Opinion
18-CV-04850 (LDH)
2019-09-30
Carmen Luz Mendez VALENTIN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Carmen Luz Mendez Valentin, Pro se. Sean P. Greene, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, Social Security Administration, for Defendant.
Carmen Luz Mendez Valentin, Pro se.
Sean P. Greene, United States Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, Social Security Administration, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
LaSHANN DeARCY HALL, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Carmen Luz Mendez Valentin, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial by Defendant the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") of her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) The Commissioner moves pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 16.)
The following facts are taken from the administrative transcript, cited in this opinion as "Tr." (ECF No. 8.)
I. Non-Medical Evidence
Plaintiff was born in 1951. (Tr. 104, ECF No. 8.) She has a master's degree in education and previously worked as a financial-aid counselor and second-grade teacher. (Tr. 41–42, 47.) Plaintiff reported that she stopped working on December 31, 2010, because of carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand. (Tr. 128.) She further reported that she cannot lift more than three pounds, that she cannot reach or lift very high without pain, and that her right hand hurts when the cyst on it is inflamed. (Tr. 141–42.) She testified that when she writes a lot, her right hand becomes swollen, and she cannot write like she used to. (Tr. 38, 137.) She further testified that she goes to the supermarket every day to buy produce and volunteers at her church from 11:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. (Tr. 38, 40.) However, she reported that she cannot cook like she used to. (Tr. 137.) Her granddaughter does her laundry. (Tr. 40.) Although Plaintiff reported in her application that she had no problems standing, walking, sitting, kneeling, or squatting, she testified that she has pain in her left leg that sometimes prevents her from walking more than two blocks at a time and makes it difficult for her to stand for long periods of time. (Compare Tr. 141–42 with Tr. 36, 42–44.) She also reported that, when climbing stairs, she must hold onto the railing. (Tr. 141.) She treats her hand and leg pain with cinnamon and over-the-counter medication. (Tr. 44.)
II. Medical Evidence
On August 31, 2011, Plaintiff presented to the Coney Island Hospital MPC Clinic (the "Clinic") for an initial medical exam. (Tr. 194.) She complained of "numbness on the fore arm [sic ] and legs" that had lasted "on and off for many months." (Id. ) She also reported not having "see[n] a doctor for a while ... [because] she did not ha[ve] medical problems." (Id. ) At an October 19, 2011 follow-up visit, Plaintiff indicated that the "tingling and numbness in [her] fingers and hands" had been "resolved," and she reported no new complaints. (Tr. 192.) The attending physician noted that Plaintiff's neuropathy had "improved after her job changed limiting strain on her wrists." (Tr. 193.) During visits to the Clinic on September 11, 2012, and May 10, 2013, Plaintiff made no complaints. (Tr. 185, 189.)
On June 2, 2013, Plaintiff presented to the Coney Island Hospital's emergency department complaining of pain that had lasted for four or five days in her back and left lower leg. (Tr. 182.) Dr. Slava Goldstein, D.O., diagnosed Plaintiff with unspecified back pain and ordered an x-ray, which showed no abnormalities apart from mild degenerative changes of the lumbar spine with loss of lumbar lordosis which may have been secondary to muscle spasm or position. (Tr. 184, 208.)
A consultative examination of Plaintiff was performed by Dr. Marisela Gomez, M.D., on November 18, 2015. (Tr. 209–12.) Plaintiff reported a four-year history of pain in her right hand caused by a cyst in the middle of her palm that would swell unpredictably. (Tr. 209.) She also reported intermittent pain in her left leg that prevented her from walking more than two city blocks. (Id. ) Dr. Gomez observed that Plaintiff walked with a normal gait, had a normal stance, used no assistive devices, could walk on her heels and toes without difficulty, could squat fully, needed no help changing for the exam or getting on and off the exam table, and was able to arise from her chair without difficulty. (Tr. 210.) Dr. Gomez further observed that Plaintiff had full range of motion of her shoulders, elbows, forearms, wrists, hips, knees, and ankles bilaterally. (Tr. 211.) Dr. Gomez identified a small, hard, non-tender cyst approximately one-sixteenth of an inch in diameter in Plaintiff's right palm, which was not tender to palpitation. (Id. ) Dr. Gomez did observe increased sensitivity to pinprick in Plaintiff's left lower extremity. (Id. ) She further observed that Plaintiff's hand and finger dexterity were intact, with full grip strength bilaterally. (Id. ) Dr. Gomez diagnosed Plaintiff with right hand pain, left leg pain and weakness, a history of asthma, and a history of heart attack. (Tr. 212.) Dr. Gomez opined that Plaintiff had mild limitation with activities requiring fine manipulation of the hands and mild limitation in walking and standing for long periods. (Id. )
The record does not contain a statement from a treating physician. (Tr. 24.)
