Opinion
No. 11-14-00110-CV
04-07-2016
ADRIAN VALENCIA AND ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants v. BILLY J. SULLIVAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21,444
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Billy J. Sullivan brought a forcible detainer action against Adrian Valencia and all occupants because Valencia failed to timely pay rent for 3011 Lakeview Drive in Odessa, Texas. The justice court found in Sullivan's favor, and Valencia appealed to the County Court at Law No. 2 (the trial court). Valencia asserts three issues on appeal. We dismiss.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
Sullivan owned the property at 3011 Lakeview Drive. Valencia proposed to purchase the property, and both signed a letter that Valencia asserted was a purchase and sale agreement for the property. Valencia also claimed that the payments he made in accordance with the agreement were payments for the purchase of the property. Sullivan argued that the letter was not a purchase and sale agreement because, under its express terms, it did not bind him to sell the property to Valencia and did not bind Valencia to purchase the property.
The following language was in the letter:
The purpose of this letter is to set forth some of the basic terms and conditions of the proposed purchase by the undersigned (the "Buyer") of certain real estate owned by you (the "Seller"). The terms set forth in this Letter will not become binding until a more detailed "Purchase Agreement" is negotiated and signed by the parties, as contemplated below by the section of this Letter entitled "Non-Binding."Further, in Section 8 of the letter, the parties provided:
8. NON-BINDING. This Letter of Intent does not, and is not intended to, contractually bind the parties, and is only an expression of the basic conditions to be incorporated into a binding Purchasing Agreement. This Letter does not require either party to negotiate in good faith or to proceed to the completion of a binding Purchase Agreement. The parties shall not be contractually bound unless and until they enter into a formal, written Purchase Agreement, which must be in form and content satisfactory to each party and to each party's legal counsel, in their sole discretion. Neither party may rely on this Letter as creating any legal obligation of any kind. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph to the contrary, Seller and Buyer agree that the above paragraph entitled "Stand Still" shall be binding, regardless of whether a binding Purchase Agreement is entered into by the parties.The letter also contained a provision that Sullivan could not negotiate to sell the property to anyone else before February 9, 2013. If a purchase and sale agreement had not been signed by that date, then the letter provided terms for a monthly lease of the property.
Valencia occupied the property and made rent payments, and Sullivan accepted them. Later, Valencia made neither full nor timely rent payments, and Sullivan told him that he would sell the house to another couple. However, Sullivan also told Valencia that he could still buy the house but that rent payments and a $45,000 down payment had to be paid and that, if not paid by a certain date, Valencia would have to vacate the property. Valencia did not pay the $45,000 and failed to make timely rent payments. Sullivan sent a notice of eviction to Valencia. The forcible detainer action followed.
After the County Court at Law No. 2 had set the case for a trial de novo, Valencia sought and received a continuance. Sullivan subsequently filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court heard the motion and found that Valencia was in default failing to timely pay rent, and it entered judgment awarding immediate possession of the property to Sullivan via a writ of possession. The trial court also awarded Sullivan $2,500 in damages and court costs.
After the trial court had entered the default judgment, Valencia then filed a general denial and response to Sullivan's motion for default. Valencia also filed a motion for new trial and requested that the trial court issue a temporary restraining order to prevent Sullivan from taking possession of the property. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Sullivan moved to have the temporary restraining order dissolved. The trial court heard both the motion for new trial and motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. At the hearing, Valencia asserted that he had paid rent for December 2013 and January 2014 and February 2014 but admitted that he was no longer in possession of the property because he had already been evicted. Sullivan's counsel asserted that Valencia had not timely paid the rent for February 2014. After the hearing, the trial court denied Valencia's motion for new trial and granted Sullivan's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order.
II. Issues Presented
Valencia presents three issues on appeal. First, Valencia asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded possession of the property to Sullivan because there was sufficient evidence that the parties had a purchase and sale agreement and that Valencia was current on his monthly payments of the purchase price for the property. Second, Valencia argues that the trial court erred when it found that the payment made on February 13, 2014, was late because there was insufficient evidence to establish the due date of the payment. Finally, Valencia argues that the trial court erred when it granted the motion for default judgment, denied the appeal, and granted a writ of possession because there was insufficient evidence of the date on which the rent was due.
III. Analysis
An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) (citing Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818-19 (Tex. 1936)). A forcible detainer action is a special proceeding governed by particular statutes and rules. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Rule 510.3(e) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure highlights the limited purpose of a forcible detainer action, in stating that the only issue in a forcible detainer action is "the right to actual possession and not title." TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e).
To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. Judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the right to immediate possession. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (West 2014) (providing that a suit for forcible detainer "does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits"); Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787.
Valencia asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded possession of the property to Sullivan because there was sufficient evidence that the parties had a purchase and sale agreement and because Valencia was current on his monthly payments of the purchase price for the property. Valencia admitted that he was evicted from the property and was no longer in possession. Because possession is not held by Valencia and because the basis for this appeal has ceased to exist, this appeal is moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. In Marshall, the Texas Supreme Court held that a tenant, whose lease had expired and who had vacated the apartment, could not maintain an appeal without a live controversy between the parties. Id. As long as the tenant had a right to current, actual possession of the property, the appeal was viable, but where the lease had expired and the tenant had vacated the apartment, the appeal for the right of possession was moot. Id.
At the time of the final hearing in this case, Valencia was not in possession of the property, as he had been evicted, and the lease upon which he had a right to possession, a month-to-month tenancy, had expired. Valencia claims that Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apartments is applicable to this case. Whitmire v. Greenridge Place Apartments, No. 01-06-00963-CV, 2007 WL 2894167, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Whitmire is not applicable because the tenant remained in possession of the property during the appeal proceedings. Id. In this case, Valencia and the occupants were evicted and do not possess the property. We overrule the first issue presented by Valencia on appeal. Because of our disposition of the first issue, we need not address the remaining issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
IV. This Court's Ruling
We hold that this appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal.
MIKE WILLSON
JUSTICE April 7, 2016 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,
Willson, J., and Bailey, J.