Opinion
2012-02-9
In the Matter of Florio VALENTINO, Appellant, v. Andrea D. EVANS, as Chair of the New York State Division of Parole, Respondent.
Florio Valentino, Napanoch, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), for respondent.
Florio Valentino, Napanoch, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), for respondent.
Before: MERCURE, Acting P.J., PETERS, LAHTINEN, STEIN and McCARTHY, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered April 11, 2011 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.
In 1987, petitioner brutally stabbed his former girlfriend and her sister, causing his former girlfriend to become a quadriplegic prior to her death three years later and her sister to suffer serious injuries. As a result, he was convicted of the crimes of burglary in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree and six counts of assault in the first degree ( People v. Tatta, 196 A.D.2d 328, 610 N.Y.S.2d 280 [1994], lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 972, 616 N.Y.S.2d 25, 639 N.E.2d 765 [1994] ) and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 13 1/3 to 40 years in prison. In July 2010, petitioner made his seventh appearance before the Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied his request and ordered him held for an additional 24 months. After the determination was affirmed on administrative appeal, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Following service of respondent's answer, Supreme Court dismissed the petition and this appeal ensued.
Petitioner changed his name following his criminal conviction.
We affirm. It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i ( see Matter of Dalton v. Evans, 84 A.D.3d 1664, 1664, 923 N.Y.S.2d 917 [2011]; Matter of Smith v. New York State Div. of Parole, 81 A.D.3d 1026, 1026, 916 N.Y.S.2d 285 [2011] ). Significantly, the Board is not required to articulate every factor considered in making its decision or to accord each factor equal weight ( see Matter of Wright v. Alexander, 71 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 896 N.Y.S.2d 507 [2010]; Matter of Serrano v. Alexander, 70 A.D.3d 1099, 1100, 894 N.Y.S.2d 221 [2010] ). Contrary to petitioner's claim, the record here discloses that the Board complied with the statutory requirements, taking into consideration not only the violent nature of petitioner's crimes and his past criminal history, but also his prison disciplinary record, program accomplishments, educational achievements and postrelease plans ( see Matter of Sutherland v. Evans, 82 A.D.3d 1428, 1429, 918 N.Y.S.2d 679 [2011]; Matter of Mojica v. Travis, 34 A.D.3d 1155, 1156, 824 N.Y.S.2d 497 [2006] ). Nor do we find merit to petitioner's claim that the Board's decision violated the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution. In sum, the Board's decision does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” ( Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982, 405 N.E.2d 225 [1980] ), and we find no reason to disturb it.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.