III. Plaintiff's DIB Application
Plaintiff applied for DIB on September 25, 2015, alleging disability since January 16, 2011, due to carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand. (Tr. 59, 104–05, 128.) After her application was denied, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative-law judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 66–67.) The hearing was held on June 20, 2017. (Tr. 30–51.) At the hearing, the ALJ advised Plaintiff of her right to a lawyer, and Plaintiff elected to proceed without one. (Tr. 34.) The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (Tr. 32–51.) On August 16, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled through the date she was last insured: March 31, 2016. (Tr. 18–25.) By letter dated September 1, 2017, Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 102.) On June 29, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1–4.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Act, a disability claimant may seek judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to deny her application for benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) ; see also Felder v. Astrue , No. 10-CV-5747, 2012 WL 3993594, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2012). In conducting such a review, the Court is tasked only with determining whether the Commissioner's decision is based upon correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; see also Burgess v. Astrue , 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Shaw v. Chater , 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) ). The substantial-evidence standard does not require that the Commissioner's decision be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Schauer v. Schweiker , 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[A] factual issue in a benefits proceeding need not be resolved in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence ...."). Instead, the Commissioner's decision need only be supported by "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence and by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pollard v. Halter , 377 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) ).
In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's findings, a court must examine the entire record and consider all evidence that could either support or contradict the Commissioner's determination. See Jones ex rel. T.J. v. Astrue , No. 07-cv-4886, 2010 WL 1049283, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010) (citing Snell v. Apfel , 177 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) ), aff'd sub nom. Jones ex rel. Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 432 F. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). Still, a court must defer to the Commissioner's conclusions regarding the weight of conflicting evidence. See Cage v. Comm'r of Social Sec. , 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) ). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, then they are conclusive and must be affirmed. Ortiz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 15-CV-3966, 2016 WL 3264162, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ). Indeed, if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings must be sustained, even if substantial evidence could support a contrary conclusion or where a court's independent analysis might differ from the Commissioner's. See Rosado v. Sullivan , 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Rutherford v. Schweiker , 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982) ); Anderson v. Sullivan , 725 F. Supp. 704, 706 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ; Spena v. Heckler , 587 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
DISCUSSION
To be eligible for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423, a claimant must establish her "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months," and the impairment must be of "such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(2)(A) ; see also Balsamo v. Chater , 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). Additionally, "an applicant must be ‘insured for disability insurance benefits’ " at the time of the time of onset. Kohler v. Astrue , 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Arnone v. Bowen , 882 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1989) ; 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A), 423(c)(1) ).
The Commissioner's regulations prescribe the following five-step framework for evaluating disability claims:
First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [she] is not, the Commissioner next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will consider [her] [per se] disabled .... Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, [she] has residual functional capacity to perform [her] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform [her] past work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to determine whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) ; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
At step one, the ALJ correctly determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between her alleged disability-onset date of January 16, 2011, and the date she was last insured, March 31, 2016. (Tr. 20.) At step two, the ALJ's determinations that, through the date she was last insured, Plaintiff had the severe impairments of a cyst in her right hand and pain in her left leg were supported by substantial evidence, including Dr. Gomez's consultative opinion. (Tr. 20, 212); see Rosier v. Colvin , 586 F. App'x 756, 758 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that substantial evidence supporting ALJ's decision included evaluations by consultative examiner).
In her June 18, 2019 letter in opposition to the Commissioner's motion, Plaintiff states that she suffered a heart attack, recently fainted and underwent surgery to install a pacemaker, and has "a complicated case of allergy." (ECF No. 18.) However, Plaintiff does not give onset dates for any of these conditions, which she did not identify in her disability application or testimony before the ALJ. (See generally Tr. 32–50, 128.) Indeed, the record contains no evidence to suggest that any of these conditions caused Plaintiff any functional limitations during the relevant time period.
