in Connecticut, the Appellate Court has stated that "[t]he minimum amount of motor vehicle insurance coverage that will satisfy this statutory requirement is liability coverage of $20,000 per person for bodily injury or death and $40,000 per accident." Platcow v. Yasuda Fire Marine Ins. Co. of America, 59 Conn.App. 47, 53, 755 A.2d 356 (2000). The Platcow court cited to § 14-112(a), among others, as support for that statutory requirement, stating "General Statutes § 14-112(a) requires proof of financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, any one person, of twenty thousand dollars, or by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, more than one person on account of any accident, of at least forty thousand dollars . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 53 n. 11; see also Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Paradis, 285 Conn. 342, 346-47 n. 6, 940 A.2d 730 (2008) (referring to § CT Page 12344 14-112(a) in the context of Connecticut's financial responsibility law); General Statutes § 35a-371(e) ("An owner of a private passenger motor vehicle . . . shall remain subject to all the obligations of the Financial Responsibility Law, sections 14-112 to 14-133, inclusive"). Thus, Vallombroso has failed to prove that § 14-154a(b) is a financial responsibility law, and his argument that § 14-154a(b) precludes the vicarious liability preemption of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) by way of § 30106(b) is unavailing.
Accordingly, Elrac's motion for summary judgment as to count two of Vallombroso's amended complaint is granted.
II AMICA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As previously stated, the defendant Amica Mutual Insurance Company's (Amica) has moved for summary judgment as to count four of Vallombroso's amended complaint. Count four alleges that at all relevant times Vallombroso "had an automobile insurance policy with the defendant, Amica . . . designated as: 951106-24QN and/or L03200410454D, which policy included coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorists . . . Upon information and belief, the defendant . . . Formica, was insured or underinsured to compensate the plaintiff . . . Vallombroso, fairly for the injuries, losses and damages that he sustained as a result of the accident which is the subject of this lawsuit . . . Vallombroso, is entitled to recover uninsured or underinsured benefits . . . pursuant to the terms of his insurance policy and pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. section 38a-336."
Amica identifies the relevant policy number as 951106-24QN.
Amica moves for summary judgment arguing that "there is no doubt that the vehicle operated by Michael Formica was owned by a self-insurer. As such, there is no coverage provided for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits for such a motor vehicle under the policy at issue and summary judgment should be granted . . ." Amica points to part C as the relevant policy provision. Vallombroso argues in objection that "the applicability of the exclusions spelled out in Insurance Regulation § 38a-334-6(c), are only applicable if there is coverage in the first instance available to the tortfeasor's vehicle. If the self-insured ELRAC's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, then coverage would not be made available to the plaintiff as it would be an uninsured vehicle . . . [T]here is simply no liability coverage to be exhausted."
The defendant Serfilippi filed an objection to Amica's motion for summary judgment, dated June 5, 2009, in which she "wishes to adopt and incorporate by reference" Vallombroso's objection and associated memorandum of law.
"Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is properly granted if the defendant in its motion raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999).
"[T]he established purpose of the uninsured motorist law [is] to provide protection to innocent victims of financially irresponsible drivers . . ." Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169, 176, 286 A.2d 288 (1971). The case of Moreno v. AIG National Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0460230 (July 22, 2003, Licari, J.), examined an issue very similar to the one that is presented in our case. In Moreno, the self-insurer denied coverage and the uninsured motorist policy carrier claimed a self-insured exclusion. Id. The court reasoned that the summary judgment "movant's argument leaves the plaintiff without a remedy where, as here, coverage has been denied because the alleged tortfeasor was an unauthorized user." Id. The court noted that the "rationale behind the permitted exclusion argued by the movant is that an insured is nevertheless protected because a self-insured vehicle owner is presumed to be financially responsible. To allow such an exclusion in the context at hand would frustrate the overriding purpose of our uninsured/underinsured statutory scheme to provide compensation to victims of financially irresponsible motorists. That interest should predominate to trigger uninsured motorist coverage for the plaintiff as a matter of public policy." Id. The court denied the movant's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact to exist as to "whether or not under the policy at hand the movant owes a direct independent legal obligation of coverage to its insured for injuries caused by an uninsured operator . . . No language relied upon by the movant addresses the issue of coverage where even though the subject vehicle was self-insured, coverage has been denied making the alleged tortfeasor an uninsured operator." Id.
Similarly, in Stanlake v. United Services Automobile Ass'n. and Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 94 0357200 (August 10, 1994, Booth, J.) [ 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 299], the court considered "[w]hether a self-insured vehicle could constitute an underinsured or uninsured vehicle for purposes of triggering underinsured or uninsured motor vehicle coverage." The court stated that "the exclusion for uninsured motor vehicles owned by self-insurers, set for in Regulation § 38a-334-6(c)(2)(B) does not operate to extinguish an insurer's obligation to pay uninsured motorist benefits in the event the tortfeasor vehicle is owned by a self-insurer, but instead operates to allow the insurer to factor in any amounts available from the self-insured owner when determining the amount of underinsured motorist benefits owed." Id.
Amica cites to its policy with Vallombroso and the case of Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., 248 Conn. 195, 727 A.2d 700 (1999), as affirming the granting of summary judgment "on the identical grounds raised by this defendant in this case." As noted by the court in Moreno v. AIG National Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0460230, Orkney is distinguishable from the present matter because the plaintiff there was not without a remedy, since she settled her claims against the rental car company for the maximum liability coverage the rental car company agreement provided, unlike the present matter and Moreno, where the plaintiff is without any remedy altogether. Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co., supra, 248 Conn. 198-99.
In the present case, Amica has not cited any language in the automobile insurance policy at issue that "addresses the issue of coverage where even though the subject vehicle was self-insured, coverage has been denied making the alleged tortfeasor an uninsured operator." Moreno v. AIG National Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0460230. As such, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Vallombroso's automobile insurance policy provided by Amica, in particular part C, applies to provide uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in this case. Accordingly, Amica's motion for summary judgment #149 as to count four of Vallombroso's amended complaint is denied.