We address this issue at the outset because if plaintiff has not incurred damages, she cannot state a claim for breach of warranty. See Volenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973, 773 N.E.2d 1199, 1203 (2002). The Magnuson-Moss Act supports an action against a manufacturer for the failure to comply with the terms of a written or implied warranty.
¶ 13. Furthermore, the circuit court ruled, based on Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 1199 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002), that Mayberry failed to establish she suffered any damages for any breach of warranty. The court reasoned:
However, we will discuss the issue more extensively because the general requirement that a plaintiff have actual, present damages and the rule in section 2-714(2) that damages are measured on the date of acceptance converge in this case. Defendant relies on Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969 (2002), for its contention that plaintiff could not establish "present damages" when he received fair market value when he traded in the Dakota. In Valenti, the plaintiff revoked acceptance after she experienced numerous problems with a new car that she purchased.
Damages Defendant relies on Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App.3d 969, 266 Ill. Dec. 129, 773 N.E.2d 1199 (2002), arguing that plaintiffs cannot prove damages because they sold the vehicle for fair market value. In Valenti, the plaintiff purchased a vehicle, drove it for two-and-a-half years and 17,290 miles before trading in the vehicle.
The measure of damages for a breach of warranty claim is the difference between the value of the property as warranted and the actual value on the day of the breach. Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (2002). "While it is not necessary that damages for breach of warranty be calculated with mathematical precision [citation], basic contract theory requires that damages be proved with reasonable certainty and precludes damages based on conjecture or speculation."
Without damages, there can be no recovery ***." Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973, 773 N.E.2d 1199 (2002). As noted above, plaintiff's proposed testimony properly was excluded and no abuse of discretion by the circuit court was shown.
¶ 6. The trial court agreed, granting Volkswagen's motion. Relying on Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales, 773 N.E.2d 1199 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002), the court concluded that Mayberry could not establish damages because she sold the car for more than fair market value despite its alleged defects. Discussion
A plaintiff must also show damages. Shoop v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 371 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1061, 864 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1st Dist. 2007); accord Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973, 773 N.E.2d 1199, 1203 (1st Dist. 2002). Plaintiffs have met their burden regarding their breach of express warranty claim.
Without damages, there can be no recovery." Kim v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc. 353 Ill. App. 3d 444, 460 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2004) (quoting Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2002)). When damages are precluded as a matter of law, dismissal of the breach-of-warranty claim is appropriate.
Exxon has sufficiently alleged damages caused by Amex's breach of warranty in the amount of $14,913,656. See TAS Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 491 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2007) (when moving for summary judgment on a breach of contract claim "under Illinois law, it is necessary to show damages — not the specific amount, but rather that the plaintiff did, in fact, suffer some damages"); see also Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 773 N.E.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating that plaintiff was "only required to allege that she suffered damages with enough specificity to survive a motion for summary judgment" of her breach of warranty claim). Thus, the Court grants Exxon's Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Amex's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the General Warranty component of Count I.