At step three, the ALJ determined that, through the date Plaintiff was last insured, her impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or medically exceed the severity of any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 20–21.) With respect to Plaintiff's cyst, the ALJ looked to Listing 1.02. (Tr. 21.) Listing 1.02 regards disability due to major dysfunction of a joint—characterized by gross anatomical deformity and chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of limitation of motion or other abnormal motion of the affected joint, and findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint—with an inability to effectively perform fine and gross movements of the wrist-hand. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.02B. The ALJ correctly found no evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff's right hand impairment met or exceeded the severity of Listing 1.02. (Tr. 21.) Indeed, the medical evidence precludes such a finding. Specifically, Dr. Gomez observed that Plaintiff's hand and finger dexterity were intact, she opined that Plaintiff had only mild limitation with activities requiring fine manipulation of the hands, and an x-ray of Plaintiff's right hand showed no significant bony abnormality. (Tr. 211–12, 213); cf. Britt v. Astrue , 486 F. App'x 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (finding substantial evidentiary support for the ALJ's determination that the claimant had failed to meet the requirements of Listing 1.02 where the medical evidence showed only "very slight degenerative change" in the joint at issue).
With respect to the pain in Plaintiff's left leg, the ALJ looked to Listing 1.03. (Tr. 21.) Listing 1.03 regards reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major weight-bearing joint, with the inability to ambulate effectively, where a return to effective ambulation did not occur within 12 months of onset. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.03. However, there is no evidence that Plaintiff underwent surgery of a major weight-bearing joint in her left leg, and ALJ does not indicate the basis for looking to Listing 1.03. A more appropriate listing may be Listing 1.04C, which regards lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication, established by findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by chronic nonradicular pain and weakness, and resulting in inability to ambulate effectively. Nonetheless, any error was harmless, as both listings incorporate the definition of effective ambulation under Listing 1.00B2b: "an extreme limitation of the ability to walk." The ALJ's determination is supported by Dr. Gomez's observation that Plaintiff walked with a normal gait, used no assistive devices, and could walk on her heels and toes without difficulty; Dr. Gomez's opinion that Plaintiff had only mild limitation in walking and standing for long periods; and Plaintiff's own statements that she goes grocery shopping every day and volunteers at her church for several hours a day. (Tr. 38, 40, 210, 212); cf. Polynice v. Colvin , 576 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (finding substantial evidentiary support for the ALJ's determination that the claimant did not establish inability to ambulate effectively where "[t]he consultative examiner's findings failed to indicate gait abnormalities, and [the claimant] maintained a lifestyle that included performance of household chores and attendance at church and college").
At step four, the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform her past sedentary work as a financial-aid counselor is supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Tr. 21–25.) Specifically, the ALJ's RFC determination is supported by Dr. Gomez's observation of only mild limitations in Plaintiff's abilities to finely manipulate her hands or walk and stand for long periods, Plaintiff's testimony that she shopped for groceries and volunteered daily and that she treated her pain with only cinnamon and over-the-counter medications, and the absence of any evidence of more severe symptoms. (Tr. 38, 40, 44, 212); see Dumas v. Schweiker , 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The Secretary is entitled to rely not only on what the record says, but also on what it does not say."). The ALJ's determination that Plaintiff could perform her past work as a financial-aid counselor is supported by the vocational expert's classification of such position as sedentary. (Tr. 24–25, 45, 48–49.) Specifically, the vocational expert testified that a person with Plaintiff's age and education, who could sit without problems but only occasionally use her dominant hand, could perform the work of a financial-aid counselor as that job is actually performed in the national economy. (Tr. 49.) This was not error. See Heagney-O'Hara v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 646 F. App'x 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (finding ALJ's step-four analysis supported in part by vocational expert's testimony).
Having found that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a financial-aid counselor, the ALJ was not required to proceed to step five. See Stanton v. Astrue , 370 F. App'x 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (holding that the plaintiff was not disabled where the ALJ did not err in finding that she had the RFC to perform her past relevant work); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3) ("If we find that you have the residual functional capacity to do your past relevant work, we will determine that you can still do your past work and are not disabled.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.