Mr. Chancey's testimony could be interpreted in such a way that he was in agreement with the content of the letters, but this is not sufficient to support the award of punative damages. It is a well-settled general rule that in order to render a principal liable in exemplary damages for the act of his agent, the agent's act must have been previously authorized by the principal or subsequently ratified. Sorenson Co. v. Bell, (Tex.Civ.App.), 326 S.W.2d 271, (Refused, NRE); Wright v. E-Z Finance Co., (Tex.Civ.App.), 267 S.W.2d 602, (Refused, NRE); Valencia v. Western Compress Storage Co., (Tex.Civ.App.), 238 S.W.2d 591, (Refused, NRE); Strauss v. Dundon, (Tex.Civ.App.), 27 S.W. 503. We conclude there are no pleadings or evidence to support the jury finding awarding exemplary damages against appellant.
It is well established in this jurisdiction as a general rule that in order to render a principal liable in exemplary damages for the act of his agent the agent's act must have been previously authorized by the principal, or subsequently ratified or approved, or the principal must have been guilty of negligence in the employment of the agent. Wright v. E-Z Finance Co., Tex.Civ.App., 267 S.W.2d 602; Valencia v. Western Compress Storage Co., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 591; Lusk v. Onstott, Tex.Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 549; Baker Hotel of Dallas, Inc., v. Rogers, Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 940; Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 69 Tex. 157, 6 S.W. 631; 13 Tex.Jur. 343. In the case now before us appellee did not plead prior authority, or ratification, or negligence by appellant in selecting the employees who were guilty of the act of trespass.
Certainly, Jenkins was not employed in a managerial capacity or neither did the employer or manager ratify or approve his acts. See also the case of Valencia v. Western Compress & Storage Co., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 591, writ refused, N.R.E. We do not believe there is sufficient evidence to establish just what did cause the accident in question but even if the accident were caused by the bumping of Collier's truck by Jenkins' truck, we are unable to see where the appellee was guilty of any act, omission or gross negligence causing the death of Mr. Collier.